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Foreword 
 
The macroeconomics of EMU is an important and currently relatively intensively studied 
research topic. Anssi Rantala’s doctoral dissertation deals with two sets of issues by adopt-
ing a game-theoretic approach to macroeconomic policy making: First, what is the impact 
of monetary unification on equilibrium unemployment in the presence of strategic wage 
setting, and second, how does the establishment of a monetary union affect the nominal 
wage flexibility and thereby unemployment fluctuations around the equilibrium unem-
ployment rate? In the first essay the author shows that a switch from a flexible exchange 
rate regime to a monetary union will affect macroeconomic performance by falling unem-
ployment if the degree of central bank conservatism in terms of the relative weight of infla-
tion in central bank preferences is sufficiently high. The second essay studies the political 
economy of labour market flexibility in a monetary union by adopting a simple political 
economy approach, in which national governments decide on nominal wage flexibility, but 
face political costs, which increase with the chosen flexibility. Labour market policy coor-
dination tends to increase the chosen level of nominal flexibility under discretionary 
monetary policy. The third essay provides a theoretical justification for establishing 
uniqueness of equilibrium in the model applied in the second essay by using the so-called 
adaptive learning approach of modelling private sector expectations. To conclude, this the-
sis contributes to the emerging literature about the macroeconomics of EMU in several in-
teresting ways.    
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Structures and Growth (RUESG). The aim of RUESG is to conduct theoretical and empiri-
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resources, taxation and econometrics. 
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1 Background
Monetary uniﬁcation in Europe culminated in the launch of Euro banknotes and coins
in January 2002. A common currency among countries has, however, more wide-ranging
eﬀects on the economies than the obvious beneﬁts it brings along to travellers and business
ﬁrms by abolishing exchange commissions and exchange rate uncertainty. The arguments
related to the costs of a common currency are typically based on the theory of optimum
currency areas put forward by Mundell (1961) about forty years ago. The optimum
currency area approach focuses on the impact of asymmetric shocks and the necessary
adjustment mechanisms to counteract them. When countries have independent monetary
and exchange rate policies, the nominal exchange rate can, at least in principle, be used
to restore the labor market equilibrium after an asymmetric shock. If the countries have,
however, adopted a common currency, there are basically two alternative mechanisms,
which keep unemployment from rising in a country hit by an asymmetric negative shock;
either labor mobility between countries has to be considerable, or wages need to be
ﬂexible. Needless to say that Europe seems to be a “Mundellian nightmare” with low
mobility of labor and inﬂexible wage structures.
The critics of the theory of optimum currency areas have pointed out that the ability of
exchange rate changes to absorb asymmetric shocks may be much weaker than the theory
suggests. Moreover, pure exchange rate shocks, that is, exchange rate movements not
driven by fundamentals, or even policy-induced exchange rate shocks are often considered
to be a source of macroeconomic disturbances. Giving up monetary independence can
then be welfare improving, provided that it decreases undesirable exchange rate volatility.
The most often mentioned economic beneﬁts of a common currency are related to
increased international integration of ﬁnancial and product markets. In particular, a
common currency is seen as a stimulus to international trade, which through more ef-
ﬁcient resource allocation will increase per capita output and ultimately welfare. De
Grauwe (2000) oﬀers a comprehensive treatment of both microeconomic and macroeco-
nomic aspects of monetary integration.
The standard cost-beneﬁt analysis of the impact of monetary uniﬁcation lacks an
important aspect. The formation of a monetary union is a fundamental regime change,
which could transform established behavioral relationships in the economy. Focusing on
labor markets, one can argue that the monetary regime will aﬀect the constraints faced by
the labor unions and policy makers, and thereby the unemployment process may change
as well. Calmfors (2001b) provides a thorough survey and an assessment of the literature
on the relationship between monetary uniﬁcation and wage bargaining institutions.
It is instructive to divide the impact of monetary uniﬁcation on unemployment out-
comes through wage setting into two parts. The ﬁrst part deals with the impact on the
equilibrium rate of unemployment. According to a conventional wisdom, money is just
a veil in the long run, and hence monetary regime will not aﬀect equilibrium outcomes
in the real economy. However, it has been shown by e.g. Cukierman and Lippi (1999)
and Soskice and Iversen (2000) that assuming non-atomistic strategically behaving labor
unions will break the long-run neutrality so that the monetary policy strategy will aﬀect
the real economy.1 The second part of the question is related to nominal wage ﬂexibility
and cyclical sensitivity of unemployment around the equilibrium rate. The incentives for
reforms which increase nominal wage ﬂexibility may change with monetary uniﬁcation,
since the agents of the economy realize that the nominal exchange rate can’t anymore
be used to counteract the impact of asymmetric shocks. This has been studied by Sibert
and Sutherland (2000) and Calmfors (2001a).
A careful empirical assessment of the unemployment consequences of the European
Economic and Monetary Union, the EMU in short, will have to wait for some time.
In order to attain any reliable estimates of the impact, one should use long time series
containing several business cycles both before and after the establishment of the EMU.
Hence, while waiting for the data to accumulate, at this point theoretical work still
provides the only feasible way to conduct research on this topic.
This dissertation consists of three theoretical essays that contribute to the literature
on the macroeconomics of monetary union. The essays can be read independently of
each other. Since the topics of the essays are related, some repetition is unavoidable.
The ﬁrst essay (Chapter 2) deals with the impact of monetary uniﬁcation on equilibrium
1
It is noteworthy that money will still be neutral in a sense that, other things equal, including the
central bank’s behavior, changes in the nominal money stock will pass on to prices without aﬀecting any
real variables. See Soskice and Iversen (2000) for an illustration of this point.
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unemployment. The second and the third essays (Chapters 3 and 4, respectively) are
related to nominal wage ﬂexibility and unemployment ﬂuctuations around the equilibrium
rate in a monetary union. The last two essays complement each other so that the third
essay provides a novel theoretical justiﬁcation for establishing uniqueness of equilibrium
in the model applied in the second essay.
All three essays adopt a game-theoretic approach to macroeconomic policy making.
The central bank (or banks, as in the ﬁrst essay) and labor unions are the players of the
game in each essay. In the second essay (Chapter 3) there are also national governments
involved. In the ﬁrst and the second essays the main results are driven by strategic
interactions either between non-atomistic labor unions and the central bank (or banks),
or between national governments and the central bank. The third essay abstracts from
strategic behavior and focuses on the implications of adaptive learning on the stability
of rational expectations equilibria.
The modelling of central bank preferences adopted in this dissertation deviates from
the traditional practice in the literature on monetary policy games in one important
respect. The central bank is assumed to target the equilibrium rate of unemployment in-
stead of having an “over-ambitious” unemployment target which produces the celebrated
inﬂation bias result (see Barro and Gordon (1983)).2 The inﬂation bias model can be seen
as a rather good description of the incentives facing politicians when they are in charge
of monetary policy. If the natural rate is too high from the society’s point of view due to
e.g. imperfections in product and labor markets or distortionary taxation, governments
may be tempted to take the soft option and, instead of implementing politically costly
structural measures, try to use monetary policy to bring down unemployment. However,
when monetary policy is delegated to an independent central bank, there seems no rea-
son whatsoever for the central bank to target anything other than the natural rate (for
discussion on this point, see Blinder (1998)).
This monetary policy framework, where the central bank is concerned about keeping
inﬂation, and inﬂation expectations, low and stable and at the same time striving to limit
cyclical swings in resource utilization, has been referred to as constrained or enlightened
discretion (see e.g. Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) and Blinder (1998)). It can be said
that constrained discretion has become the standard approach to monetary policy in the
industrialized countries. In particular, the increasingly popular policy framework known
as inﬂation targeting can also be interpreted as constrained discretion rather than a strict
rule.
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To be precise, the model utilized in the second and the third essays makes a distinction between the
“long-run” and the “short-run” natural rate of unemployment. In the baseline model the central bank
targets the long-run natural rate. An extension considers also the short-run natural rate as a target.
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Below follows brief summaries of the three essays in the order of their appearance.
2 Strategic Wage Setting and Equilibrium Unem-
ployment in a Monetary Union
The ﬁrst essay (Chapter 2) investigates the impact of the formation of a monetary union
on equilibrium unemployment in the presence of strategic wage setting. According to
the natural rate hypothesis developed by Phelps (1967) and Friedman (1968), monetary
regime is neutral in the long run, and the equilibrium rate of unemployment is determined
only by real factors of the economy. The voluminous literature on monetary policy games
initiated by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) combines the
natural rate hypothesis with rational expectations and analyzes the optimal behavior of
the policy makers with well-known results. Only inﬂation depends systematically on the
conduct of monetary policy, and due to shocks in the economy unemployment ﬂuctuates
around an exogenous natural rate. Hence, equilibrium unemployment should not be
aﬀected by the establishment of a monetary union, which is just a change of monetary
regime.
Recent research by Grüner and Hefeker (1999) and Cukierman and Lippi (2001) sug-
gests, however, that in the presence of non-atomistic labor unions a non-neutrality result
of monetary uniﬁcation emerges due to strategic interaction between labor unions and
monetary authorities. In particular, these contributions show that the establishment of
a monetary union will increase both unemployment and inﬂation, provided that national
labor unions are “inﬂation averse”. An inﬂation averse labor union refers to a one which
is, in addition to having traditional real wage and unemployment targets, also concerned
about inﬂation per se. Inﬂation aversion moderates wage claims and lowers unemploy-
ment under national monetary policy, because unions are willing to compromise over the
real wage target in order to reduce inﬂation. In a monetary union this moderating ef-
fect will be smaller and unemployment will rise. This argument, however, hinges on two
somewhat questionable assumptions; the existence of both inﬂation aversion and inﬂation
bias are crucial for the outcome. If either one is missing, monetary uniﬁcation will have
no eﬀect on unemployment.
In this essay, it is shown that in a model with open-economy spillovers, a switch from a
ﬂexible exchange rate regime to a monetary union will aﬀect macroeconomic performance,
even though national labor unions are not averse to inﬂation, and there is no inﬂation
bias. In particular, it is shown that unemployment will fall, provided that the degree of
central bank conservatism is suﬃciently high, whereas with low degrees of conservatism
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unemployment increases. Conservatism refers here to the relative weight of inﬂation in
the central bank preferences.
The mechanism behind the non-neutrality result is related to international spillovers
created by imperfect substitutability between goods produced in diﬀerent countries. Due
to imperfect substitutability, the labor union’s wage claim will aﬀect the real exchange
rate, which in turn inﬂuences consumer prices and real consumer wages. The strength of
the union’s ability to aﬀect the real exchange rate depends on the monetary regime, and
under a ﬂexible exchange rate also on the preferences of the monetary authorities toward
inﬂation and unemployment. Monetary regime will aﬀect the labor union’s perceived real
wage—unemployment tradeoﬀ through the real exchange rate channel. In other words, the
real consumer wage elasticity of labor demand is endogenous in the model. In this respect
the model is similar to Holden’s (2003) model with traded and non-traded sectors, where
the impact of monetary regime on wage setting is transmitted via labor demand elasticity.
Interestingly enough, relative to the ﬂexible exchange rate regime, the inﬂexibility of the
common monetary policy in responding to a country speciﬁc wage increase is good news
in terms of unemployment if the central bank is conservative, whereas it is bad news if
the central bank is fairly liberal.
This essay oﬀers insights for desirable policy choices in a monetary union where labor
unions have a strategic position. The analysis suggests that when a monetary union is
established, it is possible to attain a lower rate of equilibrium unemployment by delegat-
ing monetary policy to a suﬃciently conservative central bank. It can be argued that
in Europe the creation of the EMU has increased the eﬀective degree of central bank
conservatism in most member countries. Hence, one could speculate that the EMU may
well have positive eﬀects on equilibrium unemployment in these countries.
3 Labor Market Flexibility and Policy Coordination
in a Monetary Union
The second essay (Chapter 3) investigates the political economy of labor market ﬂexibility
in a monetary union. Labor market ﬂexibility is often suggested as a remedy for European
unemployment problems. Recently the EU Council (2002) urged the member countries
on to continue implementing further structural reforms to improve the functioning of the
European labor market, and to examine the possibility of introducing more ﬂexible labor
contract types into their national law. There seems to be a consensus of opinion that
ﬂexible labor markets are especially important in a monetary union, such as the EMU,
where some shocks to the economy are very likely asymmetric so that only some regions
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or countries of the monetary union area are aﬀected. Labor mobility in the EMU is
relatively low, partly due to cultural diﬀerences and language barriers, so one can’t count
much on mobility as a shock absorber mechanism (see OECD (1999)). National ﬁscal
policy could in principle be used as a macroeconomic stabilization tool, but acknowledging
that due to political biases ﬁscal policy tends to err on the lax side has led to a general
perception that discretionary ﬁscal policy should be restricted by rules limiting the size
of government deﬁcits.
What are the factors which determine the ﬂexibility of the national labor markets
in a monetary union, and what can policy makers do in order to promote ﬂexibility?
This essay attempts to give at least partial answers to these questions by adopting a
simple political economy approach, in which national governments decide on nominal
wage ﬂexibility, but face political costs which are increasing in the chosen level of ﬂex-
ibility. This setup can be seen as a simpliﬁcation of a complicated process where labor
market institutions must be designed and legislation must be enacted in a parliamentary
process. In particular, this essay studies the role of international labor market policy
coordination in the determination of ﬂexibility. The motive for coordination comes from
the fact that governments can attain a strategic position vis-à-vis the central bank by
coordinating their actions. In the European Union, there has been eﬀorts to increase
coordination in labor market issues. Policy coordination intensiﬁed with the 1997 Ams-
terdam Treaty, which declares that member states shall treat employment “as a matter
of common concern, and shall coordinate their action”.
It is well established empirically that the unemployment rate is highly persistent (see
e.g. Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991, Ch. 9)). Adding unemployment persistence to a
standard Barro and Gordon (1983) natural rate model was ﬁrst made by Lockwood and
Philippopoulos (1994), and further results were derived by Svensson (1997) and Lock-
wood, Miller and Zhang (1998). They pointed out that in the presence of unemployment
persistence discretionary monetary policy leads to a new problem, that is, a stabilization
bias emerges. Inﬂation variability is too high and unemployment variability is too low
from the society’s point of view. This ineﬃcient stabilization performance will turn out
to play an important role in the analysis of ﬂexibility.
The main result of this essay shows that labor market policy coordination between
member country governments tends to increase the chosen level of nominal wage ﬂexibility
under discretionary monetary policy. The intuition behind this result is simple. The
ﬂexibility choice under coordination interacts with the stabilization properties of the
economy through the common monetary policy. In particular, coordination internalizes
the beneﬁt of reduced stabilization bias of monetary policy, which is brought about by
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increased labor market ﬂexibility. Since the impact of coordination on the chosen level of
ﬂexibility is related to stabilization properties, it follows that coordination is redundant
provided that stabilization of shocks optimal. Therefore, if the central bank has access
to a commitment technology, or there is no real persistence in the economy, coordination
outcome coincides with the one obtained under national decision making.
As an extension to the basic model the essay considers an alternative unemployment
target for the central bank and its implications for labor market ﬂexibility and coordina-
tion. As in Svensson (1997) and Røisland (2001), the central bank is assumed to target
the short-run natural rate, which results in stabilization bias in the opposite direction
than in the baseline model. In this case international coordination of labor market poli-
cies is shown to result in less ﬂexible markets than national decision making, since lower
ﬂexibility calls for a stronger monetary policy reaction to production shocks, thereby
pushing stabilization closer to the optimum. Another extension qualiﬁes some results of
Calmfors (2001a), where it was shown that labor market ﬂexibility tends to be higher
when a country is inside a monetary union than when it has an independent monetary
policy. It turns out that this is not necessarily the case when unemployment persists,
since like under policy coordination in a monetary union, under an independent mone-
tary policy the government is in a strategic position and has an incentive to choose more
ﬂexible markets in order to improve on stabilization properties of the economy.
4 Adaptive Learning and Multiple Equilibria in a
Natural Rate Model with Unemployment Persis-
tence
The formation of the EMU in Europe was a major regime shift in economic policy.
Monetary policies were quite diﬀerent in the member countries before the EMU. The
one-size-must-ﬁt-all monetary policy brought about by the EMU is a signiﬁcant change in
the economic environment, and it seems quite plausible to assume that the private sector
agents don’t immediately know all new parameter values, for example the preferences of
the common central bank, which aﬀect the economy. Therefore, rational expectations
is a particularly strong assumption in this kind of situation, and some sort of bounded
rationality may provide a much more realistic starting point in thinking of the behavior
of the agents
The third essay (Chapter 4) demonstrates that adaptive learning approach of mod-
elling private sector expectations can be used as an equilibrium selection mechanism in
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a natural rate model augmented with unemployment persistence, which is applied in the
second essay (Chapter 3). The starting point in the analysis of adaptive learning in
macroeconomics is that some or all agents have imperfect knowledge about the struc-
ture of the economy. The agents rely on an econometric learning technology to form
expectations and continuously update their estimates on the structure of the economy
based on incoming data. Evans and Honkapohja (2001) oﬀer a comprehensive treatment
of learning in macroeconomics. Recent years have witnessed a surge of interest in the
application of adaptive learning approach on the analysis of monetary policy (see Evans
and Honkapohja (2003) for a recent survey of the literature).
Lockwood and Philippopoulos (1994) showed that when unemployment rate is per-
sistent, there are two rational expectations equilibria in a natural rate monetary model.
One is associated with low inﬂation and intuitive comparative statics properties, and the
other with high inﬂation and counter-intuitive comparative statics properties. This essay
shows that only one of the two rational expectations equilibria is stable under adaptive
learning, and that it is always the low inﬂation equilibrium with intuitive comparative
statics properties, which is learnable.
In the earlier contributions which use the natural rate model with real persistence two
solutions to the multiple equilibria problem have been adopted. The ﬁrst solution is to
ignore the “bad” high inﬂation equilibrium by appealing to counter-intuitive comparative
statics properties, and to the fact that the high inﬂation equilibrium appears only in the
inﬁnite horizon model. The second solution treats the two equilibria more equally and
considers both cases as being the possible outcomes of the model. This essay proposes
a third solution to this problem, namely the use of adaptive learning as a selection
tool. Hence, this essay provides a more elegant justiﬁcation in a theoretical sense for
focusing on the low inﬂation equilibrium than the ﬁrst approach, where the high inﬂation
equilibrium was ignored mainly because of its unpleasant characteristics. In addition
to being an independent contribution, this essay thereby complements the second essay
(Chapter 3), where the high inﬂation equilibrium was ignored in the analysis.
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Chapter 2
Strategic Wage Setting and Equilibrium
Unemployment in a Monetary Union
Abstract
This essay investigates the impact of the formation of a monetary union on
equilibrium unemployment in a two-country monetary model with strategic wage
setting and open-economy spillovers. It is shown that the monetary regime aﬀects
the tradeoﬀ between real consumer wages and unemployment faced by the labor
unions. Consequently, the equilibrium rate of unemployment is endogenous and
depends on the monetary regime. In particular, a switch from a ﬂexible exchange
rate regime to a monetary union reduces unemployment, provided that the degree
of central bank conservatism is suﬃciently high, whereas with low degrees of con-
servatism unemployment rises. This non-neutrality result of a monetary union does
not depend on the existence of an inﬂation bias, that is, the outcome is unchanged
even though the central banks target the equilibrium rate of unemployment.
1 Introduction
This essay investigates the impact of the formation of a monetary union on equilibrium
unemployment. The outcome of the analysis seems to be obvious for a well-trained
economist. According to the natural rate hypothesis developed by Phelps (1967) and
Friedman (1968), monetary policy is neutral in the long run and the equilibrium rate of
unemployment is determined only by real factors of the economy. A large literature on
monetary policy games initiated by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon
(1983) combines the natural rate hypothesis with rational expectations and analyzes the
optimal behavior of the policy makers with well-known results. Only inﬂation depends
systematically on the conduct of monetary policy, and due to shocks in the economy
unemployment ﬂuctuates around an exogenous equilibrium (or natural) rate. Hence,
equilibrium unemployment should not be aﬀected by the establishment of a monetary
union, which is just a change of monetary regime. Recent research suggests, however,
that in the presence of non-atomistic labor unions a non-neutrality result of monetary
11
policy emerges due to strategic interaction, and the conservatism of the central bank
will have a systematic eﬀect on equilibrium unemployment.1 This has been shown e.g.
by Cukierman and Lippi (1999), Lippi (2002), Soskice and Iversen (2000) and Coricelli,
Cukierman and Dalmazzo (2000, 2001).
Recent papers by Grüner and Hefeker (1999) and Cukierman and Lippi (2001) analyze
the eﬀects of a monetary union on economic performance in a model with strategic
wage setting. They show that the establishment of a monetary union will increase both
unemployment and inﬂation, provided that national labor unions are “inﬂation averse”,
i.e. in addition to traditional real wage and unemployment targets labor unions are also
concerned about inﬂation per se. Inﬂation aversion moderates wage claims and lowers
unemployment, because unions are willing to compromise over the real wage target in
order to reduce inﬂation. In a monetary union each union perceives that its wage demand
will have a smaller eﬀect on inﬂation, which makes unions more aggressive in wage setting.
Higher real wages lead to higher unemployment through reduced demand for labor. This
argument, however, hinges on the assumed inﬂation aversion of the labor unions. Absent
that, monetary union has no eﬀect on unemployment and inﬂation.2 It is noteworthy
that the analysis rests on the assumed inﬂation bias problem of monetary policy. If the
central bank targeted the equilibrium rate of unemployment, there would be no inﬂation
bias and so labor unions’ incentives for wage restraint because of excess inﬂation would
be absent.
In this essay, it is shown that in a model with open-economy spillovers, a switch from a
ﬂexible exchange rate regime to a monetary union will aﬀect macroeconomic performance,
even though national labor unions are not averse to inﬂation and all structural parameters
of the model remain unchanged. In particular, it is shown that unemployment will fall,
provided that the degree of central bank conservatism is suﬃciently high, whereas with
low degrees of conservatism unemployment increases. Importantly, and unlike in the
previous contributions, the real eﬀects of a monetary union are present independent of
the inﬂation bias problem.
In an earlier version of this essay (Rantala (2001)) it was shown that inﬂation will
increase when a monetary union is established, provided that the central banks both
before and after monetary uniﬁcation have an over-ambitious unemployment target, which
1
The term “conservatism” will be used to describe the relative weight of inﬂation deviations from the
target in the central bank’s objective function. Elsewhere in the literature “independence” is occasionally
used interchangeably with conservatism (see e.g. Cukierman and Lippi (1999)). Berger, de Haan and
Eijﬃnger (2001) discusses the diﬀerence between the two concepts.
2
Cukierman and Lippi (2001) show that monetary union will have real eﬀects even without inﬂation
aversion, if there are more than one labor union in each country. But, an inﬂation bias is needed in order
to generate these real eﬀects.
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results in inﬂation bias. These results are not reproduced here, since the purpose of the
essay is to highlight the fact that inﬂation bias is unnecessary for the real eﬀects of
a monetary union to emerge in this model setup. Moreover, as monetary policy is in
most industrialized countries delegated to an independent central bank, it is diﬃcult to
understand why the central bank would target anything other than the equilibrium rate
of unemployment.3,4
The model framework is similar to a simple two-country monetary model with national
labor unions studied in Jensen (1993, 1997). The model focuses on international spillovers
via the real exchange rate. Each country is specialized in the production of a traded
good, which are imperfect substitutes in consumption. Both goods are consumed in both
countries, and their relative demand depends on the relative price between the two goods.
Imperfect substitutability between the two goods creates two policy spillovers. First,
in a ﬂexible exchange rate regime national central banks can aﬀect the real exchange
rate with their policies, and thus their actions will have repercussions in both countries.
This policy spillover implies that monetary policies are interdependent. The central bank
behavior is modelled as a non-cooperative simultaneous move game. Once the monetary
union is established, the common central bank has only one policy instrument, the area-
wide money supply. Therefore, it can’t aﬀect the real exchange rate between the two
countries. Second, national labor unions choose their nominal wages before monetary
policies are set, and their wage setting will also aﬀect the real exchange rate.5 Obviously,
assuming that the labor unions are so large that their actions will aﬀect macroeconomic
variables is crucial, since this assumption creates a strategic role for the labor unions in
the model. The strength of the labor unions’ ability to appreciate the real exchange rate
with their nominal wage claims will depend on the monetary regime as well as central
bank conservatism. Due to the above mentioned spillovers, monetary regime will in
general aﬀect the real wage—unemployment tradeoﬀ faced by the labor unions, i.e. the
real consumer wage elasticity of labor demand is endogenous in the model. It follows that
the equilibrium rate of unemployment is endogenous as well, and depends, among other
things, on the chosen monetary regime. Holden (2003a) shows that monetary regime
3
For discussion, see e.g. Blinder (1998).
4
Rantala (2001) also analyzes an alternative starting position for a monetary union, namely an asym-
metric credibly ﬁxed exchange rate regime. An asymmetric ﬁx can be thought as a simple and crude
description of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in Europe (see e.g. Lane (2000)). A similar exercise
is conducted in Grüner and Hefeker (1999) and Cukierman and Lippi (2001) without explicitly modelling
the exchange rates between the countries. However, realignments of the parity rates were actually quite
common in the ERM, and so modelling the ERM as a credible commitment, like in all contributions
above, is somewhat problematic.
5
The real exchange rate motive for wage increases in models without monetary authorities is studied
e.g. in Driﬃll and van der Ploeg (1993) and Rama (1994).
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aﬀects the real wage—employment tradeoﬀ in a small open economy with tradable and
non-tradable goods sectors.
Although the model speciﬁcation is closely related to that of Grüner and Hefeker
(1999), the mechanism behind the results is completely diﬀerent. In their model, pur-
chasing power parity is assumed to hold, and therefore economic performance under a
ﬂexible exchange rate is solely determined by domestic policy actions. In a monetary
union each labor union thus becomes smaller in a sense that their wage claims will have a
smaller eﬀect on inﬂation. As mentioned above, this makes labor unions more aggressive
in a monetary union provided that they are inﬂation averse. In this essay the “size eﬀect”
is absent. In contrast, due to the spillover eﬀects, both domestic and foreign wages aﬀect
the economic performance in both countries even in a ﬂexible exchange rate regime. The
only change in the strategic environment of the labor unions is the replacement of the
national central banks by a common central bank. It follows that policy targets as well
as policy instruments of the monetary policy authorities will be diﬀerent in a monetary
union. It is thereby quite intuitive that the monetary policy reaction to a unilateral
wage increase by one labor union will change as well. The strategic interaction between
labor unions and the monetary authorities is thereby transformed and optimal wage set-
ting behavior will be aﬀected. Macroeconomic consequences of a monetary union are
a priori ambiguous in the model, but as mentioned, they will depend on central bank
conservatism.
Monetary union is an extreme form of monetary policy cooperation.6 In the literature
cooperation usually means that central banks set their policy instruments jointly so as
to maximize (or minimize) a weighted average of their policy objectives. Rogoﬀ (1985b)
showed that monetary policy cooperation can be counterproductive in the presence of
domestic credibility problems. In a ﬂexible exchange rate regime monetary policies are
constrained by fears of inﬂationary real exchange rate depreciation. In a cooperative
policy regime this real exchange rate eﬀect is internalized. Therefore monetary policies are
more expansionary and inﬂation will be higher. Monetary union diﬀers from a cooperative
policy regime in one important respect. A common central bank has only one policy
instrument available. This is a crucial diﬀerence in a setup with large wage setters. In a
cooperative regime, a unilateral wage increase by one national labor union will induce an
asymmetric response from the two central banks, as long as the immediate eﬀects of the
wage increase in the two economies are asymmetric. However, when a common central
bank faces a unilateral wage increase in one member country, its policy will, by deﬁnition,
be symmetric. Jensen (1993) analyzes monetary policy cooperation in a similar model
6
For a comprehensive survey on international policy coordination, see Persson and Tabellini (1995).
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framework as used in this essay, and shows that in a cooperative regime unemployment
is always higher than in a ﬂexible exchange rate regime.7
The focus of this essay is on the direct eﬀect of a monetary union on equilibrium
unemployment through changes in the strategic interaction between central banks and
labor unions. There are at least three additional channels through which equilibrium
unemployment might be aﬀected.
First, monetary integration may enhance product market integration and thus also
competition via lower transaction costs, the disappearance of the exchange rate risks
and easier price comparisons between countries. This has been a common argument
in policy debates concerning the eﬀects of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)
in Europe. Intensiﬁed competition in the product markets improves employment in two
ways. Labor demand becomes more elastic with respect to wages, and ﬁrms’ mark-ups are
reduced. The eﬀects of increased competition in the product markets in the presence of
unionized labor markets has been analyzed by Coricelli, Cukierman and Dalmazzo (2000,
2001). They show that both unemployment and inﬂation are reduced when competition
increases. However, as e.g. Burda (1999) and Calmfors (2001b) point out, it is not
clear that increased product market integration will foster competition. On the contrary,
integration may help multinational companies to penetrate the markets, and therefore
competition can actually decrease.
Second, incentives for labor market reforms can be aﬀected by the establishment of a
monetary union.8 This has been analyzed by Sibert and Sutherland (2000) and Calmfors
(2001a). Here, reform refers to any structural measure in the labor markets which reduces
the equilibrium rate of unemployment. The government can choose the level of reform
before labor unions set their wages and before monetary policy is set. The reform lowers
the equilibrium rate of unemployment, but it entails a political cost to the government.
This cost can arise for various reasons, e.g. the reform reduces real wages or because
workers value labor market institutions intrinsically. The main argument of these papers
is intuitive. In a country which is not a member of a monetary union, choosing a low
level of reform implies that unemployment is high. In addition, in the presence of an
inﬂation bias, inﬂation will be high as well. If the government chooses a low level of
reform in a monetary union, the ﬁrst eﬀect is obviously the same. However, the second
eﬀect is reduced. High unemployment in one member country has only a small eﬀect
on the area-wide average level of unemployment. The common central bank cares about
the average level of unemployment, and thus the marginal eﬀect of high unemployment
7
Monetary policy cooperation with inﬂation averse labor unions is treated in Jensen (1997).
8
Saint-Paul (2000) oﬀers a comprehensive analysis and discussion on the political economy of labor
market reforms.
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in one member country on the inﬂation bias will be smaller in a monetary union. The
government’s incentives for labor market reform are thereby reduced in a monetary union
and the chosen level of reform will be lower.
Third, labor unions’ incentives for coordinated wage bargaining may be aﬀected. The
impact of wage bargaining institutions on macroeconomic outcomes is a subject of a vo-
luminous literature.9 Both theoretical and empirical studies generally point to a direction
that a high level of centralization of wage bargaining is associated with lower unemploy-
ment than intermediate levels of centralization. The structure of wage bargaining is,
however, usually exogenous to the model. Holden (2003b) shows that monetary regime
may aﬀect the labor unions’ incentives to coordinate their wage setting and thereby aﬀect
equilibrium unemployment as well. Provided that a strict central bank disciplines large
labor unions so that their wage claims are reduced, a membership in a monetary union
may induce a more aggressive wage policy, because labor unions realize that monetary
policy will not react as strongly as before, since each union is smaller relative to the
central bank. Higher real wages in turn lead to higher unemployment via reduced de-
mand for labor. As the outcome of an uncoordinated wage bargaining becomes worse in
a monetary union, the incentives for labor unions to voluntarily coordinate their actions
at the national level are stronger. Hence, if the national central bank has a strict policy,
e.g. an inﬂation target, the country’s entry into a monetary union may induce large
labor unions to coordinate wage setting, which leads to real wage restraint and lower
equilibrium unemployment.
The essay is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model setup. The model is
solved and equilibrium unemployment in both monetary regimes is derived in Section 3.
Finally, Section 4 analyzes the impact of the formation of a monetary union on equilibrium
unemployment. Section 5 studies two special cases where monetary regime is irrelevant
for unemployment determination. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 The Basic Structure
The model speciﬁcation in a ﬂexible exchange rate regime follows that of Jensen (1993,
1997), which is a variant of the standard two-country monetary model studied in Can-
zoneri and Henderson (1988, 1991). Jensen’s model is extended to cover the case of a
monetary union.
9
For a survey see e.g. Calmfors et al. (2001, Ch. 5).
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There are two equal sized countries, each specialized in the production of a traded
good.10 All variables are in natural logarithms and foreign variables are denoted with an
asterisk. Throughout the essay it is assumed that all structural and policy parameters
are equal across countries.
Home and foreign output supplies, denoted by y and y∗, are deterministic functions
of employment levels, l and l∗, subject to decreasing returns to scale
y = αl, y∗ = αl∗, (1)
where 0 < α < 1. Labor is assumed to be immobile between countries and supplied
inelastically. At least from a European perspective, immobile labor seems a reasonable
starting point for the analysis, since labor mobility between countries is still quite modest
(see e.g. OECD (1999)).
Goods markets are characterized by perfect competition. Proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms
employ labor up to the point at which real product wages are equal to marginal products
of labor
w − p = − (1− α) l, w∗ − p∗ = − (1− α) l∗, (2)
where nominal wages are denoted by w and w∗, while p and p∗ are the product prices of
home and foreign countries respectively.11 Denoting full employment in both countries
as l and normalizing it to zero it is possible to deﬁne the unemployment rate as12
u = l − l = −l, u∗ = l − l∗ = −l∗. (3)
Relative output demand is a function of the real exchange rate, z
y − y∗ = δz, (4)
where the parameter δ > 0 can be interpreted as indexing the degree of substitutability
between home and foreign goods. A large value of δ implies that the two goods are close
10
Obviously, a more satisfactory model of a monetary union would be an n-country model where some
subset of countries would form a monetary union. This benchmark case is considered for analytical
simplicity. Canzoneri and Henderson (1991) present also a three-country version of their model, and
Buiter, Corsetti and Pesenti (1995) construct an (n+ 1)-country center-perifery model in order to analyze
the collapse of the ERM.
11
The marginal product of labor is actually w − p = lnα − (1− α) l, but the constant is omitted for
notational simplicity.
12
Strictly speaking, this deﬁnition of u only approximates the standard deﬁnintion u =
(
L− L
)
/L =
1−
(
L/L
)
, where L refers to employment and L to labor force. Rewriting this expression as 1−u = L/L,
taking logs on both sides and using the approximation log (1− u) ≈ −u and the normalization l = 0
mentioned in the text, one obtains u ≈ −l.
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substitutes, and therefore a small change in the real exchange rate brings about a large
change in relative demand.
The real exchange rate is deﬁned as the relative price of the foreign good in terms of
the domestic good, expressed in home country currency
z = e+ p∗ − p, (5)
where the nominal exchange rate, denoted by e, is the domestic price of foreign currency.
Hence, a decrease in z implies that domestic currency appreciates in real terms. By
deﬁnition, in a monetary union (the log of) the nominal exchange rate is zero, and the
real exchange rate is simply
z = p∗ − p. (6)
Assuming that the underlying preferences over consumption are Cobb-Douglas with
a constant share of imports, β, the domestic and foreign consumer price indices (CPIs)
are given by
π = (1− β) p+ β (e + p∗) = p+ βz, (7)
π∗ = β (p− e) + (1− β) p∗ = p∗ − βz. (8)
The value of β is restricted to lie in the interval 0 < β < 1
2
, which is equivalent to
assuming a home bias in consumption.13 It seems that this is a rather mild restriction, as
there is a large empirical literature on the home bias in trade showing that people indeed
have a strong preference for consumption of their home country goods.14
Under ﬂexible exchange rates money demand is assumed to be proportional to nominal
income and only domestic residents hold domestic money. The money markets are in
equilibrium when nominal money supplies, m and m∗, satisfy simple quantity equations
m = p+ y, m∗ = p∗ + y∗. (9)
In a monetary union there is only one currency, which is held by the residents of both
countries. Monetary equilibrium requires that union-wide money demand equals union-
wide money supply. Following Lane (1996), money demand is proportional to average
13
This is a common assumption in the open-economy macro literature, see. e.g. Buiter, Corsetti and
Pesenti (1995), Lane (1996, 2000) and Zervoyianni (1997).
14
See e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000) and references therein.
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nominal income of the member countries
mu =
1
2
(p+ y) +
1
2
(p∗ + y∗) , (10)
where mu is the union-wide money supply. It is assumed that the common money supply
is spread out equally on both member countries, and thus the common central bank can’t
aﬀect the distribution of money supply across countries.
2.2 Labor Union and Central Bank Preferences
In each country there is a single monopoly union, which sets the nominal wage rate strate-
gically, that is, the union takes into account the following reactions from the monetary
authorities. Unions’ utility functions are given by
U = γ (w − π)− 1
2
u2, U∗ = γ (w∗ − π∗)− 1
2
u∗2, (11)
where w − π and w∗ − π∗ are the real consumer wages, and u and u∗ are unemployment
rates in the two countries. The unions’ utility depends positively on the real consumer
wage and negatively on unemployment, which is consistent with traditional labor union
theory (see e.g. Oswald (1985)).15 This is where the essay departs from much of the
recent literature on strategic interaction between labor unions and the central bank. In
most studies it is assumed that labor unions care not only about the real wage and
unemployment, but also about inﬂation per se.16
Why should labor unions be interested in inﬂation? The standard explanation is
that union members have some non-indexed nominal assets or incomes other than their
salaries, such as bank deposits or pensions, values of which are eroded by inﬂation.
However, pensioners are usually not labor union members, and it seems unlikely that
unions would look after their interests. In many contributions labor unions’ inﬂation
aversion is actually driving the results, and therefore a closer look on possible reasons for
15
The linear-quadratic functional form is widely used in this literature (see e.g. Jensen (1993, 1997),
Cukierman and Lippi (1999, 2001), Coricelli, Cukierman and Dalmazzo (2000, 2001) and Berger, de
Haan and Eijﬃnger (2001)). As the utility is linear in the consumer real wage, parallel shifts in labor
demand curve do not aﬀect unemployment. Hence, the impact of monetary regime on the equilibrium
rate of unemployment comes solely from changes in the slope of the labor demand curve. In other words,
the establishment of a monetary union will aﬀect equilibrium unemployment only if the real consumer
wage elasticity of the labor demand is aﬀected.
16
See Cukierman and Lippi (1999) and references therein. However, Soskice and Iversen (2000),
Coricelli, Cukierman and Dalmazzo (2000) and Lawler (2002) also abstract from labor union inﬂation
aversion in a closed-economy setting. Holden (2003a) studies a small open-economy case and Coricelli,
Cukierman and Dalmazzo (2001) build a two-country monetary union model.
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inﬂation aversion would be desirable.17
Monetary policy is discretionary in the model and the loss functions describing policy
preferences are of standard quadratic type
L = π2 + λ
(
u− uf
)
2
, L∗ = π∗2 + λ
(
u∗ − uf
)
2
, (12)
where 0 ≤ λ < ∞. Since the model is assumed to be completely symmetric, the policy
parameters describing the conservatism of the central bank, λ, and the unemployment
target, uf , are equal across countries.18 CPI inﬂation is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between
the log price levels in current and previous periods, π − π
−1
. Without loss of generality,
π
−1
is normalized to zero, and thus CPI and CPI inﬂation are equivalent in this setup.
The inﬂation target of the central banks is set to zero for analytic convenience.
The parameter λ reﬂects the relative weight placed by the central bank on unem-
ployment deviations from the target level. λ−1 thus measures the Rogoﬀ (1985a) type
of conservatism of the central bank.19 The smaller λ is, the more the central bank cares
about inﬂation deviations and the less about unemployment, i.e. it allows unemployment
to deviate more from the target level in order to push inﬂation closer to zero. Nominal
money supplies, m and m∗, are the policy instruments of the central banks.20
In a monetary union the common central bank is assumed to care only about the
average rates of unemployment and inﬂation in the area
Lu =
(
π + π∗
2
)
2
+ λ
(
u+ u∗
2
− uu
)
2
, (13)
where uu is the unemployment target of the common central bank.21 It is assumed that
conservatism of the central bank, λ, will be unchanged when the monetary union is
established.
The aim of the essay is to demonstrate that the formation of a monetary union will
17
A step into this direction is taken in Berger, Hefeker and Schöb (2002), where inﬂation aversion is
endogenized by assuming that the outside option of the labor union is deﬁned in nominal terms.
18
The superscript f refers to a ﬂexible exchange rate regime.
19
It would be conceptually clearer to write the weight parameter in front of the inﬂation term in the
loss function. Then the parameter would have a direct interpretation as the degree of conservatism. The
choice made in this essay, however, makes some derivations simpler.
20
This assumption is, admittedly, at odds with reality, since monetary policy is usually conducted
with the short-term nominal interest rate as the instrument. Money supply is, however, a natural choice
here as the model is static. Using interest rates as instruments in a static model would be conceptually
confusing, as interest rates are intertemporal by deﬁnition.
21
Gros and Hefeker (2002) investigate how the common central bank’s choice of policy targets, that is,
average monetary union wide welfare losses vs. the sum of national welfare losses, will aﬀect the welfare
in member countries in a heterogeneous monetary union.
20
have real eﬀects independent of the existence of an inﬂation bias. Therefore, the central
bank’s unemployment target both under ﬂexible exchange rates and in a monetary union
are assumed to be set at an arbitrary level, and it will be shown that the real economy is
unaﬀected by the chosen level. In particular, even though the target would coincide with
the equilibrium rate, the real eﬀects will remain.
2.3 Timing of the Model
Events unfold as follows. (i) The two labor unions set their nominal wages simultaneously
taking the other union’s wage as given. They have full information about the reaction
functions of the central banks and take them into account in the wage setting process.
In other words, unions act strategically as Stackelberg leaders against the central banks.
(ii) Under ﬂexible exchange rates the central banks choose their money supplies simulta-
neously taking the other central bank’s money supply as well as previously set nominal
wages as given. In a monetary union the common central bank sets the union-wide money
supply. (iii) Production and trade take place and macroeconomic outcomes are realized.
The choice of modelling the game between labor unions and central banks as a Stack-
elberg game is supported by observations in the real world wage setting and monetary
policy practices. Wage contracts are usually negotiated to cover at least a year, whereas
monetary policy can be adjusted frequently. It is assumed that the central banks don’t
have access to a commitment technology. In other words, the essay considers time-
consistent discretionary monetary policy. If the central banks could credibly commit to
a certain policy rule in advance, it might still be the case that monetary union would
aﬀect equilibrium unemployment. All what is needed to generate changes in equilibrium
unemployment is that from a labor union’s perspective the optimal rule for the com-
mon central bank is diﬀerent from the optimal rules of the national central banks. This
conjecture is, however, not investigated further in this essay.
The behavior of the labor unions can be time-inconsistent as well. It may be the
case that after the central banks have set their policies, the labor unions ﬁnd it optimal
to renege on the wage contracts and set new, higher or lower, nominal wages. This
possibility is ruled out by assuming that nominal wage contracts are legally binding for
the whole contract period.
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3 Monetary Policy and Wage Setting
In this section the two-stage game between labor unions and central banks is solved
in both monetary regimes by backward induction.22 Starting from the second stage,
equilibrium strategies are presented for central banks in a ﬂexible exchange rate regime,
and for a common central bank in a monetary union case. Then the wage setting problem
at the ﬁrst stage is solved and equilibrium outcomes are derived for macroeconomic
variables.
3.1 Monetary Policy in a Flexible Exchange Rate Regime
The reduced forms for home and foreign rates of unemployment and inﬂation in a ﬂexible
exchange rate regime can be derived from equations (1)-(5) and (7)-(9)23
u = −m+ w, u∗ = −m∗ + w∗, (14)
π = (1− α)m+ αw + αβ
δ
(m− w −m∗ + w∗) , (15)
π∗ = (1− α)m∗ + αw∗ − αβ
δ
(m− w −m∗ + w∗) . (16)
Equation (14) shows that a domestic wage increase has a direct eﬀect on unemployment
in home country, whereas foreign unemployment is unaﬀected. The home product price
is increased (see equation (47) in the Appendix) in order to balance the money market.
The real exchange rate appreciates so that the goods markets are in equilibrium (see
equation (48) in the Appendix). This reduces domestic consumer prices and increases
foreign consumer prices. The total eﬀect on domestic CPI is ambiguous, but the foreign
CPI increases, i.e. inﬂation is exported by a unilateral wage increase.
Next, consider a unilateral domestic monetary expansion. Domestic unemployment
falls, and to balance the money market the product price increases (see equation (47)
in the Appendix). Goods market equilibrium calls for real exchange rate depreciation.
Domestic CPI increases and foreign CPI decreases because of the real exchange rate
depreciation.
The home country central bank’s problem is to minimize the loss function L in (12)
with respect tom, and subject to (14) and (15), taking nominal wages and foreign money
22
The third stage of the game involves no strategic choices, since product markets are assumed to be
competitive.
23
The reduced forms for the other endogenous variables are presented in the Appendix as equations
(47)-(49).
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supply m∗ as given. The ﬁrst-order condition becomes
π =
λ
1− α + αβ
δ
(
u− uf
)
, (17)
which reveals that whenever the unemployment target is below the equilibrium rate of
unemployment, an inﬂation bias emerges.
Inserting the reduced forms (14) and (15) into the ﬁrst-order condition and solving it
explicitly for m, yields the reaction function of the home central bank
m =
λ− Γ
(
α− αβ
δ
)
(λ+ Γ2)
w +
Γαβ
δ
(λ+ Γ2)
(m∗ − w∗)− λ
(λ+ Γ2)
uf , (18)
where Γ = 1 − α + αβδ−1. Depending on central bank conservatism, λ−1, the central
bank reacts to a domestic wage increase either by expanding or contracting money supply.
Cukierman, Rodrigues and Webb (1998) provide empirical evidence on monetary policy
responses to wage increases. Their results show that in countries with highly conservative
central banks, monetary policy is tightened in response to high wage settlements, whereas
in countries with less conservative central banks monetary policy is accommodating.
Due to perfect symmetry of the model, the foreign money supply schedule can be
written symmetrically. The two central banks choose their non-cooperative policies si-
multaneously. The Nash equilibrium policy for the home country is given by24
m = cf
1
w + cf
2
w∗ + cf
3
uf , cf
1
 0, cf
2
≤ 0,−1 < cf
3
≤ 0, (19)
where the superscript f refers to the ﬂexible exchange rate regime. The interpretation of
cf
1
, cf
2
and cf
3
is straightforward. Home country wage increase induces either negative or
positive monetary policy reaction in equilibrium depending on central bank conservatism.
Since wage increase in the foreign country doesn’t directly aﬀect home country unem-
ployment and is always inﬂationary, home country money supply is always reduced in
equilibrium. Also, it is intuitive that, other things equal, an increase in the unemployment
target calls for a reduction in money supply in equilibrium.
Finally, inserting equation (19) into equations (14) and (15) yields the rates of unem-
24
The explicit forms of c
f
1
, c
f
2
and c
f
3
are given in the Appendix. An analogous equation holds for the
foreign country and is given by m
∗
= c
f
1
w
∗
+ c
f
2
w + c
f
3
u
f
.
23
ployment and inﬂation as functions of home and foreign nominal wages25
u = af
1
w + af
2
w∗ + af
3
uf , af
1
> 0, af
2
≥ 0, 0 ≤ af
3
< 1, (20)
π = bf
1
w + bf
2
w∗ + bf
3
uf , bf
1
≥ 0, bf
2
≥ 0,−1 < bf
3
≤ 0, (21)
where, as before, the superscript f refers to the ﬂexible exchange rate regime. These two
equations contain the optimal monetary policy responses to unions’ nominal wage claims.
At the ﬁrst stage of the game, labor unions rationally anticipate the policy responses and
take them into account in wage setting, that is, the labor unions set wages strategically.
The nominal wage elasticity of unemployment, af
1
, is always positive. The central
bank will accommodate the wage increase only partially, since money supply increases
are inﬂationary. If the central bank is conservative enough, it will contract money supply
in response to a wage increase, which implies that af
1
can be greater than unity. Domestic
nominal wage increase will thereby always increase domestic unemployment. Less obvious
is the fact that a unilateral foreign nominal wage hike will increase unemployment in
home country, that is, af
2
≥ 0. However, the explanation is simple and can be seen
from the reduced forms in equations (14)-(16). The direct eﬀect of foreign wages on
domestic unemployment is nil (see equation (14)), and the direct eﬀect on domestic
inﬂation is positive (see equation (15)). Therefore, as long as the domestic central bank
targets both inﬂation and unemployment deviations, it will reduce money supply in order
to push inﬂation down. Since the domestic nominal wage is assumed to be unaltered,
unemployment will go up (see equation (14)). Other things equal, an increase in uf will
induce higher unemployment, since monetary policy will be more contractionary.
The nominal wage elasticities of inﬂation, bf
1
and bf
2
, are both positive, i.e. wage
increases are always inﬂationary. Only in the special case of ultra-conservative central
banks with λ = 0, will bf
1
and bf
2
be zero. As noted above, an increase in uf raises u.
But, due to af
3
< 1, u − uf gets smaller and from (17) it follows that the inﬂation bias
problem will be reduced.
3.2 Monetary Policy in a Monetary Union
As in the previous section, ﬁrst the reduced forms for rates of unemployment and inﬂation
are solved from equations (1)-(4), (6)-(8) and (10). By deﬁnition, (the log of) the nominal
exchange rate now equals zero, and the real exchange rate is simply expressed as the
diﬀerence of (the logs of) the foreign and domestic product prices in equation (6). Money
demand depends on the average union-wide nominal income. The reduced forms are
25
The explicit forms of the elasticities are given in the Appendix.
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given by26
u = −mu + 1
2
(w + w∗) +
1
2
δ
α + (1− α) δ (w − w
∗) , (22)
u∗ = −mu + 1
2
(w + w∗)− 1
2
δ
α + (1− α) δ (w −w
∗) , (23)
π = (1− α)mu + w −
(
1− α
2
)
(w + w∗) (24)
−1
2
(
2αβ + (1− α) δ
α + (1− α) δ
)
(w −w∗) ,
π∗ = (1− α)mu + w∗ −
(
1− α
2
)
(w + w∗) (25)
+
1
2
(
2αβ + (1− α) δ
α + (1− α) δ
)
(w − w∗) .
From (22) one sees that in a monetary union unemployment depends directly on both
domestic and foreign wages, whereas in a ﬂexible exchange rate regime only domestic
wage entered the unemployment equation.27 This interdependence in a monetary union
results from money market equilibrium (10), which can be rewritten as
mu =
1
2
(p+ y) +
1
2
(p∗ + y∗) =
1
2
(w − u) + 1
2
(w∗ − u∗) . (26)
In a ﬂexible exchange rate regime a unilateral wage increase doesn’t directly aﬀect real
variables in the other country, while in a monetary union unemployment (and output)
in both countries will in general be aﬀected. From (26) one sees that an increase of w
generally aﬀects both u and u∗ when mu and w∗ are ﬁxed.28
As expected, the reduced forms (22)-(25) reveal that an increase in the area-wide
money supply, mu, aﬀects both countries symmetrically. Hence, the common central
bank can’t aﬀect the real exchange rate, z, which is solely determined by the labor
unions (see equation (52) in the Appendix).
The common central bank chooses mu in order to minimize the loss function (13)
subject to (22)-(25). The ﬁrst-order condition of the common central bank’s optimization
26
The reduced forms for the other endogenous variables are presented in the Appendix as equations
(50)-(52).
27
Unemployment depends indirectly on both home and foreign wages in a ﬂexible exchange rate regime,
because monetary policies in both countries are aﬀected by both w and w
∗
.
28
From (22) one sees, however, that when δ = 1, unemployment depends directly only on the home
country wage.
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problem can be written as
π + π∗
2
=
λ
(1− α)
(
u+ u∗
2
− uu
)
, (27)
which relates the average rate of inﬂation to the average rate of unemployment in the
monetary union area. Comparing this expression with equation (17), one ﬁnds that with a
given diﬀerence between the average rate of unemployment and the unemployment target,
average inﬂation is higher in a monetary union than under ﬂexible exchange rates. As
mentioned in Introduction, a similar result is obtained in monetary policy cooperation
case (see e.g. Rogoﬀ (1985b)).
Solving the ﬁrst-order condition explicitly for mu yields the reaction function of the
common central bank
mu =
λ− α (1− α)
2
(
λ+ (1− α)2
) (w + w∗)− λ(
λ+ (1− α)2
)uu. (28)
The central bank’s reaction to wage increases is symmetric in a sense that the monetary
policy reaction to a unilateral wage increase doesn’t depend on which country is the
source. This characteristic obviously results from the assumed symmetry of the model.
If the central bank is conservative enough, it reduces money supply when nominal wages
are raised.
Finally, the rates of unemployment and inﬂation as functions of the nominal wages in
both countries and unemployment targets are derived by inserting the reaction function
(28) into the reduced forms of u and π29
u = au
1
w + au
2
w∗ + au
3
uu, au
1
> 0, au
2
 0, 0 ≤ au
3
< 1, (29)
π = bu
1
w + bu
2
w∗ + bu
3
uu, bu
1
> 0, bu
2
 0,−1 < bu
3
≤ 0, (30)
where the superscript u refers to the monetary union case. Earlier it was shown that af
2
is always positive. Now, au
2
can be negative, i.e. a foreign wage increase may lower un-
employment in home country. This may happen if the common central bank is relatively
“liberal” (λ is large), or if the goods are close substitutes (δ is large). The diﬀerence
comes from the fact that the response of the common central bank to a unilateral wage
increase by one labor union is symmetric in both countries. It is instructive to consider
a case of a relatively liberal central bank, i.e. λ is large. Now, by setting δ = 1 the direct
eﬀect of a foreign wage increase on domestic unemployment is nil as in a ﬂexible exchange
29
The explicit forms for the elasticities are given in the Appendix.
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rate regime (see footnote 28 and equations (14) and (22)). The average area-wide unem-
ployment will increase, since foreign unemployment goes up and home unemployment is
unaﬀected. Now, given that the common central bank is fairly liberal, it will increase the
area-wide money supply so as to pull down the average unemployment rate. Since the
direct eﬀect of a foreign wage increase on domestic unemployment is nil, accommodating
monetary policy will lower the domestic rate of unemployment below the initial level and
the total eﬀect is thus negative.
The home country nominal wage elasticity of inﬂation, bu
1
, is always positive in a
monetary union. However, the foreign country nominal wage elasticity of inﬂation, bu
2
, can
be negative, if the common central bank is very conservative, i.e. λ is very small. Again,
this is caused by the inability of the common central bank to respond asymmetrically
to a unilateral wage increase. An increase in foreign wage level increases home inﬂation
less than foreign inﬂation, provided that β < 1
2
(as assumed in the model). If the central
bank is very conservative, it will push the average inﬂation close to zero by reducing the
common money supply. Thereby, the home country inﬂation can become negative. It is
noteworthy that in this model the inﬂation rates of the member countries of a monetary
union need not to be equal, as it is the case e.g. in Grüner and Hefeker (1999) and
Cukierman and Lippi (2001).30
3.3 Strategic Wage Setting and Equilibrium Unemployment
The labor unions choose their wages in the ﬁrst stage of the game taking the other union’s
wage as given. The unions have complete information about the reaction functions of the
central banks and they realize that since they are large enough, their wage claims will
aﬀect the monetary policy. Hence, the unions set their wages strategically taking into
account the following monetary policy responses.
The labor unions maximize their utility functions (11) subject to (20) and (21) in a
ﬂexible exchange rate regime, and subject to (29) and (30) in a monetary union. Since
the form of the wage setting problem is similar in both monetary regimes, the regime
in question is denoted with a superscript i whenever making a distinction between the
variables of the two regimes is not necessary. Solving the ﬁrst-order condition for wi
yields a reaction function of the form
wi = γ
(1− bi
1
)
(ai
1
)
2
− a
i
2
ai
1
(w∗)i − a
i
3
ai
1
ui, (31)
30
Even though the model allows inﬂation diﬀerences between the member countries in a monetary
union, the equilibrium rate of inﬂation will be equal since the model is symmetric.
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where i = f, u. Again, the symmetry of the model implies that the reaction function of
the foreign union is of the same form. In Nash equilibrium nominal wages are given by
wi = (w∗)i = γ
(1− bi
1
)
ai
1
(ai
1
+ ai
2
)
− a
i
3
(ai
1
+ ai
2
)
ui. (32)
Inserting the equilibrium nominal wage (32) into the reduced form of the rate of
unemployment, (20) or (29), yields equilibrium unemployment
ui = (u∗)i = γ
(1− bi
1
)
ai
1
. (33)
It is noteworthy that equilibrium unemployment is independent of the central banks’
unemployment target ui.
Once equilibrium unemployment levels in both countries are derived, equilibrium in-
ﬂation rates can be obtained from equations (17) and (27). Rantala (2001) analyzes
the case where ui = 0. However, for the purpose of this essay it suﬃces to notice that
equilibrium unemployment doesn’t depend on ui. It follows that even though the un-
employment target ui would coincide with the equilibrium rate of unemployment, which
results in the disappearance of inﬂation bias (see equations (17) and (27)), the real eﬀects
brought about by the establishment of a monetary union, which are discussed in the next
section, remain unchanged. Moreover, equation (33) reveals the source of unemployment
in the model. The equilibrium rate of unemployment is always positive, provided that
the labor unions have a real wage target, i.e. γ > 0.
In order to gain some intuition on the unemployment determination in the model, it
is instructive to study the labor union’s wage setting in unemployment—real wage space.
Employment, and thus also unemployment, is determined from the labor demand curve.
From equations (2) and (3) one observes that the slope of the labor demand curve in
(ui, (wi − pi)) space is (1− α).31 However, the labor union’s utility depends on the real
consumer wage and the rate of unemployment. Contrary to the real product wage, wi−pi,
the real consumer wage, wi − πi, contains also foreign product price as an element, and
it turns out to be useful to study the eﬀective labor demand curve for the union in
31
Since the variables are in logs, the slope coeﬃcient can be directly converted into real product wage
elasticity of labor demand, η ≡ −
∂ logN
∂ logW/P
= −
∂l
∂(w−p)
=
∂u
∂(w−p)
=
1
1−α
∈ (1,∞), which in this model
depends only on production technology.
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(ui, (wi − πi)) space32
(
wi − πi
)
=
1− bi
1
ai
1
ui − a
i
1
bi
2
+ (1− bi
1
) ai
2
ai
1
(w∗)i (34)
−a
i
1
bi
3
+ (1− bi
1
) ai
3
ai
1
ui.
The slope coeﬃcient, (1− bi
1
) /ai
1
, of the eﬀective labor demand curve (34) together with
the labor union preference parameter, γ, directly determine the equilibrium rate of un-
employment in the model (see equation (33)). Figure 1, where one indiﬀerence curve of
the labor union is denoted by U((w − π) , u; γ), illustrates the equilibrium.
u
w-π U((w-π),u;γ)
slope (1-b1)/a1
Figure 1: Determination of equilibrium unemployment
The slope coeﬃcient (1− bi
1
) /ai
1
can be written as a function of the two nominal wage
elasticities of unemployment, ai
1
and ai
2
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1− bi
1
ai
1
= (1− α) + αβ
δ
(
ai
1
− ai
2
ai
1
)
. (35)
This formulation is helpful in unemployment comparisons between the two monetary
regimes presented in the next section. Equilibrium unemployment depends on two elas-
ticities. The ﬁrst one is the nominal wage elasticity of the real exchange rate, which is
given by ∂z/∂wi = −αδ−1 (ai
1
− ai
2
) ≤ 0. The stronger eﬀect the wage has on the real
exchange rate, the steeper is the eﬀective labor demand curve. The second elasticity is
32
This expression is obtained from equations (20) and (21) (or from (29) and (30)).
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Derivation of this expression can be found in the Appendix.
29
the home country nominal wage elasticity of unemployment, ∂u/∂wi = ai
1
> 0. The
larger the unemployment loss, the less steep is the eﬀective labor demand curve.
Since ai
1
and ai
2
depend on the monetary regime (and conservatism of the central
bank), it is now evident that the slope of the eﬀective labor demand curve the union
faces in wage setting is endogenous. In particular, if the slope becomes steeper in a
monetary union unemployment will increase, whereas a less steep curve implies reduced
unemployment.
The inverse of (1− bi
1
) /ai
1
is actually the eﬀective real consumer wage elasticity of
labor demand
η
w−π
= − ∂l
∂ (w − π) =
∂u
∂ (w − π) =
1
1− α + αβ
δ
(
a
1
−a
2
a
1
) . (36)
Therefore, equilibrium unemployment inversely related to η
w−π
so that from (33) and
(36) one obtains
ui = (u∗)i =
γ
η
w−π
. (37)
4 Equilibrium Unemployment in a Monetary Union
This section analyzes the impact of the formation of a monetary union on equilibrium
unemployment. The structural parameters of the economy, as well as central bank and
labor union preferences remain the same when a monetary union is established. This
essay thereby focuses on the direct eﬀect of a monetary union on economic performance
through changes in the strategic environment and the behavior of the labor unions. The
degree of central bank conservatism turns out to be a crucial factor in what happens to
unemployment in a monetary union.
4.1 EquilibriumUnemployment and Central Bank Conservatism
As discussed in Introduction, unemployment is not aﬀected by central bank conservatism
in the standard Barro-Gordon framework. Labor markets are assumed to be atomistic,
i.e. it is as Barro and Gordon (1983) put it, “...a game between the policy maker and
a large number of private sector agents.” It follows that each agent is too small to have
any eﬀect on policy maker’s behavior, and thus there is no strategic interaction between
them. However, abandoning this assumption and introducing non-atomistic labor unions
into the model will make the neutrality result disappear.
It is easy to show that equilibrium unemployment goes down in both monetary regimes
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when central bank conservatism increases (see the Appendix for derivations).34 The intu-
ition behind this somewhat surprising result is clear. When λ is small, i.e. conservatism
is high, labor unions correctly anticipate tight monetary policy and a large rise in un-
employment in response to their wage claims. Conservatism works as a deterrent to
wage increases and therefore moderates the labor unions’ real wage targets leading to
lower unemployment. This can be seen by diﬀerentiating the nominal wage elasticities of
unemployment with respect to λ in both regimes, which gives
∂af
1
∂λ
< 0,
∂au
1
∂λ
< 0, (38)
where an increase in conservatism means that λ becomes smaller.
Strictly speaking, this argument is correct only in the monetary union case, where
the nominal wage elasticity of the real exchange rate doesn’t depend on central bank
conservatism. Under a ﬂexible exchange rate an increase in conservatism strengthens
the union’s ability to appreciate the real exchange rate, which works into the opposite
direction and tends to increase wage demands. Diﬀerentiating (ai
1
− ai
2
) (where i = f, u)
with respect to λ yields
∂
(
af
1
− af
2
)
∂λ
< 0,
∂ (au
1
− au
2
)
∂λ
= 0. (39)
As shown in the Appendix, the deterrent eﬀect of central bank conservatism dominates
the real exchange rate eﬀect, and therefore increased conservatism will decrease unem-
ployment also in a ﬂexible exchange rate regime. Hall and Franzese (1998) and Cukierman
and Lippi (1999) provide some empirical evidence supporting the result. They show that
when bargaining structure is highly centralized, an increase in central bank conservatism
tends to lower unemployment.
34
The ﬂexible exchange rate case is presented in Jensen (2000), a fact which was kindly brought to
the author’s notice by Henrik Jensen after the working paper version of this essay (Rantala (2001)) was
published.
31
4.2 The Impact of Monetary Union on Equilibrium Unemploy-
ment
The impact of the formation of a monetary union on equilibrium unemployment can be
analyzed by studying the following expression
sgn
(
uu − uf
)
= −sgn
(
au
2
au
1
− a
f
2
af
1
)
, (40)
where the right-hand side is obtained from (35). In the Appendix it is proved that
there exists a unique non-negative cut-oﬀ point for central bank conservatism, λ, where
uu = uf . This critical value, λ, is given by
λ =
1
2δ2
(
−A+
√
A2 +B
)
, (41)
A = (1− α)2 δ2 + α (1− α) (3β − 1) δ + 2α2β2,
B = 4δ2α (1− α)2 (1− 2β) (αβ + δ (1− α)) > 0,
where B > 0 holds, since β < 1
2
. The equilibrium unemployment is lower in a monetary
union than under ﬂexible exchange rate regime when central bank conservatism is high
enough, i.e. λ ∈ [0, λ). However, when λ ∈ (λ,∞) unemployment will be higher in a
monetary union. Figure 2 illustrates the result.
u
w-π U((w-π),u;γ)
uu uf uu
conservatism low
conservatism high
Figure 2: The impact of monetary union on equilibrium unemployment
This result is in sharp contrast with earlier results concerning the impact of mon-
etary union on equilibrium unemployment. Grüner and Hefeker (1999) show that the
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establishment of a monetary union will increase unemployment, if national labor unions
are inﬂation averse. However, their result depends crucially on the assumed inﬂation
aversion, and thereby also on the existence of an inﬂation bias. The above result (41)
points out that in this model with open-economy spillovers, monetary union will have
real eﬀects even when labor unions are not inﬂation averse, and without an inﬂation bias.
Interestingly enough, (41) indicates that one can always ﬁnd a level of conservatism such
that monetary union will be beneﬁcial in terms of reduced unemployment.
An intuitive explanation for the above result can be obtained by inspecting the labor
union’s incentives for wage hikes in the two alternative regimes with diﬀerent degrees of
central bank conservatism. In a monetary union the real exchange rate is solely deter-
mined by nominal wages set by the labor unions. The conservatism of the central bank
will thereby not aﬀect the unions’ ability to appreciate the real exchange rate. As noted
in the previous section, an increase in conservatism will improve the labor union’s ability
to appreciate the real exchange rate in the ﬂexible exchange rate regime (see equation
(39)). When conservatism is fairly high, the central banks will give priority to inﬂation
deviations from the target. In the face of a unilateral wage increase, the central bank
of the country in question will tighten monetary policy considerably in order to bring
inﬂation down. In the other country the central bank will also tighten its policy, since
real exchange rate depreciation is inﬂationary, but to a lesser extent. The need to react
less vigorously results from the assumption of a home bias in consumption, which implies
that inﬂation reaction to a wage hike is stronger in the country in question.35 Hence, the
equilibrium response of the two central banks appreciates the real exchange rate further,
and thereby induces more aggressive wage policy than in the monetary union case, which
in turn leads to higher unemployment.
On the other hand, when central bank conservatism is low, that is, the focus is on
unemployment deviations from the target, the ﬂexible exchange rate regime provides
weaker incentives to wage increases than a monetary union. Even though a labor union
tried to appreciate the real exchange rate with its wage claim, under a ﬂexible exchange
rate the central banks will guarantee with their policies that unemployment rates remain
close to the target, which implies that ai
1
and ai
2
are close to zero. Keeping in mind that
∂z/∂wi = −αδ−1 (ai
1
− ai
2
) ≤ 0, it becomes evident that the real exchange motive for
wage hikes is weak when conservatism is low. Irrespective of the degree of conservatism,
35
To be precise, in a ﬂexible exchange rate regime a unilateral wage increase will increase inﬂation in
home country more than in foreign country provided that the real exchange rate appreciation is not too
strong relative to the import share. From (15) and (16) one obtains a condition δ > 2β, which limits the
substitutability parameter. This restriction is satisﬁed e.g. when one assumes Cobb-Douglas preferences
for consumption, δ = 1, since β <
1
2
in the model. In a monetary union β <
1
2
is alone a suﬃcient
condition for home inﬂation reaction to exceed foreign reaction (see (24) and (25)).
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monetary policy in a monetary union is incapable of aﬀecting the real exchange rate,
and so monetary policy reactions can’t neutralize the impact of a unilateral wage hike
on the real exchange rate. It follows that in a monetary union, the labor unions do have
the real exchange motive for pushing up wages also when conservatism is low, and hence
their wage policy will be more aggressive than under ﬂexible exchange rates, resulting in
higher unemployment.
5 Restoring Neutrality: Two Alternatives
This essay emphasizes that under fairly general conditions the formation of a monetary
union will aﬀect the equilibrium rate of unemployment. It was argued that there are ba-
sically two critical assumptions, which are needed in order to generate the non-neutrality
result presented in the previous section: non-atomistic wage setting and imperfect sub-
stitutability between the two goods produced. This section relaxes these two conditions
and veriﬁes the emergence of neutrality.
So far, the goods produced in the two countries were assumed to be imperfect substi-
tutes in consumption. This is captured in the model by the substitutability parameter,
δ, which describes how the relative price of the goods will aﬀect their relative demand.
If δ approaches inﬁnity, the two goods become perfect substitutes in consumption. It is
easy to show that in this case the equilibrium rate of unemployment becomes (see the
Appendix for derivations)
uf
|δ→∞
= uu
|δ→∞
= γ (1− α) . (42)
The neutrality result emerges, because perfect substitutability implies that the real ex-
change rate becomes exogenous to labor unions. There is eﬀectively only one good in the
model. It follows that the purchasing power parity (PPP) has to hold and the real ex-
change rate can’t deviate from zero (in logs), because otherwise the world demand would
shift to one country. Hence, the labor unions’ incentives to push up nominal wages in
order to appreciate the real exchange rate are destroyed. Moreover, comparing (42) with
(33) and (35) one immediately sees that unemployment is lower when δ →∞. The same
neutrality result is obtained in Grüner and Hefeker (1999) and Cukierman and Lippi
(2001), when unions are not inﬂation averse.
The model can easily be modiﬁed to show that non-atomistic wage setting is also
crucial for the non-neutrality result of the essay. Assuming that there is a continuum of
labor union—ﬁrm pairs indexed by j and distributed uniformly between j = 0 and j = 1
in both countries implies, that all unions take the product price and the consumer price
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index as given in wage setting. Modifying (2) and (3), labor demand of the representative
ﬁrm, j, is given by
w
j
− p = − (1− α) l
j
= (1− α) u
j
. (43)
A representative union’s problem is then
max
w
j
(
γ (w
j
− π)− 1
2
u2
j
)
, (44)
s.t. (43) and π given.
The ﬁrst-order condition becomes
w
j
− p = γ (1− α)2 . (45)
Inserting the real wage (45) into (43) yields the rate of unemployment in union j
u
j
= γ (1− α) .
Aggregation over all labor union—ﬁrm pairs gives the corresponding equation for the
national rate of unemployment
u =
∫
1
j=0
u
j
dj = γ (1− α) , (46)
which is clearly independent of the monetary regime. When labor markets are atomistic,
the equilibrium rate of unemployment depends only on labor union preferences, γ, and
the real product wage elasticity of labor demand (see equation (43) and Footnote 31).
As expected, the unemployment outcome is the same as in the inﬁnite substitution case
above, that is, (46) coincides with (42).
6 Concluding Remarks
The purpose of the essay is to study the impact of the formation of a monetary union
on the equilibrium rate of unemployment. In particular, it is shown that in the pres-
ence of strategic interaction between the central bank and the labor unions, changes in
monetary regime will have real eﬀects. Monetary regime will aﬀect the labor union’s real
wage—unemployment tradeoﬀ, i.e. the real consumer wage elasticity of labor demand is
endogenous in the model.
The main result of the essay is that the establishment of a monetary union lowers
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unemployment, provided that the degree of central bank conservatism is suﬃciently high,
whereas with low degrees of conservatism unemployment goes up. Interestingly enough,
the inﬂexibility of the common central bank of the monetary union in responding to a
country speciﬁc wage increase is good news in terms of unemployment if the central bank
is conservative, whereas it is bad news if the central bank is fairly liberal. This result
indicates that the choice of a monetary regime and the way monetary policy is conducted
can be important factors in determining labor market outcomes in countries with highly
centralized wage setting. Importantly, and unlike in the previous literature in this ﬁeld,
the results of the essay don’t depend on the existence of an inﬂation bias.
The assumption of a single union in each country is obviously quite restrictive, but
it can be justiﬁed as the simplest way to model non-atomistic labor markets. Labor is
homogenous in the model. Therefore, it makes no sense to consider diﬀerent levels of
centralization of wage bargaining, since unions in this setup can’t raise their wages above
the average wage rate of the economy.36 One could follow Lippi (2002) and introduce
the level of centralization of wage bargaining into the model by assuming that labor is
diﬀerentiated in general, and that all types of labor are needed in the production of the
single good. Then each union has pricing power and the eﬀects of centralization could
be inspected. One likely consequence is that the rate of unemployment would decrease
with the number of unions, since each union’s ability to appreciate the real exchange rate
with its wage claim would be reduced. However, it is unclear how this would aﬀect the
relative unemployment performance of a monetary union.
The model belongs to a class of “traditional” open-economy models, which basically
are linearized versions of the Mundell-Fleming model. International spillovers operate
through the real exchange rate channel. A monetary expansion by one country will have
a beggar-thy-neighbor eﬀect, since the depreciation of the real exchange rate will shift
world demand toward that country. Moreover, inﬂation will increase in that country and
decrease in the other country. Thus the other country will also devalue its currency by
expansionary monetary policy and this leads to a situation known as “competitive deval-
uations”. In the traditional literature on international policy coordination this spillover
eﬀect creates an incentive to coordinate national monetary policies. However, as men-
36
There is a voluminous literature on the degree of centralization of wage bargaining and its eﬀects
on macroeconomic performance. Calmfors and Driﬃll (1988) present the well-known “hump-shape”
hypothesis, which states that macroeconomic performance is better under a fully decentralized, and on
the other hand, under a totally centralized wage bargaining systems than under intermediate levels of
centralization, such as industry level bargaining. Open-economy considerations related to the hump-
shape hypothesis are studied in Driﬃll and van der Ploeg (1993), Danthine and Hunt (1994) and Rama
(1994). Interactions between the degree centralization of wage bargaining and monetary policy are
analyzed e.g. in Cukierman and Lippi (1999), Lippi (2002) and Holden (2003b).
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tioned in Introduction, domestic credibility problems may get worse under cooperation.37
The analysis in this traditional open-economy framework lacks explicit micro-founda-
tions and the welfare criterion, like the widely used quadratic social welfare function, is
ad hoc.38 Recent contributions in the rapidly growing ﬁeld of “new open-economy macro-
economics” have questioned the beggar-thy-neighbor eﬀect in international transmission
of shocks from a country to another. The novelty of the approach initiated by Obstfeld
and Rogoﬀ (1995, 1996) is in the fully-ﬂedged micro-foundations, which enable the use
of the utility of the representative consumer as a welfare criterion in policy evaluation.39
Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and Tille (2001) show that instead of being a beggar-thy-
neighbor, an unanticipated monetary expansion can in terms of welfare actually be a
beggar-thyself policy. The intuition behind this result is simple. Although a monetary
surprise raises output and employment, the associated exchange rate depreciation wors-
ens the terms of trade, thereby reducing the purchasing power of consumers. Then it
is possible that consumers are unable to buy enough additional consumption to oﬀset
the cost of their increased eﬀort. The main result is that if the substitutability of goods
across countries is low, the adverse terms of trade eﬀect dominates and monetary ex-
pansion is a beggar-thyself policy in terms of welfare. In that case countries have no
incentives to boost employment through monetary expansions. This new result brought
about by explicit microeconomic underpinnings qualiﬁes the policy implications of the
traditional literature by showing that the exchange rate channel may not be as strong as
the traditional Mundell-Fleming analysis, which is also applied in this essay, suggests.
The model oﬀers insights for the desirable policy choices in a monetary union. Obvi-
ously, one has to be extremely cautious in drawing strong policy implications based on
such a simple model. The single union assumption clearly limits the applicability of the
model in policy analysis to countries with relatively centralized wage setting. The model
seems to suggest that when a monetary union is established, it is possible to attain lower
rate of equilibrium unemployment by delegating monetary policy to a suﬃciently conserv-
ative central bank. In Europe the creation of the EMU has increased the degree of central
bank conservatism in most member countries. Thus, based on the analysis, one could
speculate that the EMU may well have positive eﬀects on equilibrium unemployment in
many member countries. However, it must be stressed, that the deterministic analysis
conducted in the essay abstracts completely from stabilization problems in a stochastic
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See Persson and Tabellini (2000, Ch. 18) for discussion and analysis on competitive devaluations,
credibility problems and proper institutions for sustaining desirable policies.
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However, it is well-known that this widely used functional form can be obtained as a second-order
Taylor series approximation to the level of expected utility of the representative household in an opti-
mizing model with nominal price rigidities (see e.g. Woodford (2001)).
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Lane (2001) surveys the “new open-economy macroeconomics” literature.
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setup. Central bank conservatism is a free lunch in the model. The policy implications
will probably change, if one takes into account that delegating monetary policy to a cen-
tral bank which is more conservative than the society will distort stabilization policy. It
is quite likely that a tradeoﬀ between low equilibrium unemployment and stabilization
properties of the economy emerges, and that one can derive an optimal degree of central
bank conservatism, where the weight on unemployment deviations is strictly positive. A
thorough investigation of this point is left for future research.
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A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of Endogenous Variables and Nominal Wage
and Unemployment Target Elasticities
The reduced forms for the other endogenous variables in the ﬂexible exchange rate regime
are
p = (1− α)m+ αw, p∗ = (1− α)m∗ + αw∗, (47)
z =
α
δ
(m− w −m∗ + w∗) , (48)
e =
(α
δ
+ (1− α)
)
(m−m∗) +
(
α− α
δ
)
(w −w∗) . (49)
The Nash equilibrium nominal wage and unemployment target elasticities of money
supply in the ﬂexible exchange rate regime are
cf
1
=
(λ+ Γ2)
(
λ+ Γ
(
αβ
δ
− α
))
−
(
αβ
δ
Γ
)
2
∆
 0,
cf
2
= −αβ
δ
Γ2
∆
≤ 0,
cf
3
= − λ
(λ+ Γ (1− α))u ≤ 0,
where Γ = 1− α + αβδ−1 and ∆ = (λ+ Γ2)2 −
(
αβ
δ
Γ
)
2
> 0.
The nominal wage and unemployment target elasticities of unemployment and inﬂa-
tion in the ﬂexible exchange rate regime are
af
1
=
Γ (λ+ Γ2)
∆
> 0,
af
2
=
αβ
δ
Γ2
∆
> 0,
af
3
=
λ
(λ+ Γ (1− α)) ≥ 0,
bf
1
=
λ (λ+ Γ2)
∆
≥ 0,
bf
2
=
αβ
δ
λΓ
∆
≥ 0,
bf
3
= − λ (1− α)
(λ+ Γ (1− α)) ≤ 0.
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The reduced forms for the other endogenous variables in the monetary union case are
p = w + (1− α)mu − (1− α)
2
(w + w∗) (50)
+
1
2
(1− α) δ
α + (1− α) δ (w
∗ − w) ,
p∗ = w∗ + (1− α)mu − (1− α)
2
(w + w∗) (51)
−1
2
(1− α) δ
α + (1− α) δ (w
∗ − w) ,
z =
α
α + (1− α) δ (w
∗ − w) . (52)
The nominal wage and unemployment target elasticities of unemployment and inﬂa-
tion in the monetary union case are
au
1
=
(
(1− α) (α + 2 (1− α) δ) + δλ
Ω
)
> 0,
au
2
=
(
α (1− α)− δλ
Ω
)
 0,
au
3
=
λ
λ+ (1− α)2
≥ 0,
bu
1
=
(
λ+ (1− α)2
)
(2α (1− β) + (1− α) δ)
Ω
− (1− α)
2 (α + (1− α) δ)
Ω
> 0,
bu
2
=
(
λ+ (1− α)2
)
(2αβ + (1− α) δ)
Ω
− (1− α)
2 (α + (1− α) δ)
Ω
 0,
bu
3
=
−λ (1− α)(
λ+ (1− α)2
) ≤ 0,
where Ω = 2
(
λ + (1− α)2
)
(α + (1− α) δ) > 0.
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A.2 Derivation of Equation (35)
Under a ﬂexible exchange rate, from the reduced forms (14) and (15) one obtains
af
1
= −∂m
f
∂w
+ 1,
1− bf
1
= (1− α)
(
1− ∂m
f
∂w
)
− αβ
δ
(
∂mf
∂w
− 1− ∂m
∗f
∂w
)
,
and by noting, that ∂m
∗
∂w
= −af
2
(see the Appendix A.1) the slope coeﬃcient (35) can be
written as
1− bf
1
af
1
= (1− α) + αβ
δ
(
af
1
− af
2
af
1
)
.
Similarly, in a monetary union case one obtains
au
1
= −∂m
u
∂w
+
1
2
+
δ
2 (α + (1− α) δ) ,
1− bu
1
= (1− α)
(
−∂m
u
∂w
+
1
2
+
δ
2 (α + (1− α) δ)
)
+
αβ
(α + (1− α) δ) .
From equations (1), (3) and (4) one gets z = α
δ
(l − l∗) = −α
δ
(u− u∗) and ∂z
∂w
=
−α
δ
(a
1
− a
2
). From (52) one obtains ∂z
∂w
= − α
α+(1−α)δ
, which implies that
α
α + (1− α) δ =
α
δ
(au
1
− au
2
) .
Inserting this expression into 1− bu
1
above yields
1− bu
1
= (1− α) au
1
+
αβ
δ
(au
1
− au
2
) .
Hence, the form of the slope coeﬃcient is similar to the ﬂexible exchange rate case
1− bu
1
au
1
= (1− α) + αβ
δ
(
au
1
− au
2
au
1
)
.
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A.3 Derivation of the Impact of Conservatism on Equilibrium
Unemployment
The rates of equilibrium unemployment in both regimes are given by equation (33). Then,
equation (35) implies, that sgn
(
∂u
∂λ
)
= −sgn
(
∂
(
a
2
a
1
)
/∂λ
)
in both regimes. FromAppen-
dix A.1 one obtains
a
f
2
a
f
1
=
(αβ
δ
)Γ
λ+Γ
2
and
a
u
2
a
u
1
= α(1−α)−δλ
(1−α)(α+2(1−α)δ)+δλ
. Diﬀerentiation of these ex-
pressions with respect to λ yields ∂
(
a
f
2
a
f
1
)
/∂λ < 0 and ∂
(
a
u
2
a
u
1
)
/∂λ = −δ((1−α)(2α+2(1−α)δ))
((1−α)(α+2(1−α)δ)+δλ)
2
<
0. Hence ∂u
f
∂λ
> 0 and ∂u
u
∂λ
> 0.
A.4 Derivation of Equation (41)
Equation (35) implies, that sgn
(
uu − uf
)
= −sgn
(
a
u
2
a
u
1
− a
f
2
a
f
1
)
. The expression in brackets
on the right hand side can be written as
au
2
au
1
− a
f
2
af
1
=
α (1− α)− δλ
(1− α) (α + 2 (1− α) δ) + δλ −
αβ
δ
(
1− α + αβ
δ
)
λ+
(
1− α + αβ
δ
)
2
= δ
(
−δ2λ2 +
(
δ
(
α (1− α)− δ (1− α)2
)
− αβ (3δ (1− α) + 2αβ)
)
λ
)
(
2δ (1− α)2 + α (1− α) + λδ
) (
λδ2 + δ2 (1− α)2 + 2αβδ (1− α)
)
+δ
α (1− α)2 (1− 2β) (δ (1− α) + αβ)(
2δ (1− α)2 + α (1− α) + λδ
) (
λδ2 + δ2 (1− α)2 + 2αβδ (1− α)
) .
The denominator is always positive, and thus the quadratic function of λ in the numerator
determines the sign of the expression. Since the constant term in the numerator is
positive, and the coeﬃcient in front of the quadratic term is negative, it follows that the
quadratic function has only one positive real root. Solving the quadratic equation
−δ2λ2 +
(
δ
(
α (1− α)− δ (1− α)2
)
− αβ (3δ (1− α) + 2αβ)
)
λ
+α (1− α)2 (1− 2β) (δ (1− α) + αβ) = 0
yields two real roots, of which only the bigger one is positive
λ =
1
2δ2
(
−A+
√
A2 +B
)
,
A = (1− α)2 δ2 + α (1− α) (3β − 1) δ + 2α2β2,
B = 4δ2α (1− α)2 (1− 2β) (αβ + δ (1− α)) > 0.
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Hence,
(
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2
a
u
1
− a
f
2
a
f
1
)
> 0 when λ ∈ [0, λ) and
(
a
u
2
a
u
1
− a
f
2
a
f
1
)
< 0 when λ ∈ (λ,∞). Since
sgn
(
uu − uf
)
= −sgn
(
a
u
2
a
u
1
− a
f
2
a
f
1
)
, it follows that uu < uf provided that λ ∈ [0, λ).
A.5 Derivation of Equation (42)
The nominal wage elasticities of unemployment in a ﬂexible exchange rate regime with
inﬁnite substitutability between goods, δ →∞, can be written as af
1|δ→∞
= (1−α)
λ+(1−α)
2
and
af
2|δ→∞
= 0. Unemployment is then given by
uf
|δ→∞
= γ
(
(1− α) + αβ
δ
(
1− a
f
2
af
1
))
= γ (1− α) .
In a monetary union the nominal wage elasticities of unemployment are
au
1|δ→∞
=
(
2 (1− α)2 + λ
2
(
(1− α)2 + λ
)
(1− α)
)
,
au
2|δ→∞
= − λ
2
(
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(1− α)
.
It follows that
a
u
2
a
u
1
= − λ
2(1−α)
2
+λ
, and unemployment is given by
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|δ→∞
= γ
(
(1− α) + αβ
δ
(
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u
2
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))
= γ (1− α) .
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Chapter 3
Labor Market Flexibility and Policy
Coordination in a Monetary Union
Abstract
This essay investigates the political economy of labor market ﬂexibility in a
monetary union. Using a natural rate monetary model augmented with unemploy-
ment persistence it is shown that labor market policy coordination between member
country governments tends to increase nominal wage ﬂexibility under discretionary
monetary policy. The reason is that ﬂexibility choice under coordination interacts
with the stabilization properties of the economy through the common monetary
policy. In particular, coordination internalizes the beneﬁt of reduced stabilization
bias of monetary policy, which is brought about by increased labor market ﬂexi-
bility. However, if the common central bank has a state-dependent unemployment
target, the result can be overturned. Policy coordination is irrelevant for ﬂexibility
choice if the common central bank has access to a commitment technology or there
is no unemployment persistence.
1 Introduction
Labor market ﬂexibility is often suggested as a remedy for European unemployment prob-
lems. Recently the EU Council (2002) urged the member countries on to continue im-
plementing further structural reforms to improve the functioning of the European labour
market, innovation and competitiveness, and to examine the possibility of introducing
more ﬂexible labor contracts into their national law. In their reports, international orga-
nizations such as the IMF and the OECD quite seldom miss the opportunity to express
their worries about the inﬂexible labor markets in various European countries (see e.g.
IMF (2002) and OECD (2002)). The European Central Bank (ECB) has also contin-
uously advised the member countries of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) to
continue reforming the labor markets in order to increase ﬂexibility (see e.g. ECB (2002)).
There seems to be a consensus of opinion that ﬂexible labor markets are especially im-
portant in a large monetary union, such as the EMU, where some shocks to the economy
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are very likely asymmetric so that only some regions or countries of the monetary union
area are aﬀected. Labor mobility in the EMU is relatively low, partly due to cultural
diﬀerences and language barriers, so one can’t count much on mobility as a shock ab-
sorber mechanism. National ﬁscal policy could in principle be used as a macroeconomic
stabilization tool, but acknowledging that due to political biases ﬁscal policy tends to err
on the lax side has led to a general perception that discretionary ﬁscal policy should be
restricted by rules limiting the size of government deﬁcits. Moreover, the lags in decision
making and policy implementation make the correct timing of discretionary ﬁscal policy
extremely diﬃcult. The importance of prudent ﬁscal policy becomes even more pro-
nounced in a monetary union, where ﬁscal proﬂigacy of a member country can threaten
the stability of the whole area through ﬁnancial market reactions. In the EMU the Sta-
bility and Growth Pact was launched in order to enforce ﬁscal discipline. However, even
without discretionary ﬁscal policy the government budget still has a stabilization role if
the so-called automatic stabilizers are allowed to work, that is, the loss of ﬁscal revenue
and the increase in welfare spending due to a downturn are not counteracted.
Against this background, it is quite natural to ask what factors do determine the ﬂex-
ibility of the national labor markets in a monetary union, and what can policy makers
do in order to promote ﬂexibility. This essay attempts to give at least partial answers to
these questions by adopting a simple political economy approach, in which national gov-
ernments decide on nominal wage ﬂexibility and face political costs, which are increasing
in the chosen level of ﬂexibility. In particular, the essay investigates the role of labor
market policy coordination in the determination of ﬂexibility. Coordination refers to a
situation where the ﬂexibility parameters of the member states are chosen so as to mini-
mize joint losses of the national governments, which result from macroeconomic volatility
and political costs of making labor markets ﬂexible. In the EU labor market policy
coordination intensiﬁed with the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, which declares that member
states shall treat employment “as a matter of common concern, and shall coordinate
their action”. However, in practice the main responsibility of deciding and implementing
labor market policy remains with the member states, and so coordination is a somewhat
stronger concept in the model than it is in reality in the EU.
Labor market ﬂexibility is a frequently used, but somewhat vague concept. One
interpretation is that ﬂexibility determines how fast is the adjustment process of the
economy in response to shocks. But, one labor market can be more ﬂexible in responding
to a one kind of shock, whereas another labor market can be more ﬂexible when the
adjustment is in response to another kind of shock. Therefore, ranking of diﬀerent labor
markets with respect to ﬂexibility can be meaningfully made only in the context of a
50
particular model of the labor market and with reference to a particular shock (for more
discussion on this point, see Pissarides (1997)).
In this essay labor market ﬂexibility is modelled as nominal wage ﬂexibility. Increasing
nominal wage ﬂexibility brings about two beneﬁts. First, since nominal wages become
more responsive to production shocks, unemployment variability decreases. Second, the
need for stabilization policy by the common central bank is reduced, which contributes
to lower inﬂation variability. The degree of nominal wage ﬂexibility is decided by the
national government. This can be seen as a simpliﬁcation of a complicated process
where labor market institutions must be designed and legislation must be enacted in
a parliamentary process. Changing the institutional setup of the economy is assumed
to be so costly and time-consuming that the government sets the ﬂexibility only once
and it can’t change it afterwards. However, making the labor markets ﬂexible entails
political costs, since nominal wage ﬂexibility is not in the interests of labor unions or
their leaders. One can argue that the opposition of ﬂexibility arises from distributional
conﬂicts among the workforce. Labor unions are usually considered to be in the hands
of senior members, whose jobs are fairly safe. Long-term nominal wage contracting will
transform disturbances to labor demand into employment ﬂuctuations, but at the same
time it provides more stable and more easily predictable incomes than shorter or more
ﬂexible contracts for senior members who are sheltered from unemployment. When the
government sets ﬂexibility, it therefore faces a tradeoﬀ between macroeconomic stability
and political popularity.
The framework used in the analysis is based on the natural rate model of monetary
policy pioneered by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983).1 This
approach builds on the idea of a natural rate of unemployment, which was developed
by Phelps (1967) and Friedman (1968). They argued on theoretical grounds that the
inﬂation-unemployment tradeoﬀ is a short-run phenomenon, and that it can’t be exploited
in the long run. Any attempt to lower unemployment below the natural rate by generating
inﬂation will lead to higher inﬂation without any eﬀect on unemployment. Lucas (1973)
derives a neoclassical Phillips curve, or an expectations augmented Phillips curve, where
unanticipated changes in money supply generate short-run eﬀects in real economy due to
imperfect information on the source of price changes. Fischer (1977), on the other hand,
arrives at the very same formulation by modelling labor markets with long-term nominal
contracting. The Barro-Gordon model adds an optimizing policy maker into the analysis
and points out that the policy maker may have an incentive to exploit the short-run
1
The standard natural rate model is usually called the Barro-Gordon model, a convention which is
somewhat unfair to the original contribution by Kydland and Prescott (1977). For brevity, this usual
practice is also followed in this essay.
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tradeoﬀ between unexpected inﬂation and unemployment in order to push unemployment
below the natural rate. Provided that the private sector has rational expectations, the
government’s attempt is anticipated and the result is the celebrated inﬂation bias without
any improvement in the average unemployment rate.
Modelling of monetary policy in this essay deviates from the standard Barro-Gordon
model in two respects. First, there is persistence in the actual unemployment rate.
Second, the central bank is assumed to target the “long-run” natural rate instead of
having an “over-ambitious” unemployment target. Both of these assumptions will aﬀect
the equilibrium of the model and are discussed below. Monetary policy is modeled as
being discretionary in the model, a view which is in line with the thinking of e.g. Blinder
(1998), Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) and King (1997), who are not only prominent
academics, but they all are or were at some points of their careers also central bankers.
However, a commitment solution for monetary policy is also derived, but it is used only
as a reference point, since it yields optimal stabilization of shocks from the society’s point
of view.
Empirically it is well established that the unemployment rate is highly persistent.
Blanchard and Summers (1986) and Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1994) report that when
unemployment is regressed on one-period lagged unemployment, the coeﬃcient estimate
on the latter is close to unity in annual data for both the UK and the USA. Layard,
Nickell and Jackman (1991, Ch. 9) estimates reduced-form employment equations for 19
OECD countries and uses two diﬀerent measures of persistence. The results indicate that
unemployment is highly persistent in most cases.
Unemployment persistence can arise from at least two sources. There may be labor
adjustment costs aﬀecting the ﬁrms’ hiring and ﬁring decisions. Alternatively, the wage
setting process itself can work as a source for unemployment dynamics. This essay adopts
the second option.2 In particular, in the spirit of Lindbeck and Snower (1986) and
following Blanchard and Summers (1986), it is shown that when the wage setting process
is dominated by insiders of the labor market, the eﬀects of production shocks tend to
persist, since changes in the number of insiders will lead to changes in the objectives of
the labor unions. The insider-outsider approach to labor markets can be applied in many
diﬀerent questions related to employment and unemployment outcomes. A recent survey
and assessment of the insider-outsider literature is provided by Lindbeck and Snower
(2001).
2
The second option is advocated e.g. by Blanchard (1991), who writes “I believe—without, I must
admit, a tightly argued case at this stage—that, for the issue at hand, the medium-run persistence of
unemployment, the dynamics coming from wage bargaining dominate those coming from search, ﬁring,
and hiring costs.”
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When unemployment persistence is incorporated into the Barro-Gordon model the
central bank’s problem becomes explicitly dynamic in nature. When setting monetary
policy, the central bank has to bear in mind that its policy will aﬀect unemployment not
only in the current period, but in the future as well. It follows that it becomes more
important to stabilize production shocks, because once unemployment rises, it will take
long time before it returns to the initial level. Needless to say that this reasoning pre-
supposes that the central bank is forward-looking. Lockwood and Philippopoulos (1994)
ﬁrst analyzed the natural rate model with unemployment persistence under discretionary
monetary policy and showed that inﬂation bias problem is aggravated in the dynamic
model and that there are multiple equilibria and indeterminacy problems. Suggested
solutions to these problems will be discussed later in the essay. Svensson (1997) and
Lockwood, Miller and Zhang (1998) showed that optimal stabilization is increasing in
persistence and that discretionary monetary policy leads to a new problem, that is, a
stabilization bias emerges. Inﬂation variability is too high and unemployment variability
is too low from the society’s point of view. This ineﬃcient stabilization performance will
play an important role in the analysis.
The central bank targets the long-run natural rate in the model, which means that
the problem of inﬂation bias disappears, since the central bank’s incentives to use mone-
tary policy as a device in lowering the rate of unemployment below the natural rate are
destroyed. A justiﬁcation for rejecting the inﬂation bias argument is given in the follow-
ing. First, it must be acknowledged, that the inﬂation bias model can be seen as a rather
good description of the incentives facing politicians when they were in charge of monetary
policy. Then, it is quite natural that if the natural rate is too high from the society’s
point of view, governments may be tempted to use monetary policy to bring down unem-
ployment. As already said, this results in inﬂation bias, but the average unemployment
rate is unchanged. Obviously, structural measures to lower imperfections in product and
labor markets were actually needed to combat unemployment, but implementing such
measures are assumed to be politically costly, and therefore politicians are inclined to
take the soft option. However, when monetary policy is delegated to an independent
central bank, there seems no reason whatsoever for the central bank to target anything
other than the natural rate. Casual evidence suggests that this is indeed the case. In the
1990s central bank acts were reformed in many countries toward greater independence
from political pressures, which was followed by convergence to low inﬂation.
As an extension to the basic model the essay considers an alternative unemployment
target for the central bank and its implications for labor market ﬂexibility and coordi-
nation. Due to persistence the short-run natural rate of unemployment diﬀers from the
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long-run one. Svensson (1997) argued that the discretionary equilibrium can be improved
on by directing the central bank to target the short-run natural rate, and the outcome
then would coincide with the commitment solution, which yields optimal stabilization of
shocks. However, Røisland (2001) showed that this conjecture is incorrect.3 The central
bank’s reaction is the same as in an economy without any real persistence, which means
that the central bank stabilizes shocks too little. The short-run natural rate is deﬁned
as the unemployment level without inﬂation surprises and production shocks, that is, it
is equal to last period’s unemployment multiplied with the persistence parameter of the
unemployment process. It follows that the short-run natural rate is endogenous to the
central bank. If, however, the central bank misinterprets the changes in the natural rate
as arising solely from structural factors and hence fails to recognize the impact of its own
actions, it can justify the choice of the short-run natural rate as its target. This type of
central bank resembles, but is a milder version of “new conservatism” launched by De
Grauwe (2000, Ch. 7). The new conservatism refers to a central bank who systematically
estimates the natural unemployment rate to coincide with the observed unemployment
rate. According to De Grauwe there is a risk that the ECB may behave like this, and he
argues that the policy statements of the ECB often associate the observed level unem-
ployment with structural unemployment.
The modeling strategy of the essay is very similar to that of Calmfors (2001), where the
ﬂexibility comparison is made between national monetary policy regime and a member-
ship in a monetary union. Calmfors (2001) allows ﬂexibility to interact with the long-run
natural rate and also studies the case where inﬂation bias is present. However, a notable
diﬀerence to this essay is that there is no persistence in the economy and coordination
of labor market policies is not considered. Another closely related paper by Sibert and
Sutherland (2000) studies the same problem as Calmfors (2001), but there ﬂexibility is of
more limited nature and can’t be interpreted as perfect nominal wage ﬂexibility, because
there it aﬀects only the propagation of production shocks to the real economy, leaving
inﬂation surprises still as an eﬀective means to control real activity.4 The impact of the
formation of a monetary union on the need and incentives for ﬂexibility enhancing labor
market reform is also discussed and analyzed e.g. in Pissarides (1997), Bean (1998) and
Saint-Paul and Bentolila (2000).
This essay identiﬁes at least some of the factors aﬀecting the chosen level of labor mar-
3
Øistein Røisland kindly informed the author of this fact after a working paper version (Rantala
(2003)) of this essay was published.
4
Sibert and Sutherland’s (2000) way of modelling ﬂexibility is consistent with a timing protocol, where
wage negotiations occur after the production shock has been realized and observed, but before monetary
policy is set in each period.
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ket ﬂexibility. In a monetary union the common monetary policy reacts only to common
shocks, and therefore the structure of the shocks in the economy is a crucial factor. As
expected, the more asymmetric the shocks are, the higher is the chosen level of nominal
wage ﬂexibility. Higher marginal political costs in turn discourage ﬂexibility, since the
marginal beneﬁt from ﬂexibility is unaltered. Higher persistence leads to prolonged devi-
ations from the natural rate and, quite intuitively, encourages the government to choose
more ﬂexible markets.
The monetary union is assumed to be large in the sense that each government is small
relative to the central bank so that it will take monetary policy as given. Coordination
of national labor market policies, however, brings in a strategic aspect to the model. It
is shown that stabilization policy of the central bank is aﬀected by the average ﬂexibility
in the monetary union area so that by choosing more ﬂexibility it is possible to improve
the stabilization properties of monetary policy. In particular, by choosing more ﬂexibility
in a coordinated fashion, the governments can reduce the stabilization bias of monetary
policy. Therefore, the marginal beneﬁt from ﬂexibility is higher under coordination, and
coordination results in more ﬂexible labor markets than national decision making. But,
coordination turns out to be irrelevant for ﬂexibility, if stabilization policy is optimal
from the society’s point of view. This is the case when there is no persistence in the
economy or the central bank has access to a commitment technology.
If the central bank is of new conservative type described above, and stabilizes shocks
too little, coordination leads to lower ﬂexibility, thereby pushing the stabilization policy
closer to the optimum. The essay discusses also the impact of coordination on social wel-
fare and the government incentives for coordination. According to numerical simulations,
it seems that social welfare is higher and government losses are lower under coordination,
implying that coordination is welfare improving and that governments do have incentives
to coordinate their actions. However, in the new conservatism regime social welfare de-
creases under coordination, but the reduction of political costs due to lower ﬂexibility
reduces government losses. The result is that governments have incentives to coordinate
their actions, even though it brings about lower social welfare.
Finally, the essay brieﬂy investigates a situation where a country is not a member
of a monetary union, but has an independent monetary policy.5 Calmfors (2001) shows
that the chosen level of labor market ﬂexibility will then be lower than inside a monetary
union, because monetary policy can stabilize the country-speciﬁc asymmetric part of the
production shock, rather than just the common part like in a monetary union. This
5
Independent monetary policy in this context means that a country can and is willing to use monetary
policy as a stabilization tool. Hence, the exchange rate regime can e.g. be a ﬂexible rate regime or a
ﬁxed but adjustable rate one.
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result is in line with the TINA (there is no alternative) argument discussed in Bean
(1998), which states that once policy makers lose monetary policy as a stabilization tool,
they will have no alternative but to make labor markets more ﬂexible via reform. It turns
out that this is not necessarily the case when unemployment persists. As under policy
coordination in a monetary union, under a national monetary policy the government is
in a strategic position and has an incentive to choose more ﬂexible markets to improve
the stabilization properties of the economy. But, in a large monetary union this eﬀect
disappears. Hence, in a monetary union ﬂexibility tends to be more important because
monetary policy can no longer stabilize country-speciﬁc shocks, but on the other hand,
the disappearance of the incentive to increase ﬂexibility for stabilization reasons will
lower the chosen level of ﬂexibility. Numerical simulations suggest that the latter eﬀect
dominates when persistence is high enough, and so ﬂexibility can actually be lower in a
monetary union.
This essay is organized as follows. In Section 2 the basic structure of the model
is presented and the related Phillips curves are derived. The common central bank’s
optimal policy rule under both commitment and discretion is presented in Section 3.
Finally, Section 4 analyzes the determination of labor market ﬂexibility assuming ﬁrst
that ﬂexibility decisions are made independently by the national governments. After
deriving this benchmark case the focus shifts to policy coordination. Section 5 considers
some extensions to the model and studies the impact of coordination on social welfare.
Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 The Basic Structure
The monetary union consists of a continuum of countries indexed by i and distributed
uniformly between i = 0 and i = 1. Each country contains a continuum of ﬁrms indexed
by j and distributed uniformly between j = 0 and j = 1. For simplicity, the ﬁrms in
all countries produce the same product, so the goods market is perfectly competitive.6
Throughout the essay, all countries are symmetrical in terms of structural parameters
6
Alternatively, the product markets in each country could be monopolistically competitive. This
assumption would make the structure of the model more complicated, because ﬁrms would have pricing
power in the markets. Then the central bank could not be assumed to control inﬂation directly, as it does
in this essay. Coricelli, Cukierman and Dalmazzo (2000, 2001) and Soskice and Iversen (2000) consider
models where the central bank sets money supply and ﬁrms choose prices. Their model setups, however,
are static. In this essay the game between the central bank and the labor unions is dynamic, which
will become apparent in Section 3. It is unclear how the equilibrium strategies of the three player types
would look like in such a dynamic setup. This task is left for future research.
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and preferences of the policy makers and labor unions. Only one type of asymmetry is
allowed, namely production shocks have a country-speciﬁc part.
The model economy evolves over an inﬁnite number of time periods t = 0, 1, .... At
t = 0, each national government chooses its preferred labor market ﬂexibility, denoted
by s
i
. Following Calmfors (2001), labor market ﬂexibility is introduced into the model
by assuming that in each country there is a ﬂexible sector and an inﬂexible sector of the
economy. Slightly simplifying Calmfors’s model, a fraction s
i
of the ﬁrms is character-
ized by competitive (spot) labor markets where labor supply and labor demand together
determine the equilibrium wage, whereas in a fraction 1− s
i
of the ﬁrms one period nom-
inal wage contracting prevails and employment is demand determined.7 After ﬂexibility
is determined in all countries, a dynamic game between the common central bank and
the private sectors of all countries begins at t = 1. Within each time period events unfold
as follows. (i) Firm-speciﬁc labor unions set nominal wages in the inﬂexible ﬁrms in each
country. (ii) Production shocks are realized. (iii) The central bank sets inﬂation for the
whole monetary union area. (iv) Competitive nominal wage is determined in the ﬂexible
ﬁrms and production occurs in each country.8
2.2 The Labor Market
In every period t, ﬁrm j’s labor demand schedule in country i is given by
ld
jit
= p
it
− w
jit
− ε
it
, (1)
where l
jit
is the log of the employment level, p
it
is the log of the price level, w
jit
is the
log of the nominal wage and ε
it
is a country i speciﬁc production shock, which has zero
mean and a variance equal to σ2
ε
.9 Each ﬁrm is assumed to have a pool of immobile
workers, whose labor supply schedule is perfectly inelastic with respect to the real wage
and is normalized to zero10
ls = 0. (2)
In the ﬂexible ﬁrms characterized by competitive labor markets labor demand equals
7
In Calmfors (2001) there is a large number of production sectors in the economy, and a large number
of ﬁrms in each sector. Some sectors are ﬂexible and some inﬂexible.
8
It could equally well be assumed that in the ﬂexible ﬁrms labor unions still determine wages, but
instead of setting nominal wages at stage (i) before production shocks and monetary policy, they would
act at stage (iv).
9
Cobb-Douglas production function with ﬁxed capital stock and α as the labor share yields (1− α)
−1
as the (absolute value) of the real wage elasticity of labor demand. As in Lockwood and Philippopoulos
(1994) this elasticity is normalized to unity for analytical simplicity.
10
Complete symmetry across ﬁrms, countries and time periods implies: l
s
jit
= l
s
it
= l
s
t
= l
s
.
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labor supply at every time period, and employment is hence constant at zero, l̂
jit
= 0,
which yields zero unemployment in competitive markets, û = ls − l̂
jit
= 0. The spot
market nominal wage becomes
ŵ
it
= p
it
− ε
it
, (3)
and thereby depends both on the realized production shock and monetary policy reaction,
which in turn determines the price level.
In the inﬂexible ﬁrms workers are organized in ﬁrm-speciﬁc labor unions, who set
one-period nominal wages before the production shock is realized and inﬂation is chosen
by the central bank. Firms choose employment after the shock, so employment is demand
determined and workers may be oﬀ their labor supply schedules. The utility function of
a ﬁrm-speciﬁc labor union is given by
U
jit
= −E
t−1
(
l
jit
− l
jit
)
2
, (4)
where l
jit
is the period t employment target of the labor union and E
t−1
is a conditional
expectations operator. In a standard labor union model the union’s employment target,
l
jit
, is assumed to be constant and quite often below the full employment level. These
assumptions bring about a constant positive natural rate of unemployment. Here, the
employment target is assumed to be time varying and aﬀected by “insider power”. In
the spirit of Lindbeck and Snower (1986), and following Blanchard and Summers (1986),
it is assumed that the employment target of the union is a weighted (geometric) mean of
the currently employed insiders, l
jit−1
, and the total labor force available to the ﬁrm, ls
l
jit
= ρl
jit−1
+ (1− ρ) ls, (5)
where ρ, (0 ≤ ρ < 1) is the measure of insider power in wage setting.11 By setting ρ = 0,
the model collapses to the standard case with a constant employment target.
The union’s optimization problem is to set w
jit
so as to maximize (4). Maximization
yields a nominal wage rule of the form
w
jit
= pe
it
− (ρl
jit−1
+ (1− ρ) ls) , (6)
with pe
it
being the expectation of the price level. Together with the labor demand schedule
(1) this gives
l
jit
= ρl
jit−1
+ (1− ρ) ls + (p
it
− pe
it
)− ε
it
. (7)
11
As is clear from (2), l
s
is actually normalized to zero in the model. This assumption will be utilized
in (8).
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Deﬁning inﬂation as π
it
= p
it
− p
it−1
, from which πe
it
= pe
it
− p
it−1
follows, and deﬁning
the ﬁrm-speciﬁc unemployment rate at time t to be u
jit
= ls − l
jit
, it is possible to
derive a ﬁrm/union speciﬁc neoclassical (expectations augmented) Phillips curve with
unemployment persistence
u
jit
= ρu
jit−1
− (π
it
− πe
it
) + ε
it
. (8)
In this simple setup the parameter capturing the insider power in wage setting is
translated directly into the measure of persistence in unemployment rate. The labor
union’s employment target is in the long run consistent with the total labor force available
to the ﬁrm, ls. Thereby unemployment ﬂuctuates around the full employment level and
the existence of labor unions doesn’t create unemployment in the long run in this model.
Hence, ﬂexibility and average unemployment are independent of each other. Increasing
nominal wage ﬂexibility doesn’t lower average unemployment, but aﬀects the temporal
properties of the unemployment rate. The fact that average unemployment is zero in
the model is just a normalization. It could equally well be assumed that the long-run
employment target of the union is lower than full employment, in which case the average
unemployment would be positive in the unionized sector of the economy. Likewise, the
competitive markets could be assumed to have some matching frictions, which would
cause frictional unemployment. The model setup is chosen because by setting the average
unemployment in both ﬂexible and inﬂexible sectors the same, it is possible to isolate the
pure stabilization motive to make the economy more ﬂexible from other possible reasons
to promote ﬂexibility.
The country-wide neoclassical Phillips curve is obtained by integrating over the ﬁrm
speciﬁc Phillips curves in both union dominated ﬁrms and ﬁrms with competitive labor
markets with respect to j, which gives
u
it
=
∫
1
0
u
jit
dj =
∫
s
i
0
û
jit
dj +
∫
1
s
i
u
jit
dj (9)
= ρu
it−1
− (1− s
i
) (π
it
− πe
it
) + (1− s
i
) ε
it
,
where u
it−1
=
∫
1
0
u
jit−1
dj =
∫
1
s
i
u
jit−1
dj. Nominal wage ﬂexibility aﬀects the slope of the
Phillips curve and the unemployment eﬀect of the production shock, but persistence of the
economy is unaﬀected. At ﬁrst it may seem strange that the persistence of the aggregate
unemployment is independent of labor market ﬂexibility. However, the intuition behind
this outcome is clear. An increase in ﬂexibility will have a “level eﬀect” on unemployment
rate so that after, say, a negative production shock u
it
will not rise as much as with lower
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ﬂexibility. But, there is no “speed eﬀect” in increasing ﬂexibility, since unemployment in
union dominated ﬁrms with long-term nominal contracts will return toward the long-run
equilibrium at a constant rate, which is unaﬀected by ﬂexibility.
The ﬁnal step in developing the basic structure of the model is to aggregate the
country-speciﬁc Phillips curves into a monetary union wide one. As mentioned, the
production shock consists of a common, monetary union wide, part µ
t
and an asymmetric,
country speciﬁc, part ν
it
ε
it
= µ
t
+ ν
it
, (10)
where the two shocks are independent and symmetrically distributed and have zero means
and variances σ2
µ
and σ2
ν
, respectively.12 Integrating (9) over i gives
u
t
=
∫
1
0
u
it
di (11)
=
∫
1
0
(ρu
it−1
− (1− s
i
) (π
it
− πe
it
) + (1− s
i
)µ
t
+ (1− s
i
) ν
it
) di
= ρu
t−1
− (1− s) (π
t
− πe
t
) + (1− s)µ
t
,
where u
t−1
=
∫
1
0
u
it−1
di and s =
∫
1
0
s
i
di. The country-speciﬁc shocks, ν
it
, cancel out,
because s
i
is decided before the dynamic game between the common central bank and
the private sectors of all countries starts, and is not allowed to be state-dependent.13
Thus 1 − s
i
is uncorrelated with the realization of the country-speciﬁc shock, ν
it
, and
according to the law of large numbers the integral
∫
1
0
(1− s
i
) ν
it
di equals zero.
From (11) it is clear that the short-run natural rate of unemployment is diﬀerent
from the long-run natural rate. The former is the rate of unemployment in the absence
of an inﬂation surprise and a production shock, which is obviously state-dependent and
equal to ρu
t−1
at time period t. The latter, the long-run natural rate, is the mean of the
unemployment process and normalized here to zero.
12
With this simple shock structure (equation (10)) the correlation of shocks between the member
countries is given by
corr (ε
it
, ε
kt
) =
cov (ε
it
, ε
kt
)
√
var (ε
it
)
√
var (ε
kt
)
=
cov (µ
t
, µ
t
)
√
var (ε
it
)
√
var (ε
kt
)
=
var (µ
t
)
var (ε
it
)
=
σ
2
µ
σ
2
µ
+ σ
2
ν
.
13
Obviously, it may be the case that optimal s
it
would depend on ν
it
. This is ruled out in the analysis.
Given the interpretation of s
i
in the model, it is quite diﬃcult to consider it as being adjustable over the
business cycle.
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2.3 Government and Central Bank Preferences
The intertemporal social loss function of country i is assumed to be of the standard
quadratic form
SL
i
= E
0
(
∞∑
t=1
βt−1
1
2
(
(π
t
− π∗)2 + λu2
it
))
, (12)
where β (0 < β < 1) is the discount factor, λ > 0 is the relative weight on unemployment
stabilization, and π∗ is the inﬂation target of the society.14 The government’s loss function
of country i consists of the social loss function (12) and an additional term κs
i
, which is
interpreted as a political cost of making the economy more ﬂexible
GL
i
= E
0
(
∞∑
t=1
βt−1
(
1
2
(
(π
t
− π∗)2 + λu2
it
)
+ κs
i
))
(13)
As discussed already in Introduction, a natural explanation for the political cost can be
derived from labor union behavior in the model. The senior members of the unions can
guarantee stable incomes for themselves by long-term nominal contracting, thereby letting
unemployment to absorb shocks which are not stabilized by common monetary policy.
By increasing the ﬂexible part of the economy by choosing a higher s
i
the government
increases wage ﬂexibility in the economy, which contradicts the preferences of the senior
members of the labor unions.
The objective function of the common central bank is otherwise identical to the social
loss function (12), but has the monetary union wide unemployment rate as an argument
instead of a country-speciﬁc one
V = E
0
(
∞∑
t=1
βt−1
1
2
(
(π
t
− π∗)2 + λu2
t
))
(14)
It is assumed that the common central bank has the same discount rate, the same inﬂation
target, and the same zero unemployment target as the society. Since the unemployment
target equals to the long-run natural rate of zero, there is no average inﬂation bias in
the model. For simplicity, the central bank is assumed to have perfect control over the
inﬂation rate π
t
. It sets the inﬂation rate in each period after the productivity shock is
realized and observed.
14
Again, symmetry across countries implies π
∗
i
= π
∗
.
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3 Monetary Policy
3.1 The Dynamic Game
The equilibrium in the standard Barro-Gordon model is the one-shot Nash equilibrium,
which is repeated indeﬁnitely. Here, since unemployment is persistent (see equation (11)),
the game between the central bank and the private sector is dynamic instead of being a
repeated one. The natural rate model with unemployment dynamics was ﬁrst analyzed in
Lockwood and Philippopoulos (1994). The derivation of optimal monetary policy under
diﬀerent policy regimes in this section follows quite closely that of Svensson (1997).
The stabilization problem of the central bank is a dynamic one, since the extent to
which u
t
is stabilized after a shock will aﬀect next period’s t + 1 short-run natural rate
of unemployment, ρu
t
. The state variable of this dynamic game is u
t−1
, that is , u
t−1
summarizes the impact of the history of the game on the current short-run natural rate
of unemployment, ρu
t−1
. The fact that the persistence of the natural rate is endogenous
in the model is crucial for the outcome.15 In Barro and Gordon (1983) the natural rate
is persistent, but it is exogenous to the central bank. Then the problem is still static in
nature and the only change is that the inﬂation bias is persistent.
The solution concept used in this essay is the Markov-perfect equilibrium, where
the current actions of the players depend on the history of the game only through the
state variable and trigger strategies are ruled out (see e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)).
Since it is assumed that labor market ﬂexibility is chosen before the dynamic game starts,
s =
∫
1
0
s
i
di is taken to be exogenous to the central bank.
3.2 Commitment as a Reference Point
Even though the purpose of this essay is to focus on the interaction of discretionary (time-
consistent) monetary policy and endogenously determined labor market ﬂexibility, it is
useful to derive the commitment solution to the dynamic monetary policy game ﬁrst. The
commitment outcome serves as a reference point, because it yields optimal stabilization
of production shocks from the society’s point of view. It is, however, generally not
considered to be a good description of actual monetary policy.
The optimal policy rule under commitment can be derived by utilizing the dynamic
programming approach. The present value of losses to the central bank from t onward,
given that the precommitment rule is chosen optimally, is denoted by V ∗ (u
t−1
). Assuming
15
To be precise, persistence parameter, ρ, is exogenous to the central bank, but u
t−1
is endogenous.
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that V ∗ (u
t−1
) exists, the Bellman equation characterizing the central bank’s optimization
problem can be written as
V ∗ (u
t−1
) = min
π
t
,π
e
t
E
t−1
(
1
2
(
(π
t
− π∗)2 + λu2
t
)
+ βV ∗ (u
t
)
)
(15)
subject to (11) and
πe
t
= E
t−1
π
t
. (16)
Since the central bank chooses its policy rule before inﬂation expectations are formed,
it can actually choose the expectation πe
t
as well, subject to the requirement that πe
t
is
rational. This implies that πe
t
= E
t−1
π
t
is a constraint on the choice of policy rule by the
central bank, not an identity.
The ﬁrst-order conditions for a minimum with respect to π
t
and πe
t
are
(π
t
− π∗)− λ (1− s) u
t
− βV ∗
u
(u
t
) (1− s) + φ
t
= 0, (17)
E
t−1
(λ (1− s) u
t
+ βV ∗
u
(u
t
) (1− s))− φ
t
= 0, (18)
where φ
t
is the Lagrange multiplier of (16). Eliminating the Lagrange multiplier yields
(π
t
− π∗)− λ (1− s) u
t
− βV ∗
u
(u
t
) (1− s) + (19)
E
t−1
(λ (1− s) u
t
+ βV ∗
u
(u
t
) (1− s)) = 0.
Taking expectations at t− 1 of (19) gives
E
t−1
π
t
= π∗, (20)
which implies that the expected inﬂation rate equals the target rate.
The central bank’s problem is linear-quadratic, so the “guess and verify” technique of
solving dynamic programming problems can be applied.16 In this class of problems the
present value of losses to the central bank is a quadratic function of the state variable,
u
t−1
V ∗ (u
t−1
) = γ∗
0
+ γ∗
1
u
t−1
+
1
2
γ∗
2
u2
t−1
. (21)
Substituting equations (11), (16), (20) and V ∗
u
(u
t−1
) = γ∗
1
+ γ∗
2
u
t−1
into (19) and solving
the equation for π
t
gives the precommitment inﬂation rule
π
t
= π∗ + b∗µ
t
, (22)
16
See Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000, Ch. 2-4) for more discussion on this point.
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where
b∗ =
(1− s)2 (λ + βγ∗
2
)(
1 + (1− s)2 (λ+ βγ∗
2
)
) . (23)
Average unemployment in the monetary union will then follow the process
u
t
= ρu
t−1
+ (1− s) (1− b∗)µ
t
, (24)
and country i unemployment is given by
u
it
= ρu
it−1
+ (1− s
i
) (1− b∗)µ
t
+ (1− s
i
) ν
it
. (25)
In order to solve b∗, the coeﬃcient γ∗
2
needs to be solved ﬁrst. The coeﬃcients γ∗
0
and
γ∗
1
are not of interest here, since they don’t enter the policy rule. Substituting equations
(21)-(24) into the Bellman equation and identifying the coeﬃcient of u2
t−1
results in a
Riccati equation in γ∗
2
1
2
γ∗
2
=
1
2
λρ2 +
1
2
βρ2γ∗
2
, (26)
which gives
γ∗
2
=
λρ2
(1− βρ2)
. (27)
Finally, b∗ is solved by inserting (27) into (23), which yields
b∗ =
(1− s)2 λ(
1 + (1− s)2 λ− βρ2
) . (28)
It is noteworthy that the optimal inﬂation response to a common component of the
production shock, b∗, is increasing with unemployment persistence. In the presence of
persistence, a one-time shock to unemployment will aﬀect the unemployment rate also
in the future, whereby stabilizing unemployment becomes more important than in a
world without persistence. It follows that inﬂation variability will increase with real
persistence, but inﬂation itself doesn’t persist. By setting ρ = 0 (and s = 0) (28) reduces
to a standard static equilibrium in a natural rate model under commitment (see e.g.
Persson and Tabellini (2000, Ch. 15)).
3.3 Optimal Monetary Policy under Discretion
In the discretionary regime the monetary authority can’t commit to a certain policy
rule before inﬂation expectations are formed, but it re-optimizes in every period after
inﬂation expectations are set and the production shock is realized so as to minimize the
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intertemporal loss function. Assuming that V (u
t−1
) exists, the Bellman equation of the
central bank’s optimization problem can be written as
V (u
t−1
) = E
t−1
min
π
t
(
1
2
(
(π
t
− π∗)2 + λu2
t
)
+ βV (u
t
)
)
(29)
subject to (11). Since inﬂation expectations are now given, minimization is carried out
only with respect to π
t
. The central bank sets inﬂation after observing the production
shock, therefore min
π
t
is moved inside the expectations operator. Even though the cen-
tral bank does not take into account the impact of its choice of inﬂation on inﬂation
expectations, it does pay attention to the fact that current unemployment will have an
eﬀect on current expectations of future inﬂation through V (u
t
).
The ﬁrst-order condition for a minimum in this problem is given by
(π
t
− π∗)− λ (1− s)u
t
− βV
u
(u
t
) (1− s) = 0. (30)
Again, the value function must be quadratic, since the objective function is quadratic
and the constraint is linear. The coeﬃcients of the value function in the discretionary
case are written without asterisks
V (u
t−1
) = γ
0
+ γ
1
u
t−1
+
1
2
γ
2
u2
t−1
. (31)
The ﬁrst-order condition becomes
(π
t
− π∗)− λ (1− s) u
t
− β (γ
1
+ γ
2
u
t
) (1− s) = 0. (32)
Taking expectations of (32) yields
E
t−1
π
t
= π∗ + β (1− s) γ
1
+ (1− s) (λ+ βγ
2
) ρu
t−1
. (33)
Combining (32) and (33), using (11) and (16) yields the optimal discretionary decision
rule
π
t
= a + bµ
t
+ cu
t−1
, (34)
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where
a = π∗ + β (1− s) γ
1
, (35)
b =
(1− s)2 (λ+ βγ
2
)(
1 + (1− s)2 (λ+ βγ
2
)
) ,
c = (1− s) (λ+ βγ
2
) ρ.
Average unemployment in the monetary union will follow the process
u
t
= ρu
t−1
+ (1− s) (1− b)µ
t
, (36)
and country i unemployment is given by
u
it
= ρu
it−1
+ (1− s
i
) (1− b)µ
t
+ (1− s
i
) ν
it
. (37)
Now, the coeﬃcients γ
1
and γ
2
show up in the policy rule and need to be determined.
Substituting equations (34)-(36) into the Bellman equation (29) of the discretionary case
and identifying the coeﬃcients of u
t−1
and u2
t−1
yields two Riccati equations
γ
1
= (1− s)2 (λ+ βγ
2
)βργ
1
+ βργ
1
, (38)
1
2
γ
2
=
1
2
(1− s)2 (λ+ βγ
2
)2 ρ2 +
1
2
(λ+ βγ
2
) ρ2. (39)
The system is recursive. Equation (39) determines γ
2
, which can be substituted into (38)
to identify γ
1
. However, equation (39) is quadratic in γ
2
and thus there are in general
two solutions for γ
2
with a given set of parameters. Re-organizing the second equation
and using c from equation (35) results in
(1− s)βρc2 −
(
1− ρ2β
)
c+ λ (1− s) ρ = 0, (40)
which yields real solutions
c =
(1− ρ2β)±
√
(1− ρ2β)2 − 4 (1− s)2 ρ2βλ
2 (1− s) ρβ
, (41)
if, and only if, the discriminant is non-negative. This constraint gives an upper bound
for the weight of unemployment in the central bank’s objective function
λ ≤
(1− ρ2β)
2
4 (1− s)2 βρ2
. (42)
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Obviously, it is required that (42) is satisﬁed, since complex solutions make no sense for
rates of inﬂation and unemployment.
Whenever there is a real solution to (40) there seems to be two of them. Lockwood
and Philippopoulos (1994) show that the “low inﬂation” equilibrium which is associated
with a lower value of c has plausible comparative statics properties, whereas the “high
inﬂation” equilibrium responds counter-intuitively to changes in parameter values.17,18
Moreover, the high inﬂation equilibrium exists only when time horizon is inﬁnite.
In the literature, two approaches to deal with the problem of multiple equilibria in
this model has been applied. The ﬁrst solution is to ignore the “bad equilibrium” with
high inﬂation and to focus on the “good equilibrium”. This strategy is followed e.g. by
Svensson (1997, 1999), Beetsma and Jensen (1999), Lockwood, Miller and Zhang (1998)
and Røisland (2001). The second solution treats the two equilibria more equally and
considers them being possible outcomes of the model. This line of reasoning is followed
e.g. by Lockwood and Philippopoulos (1994), Lockwood (1997) and Jensen (1999).
This essay adopts the ﬁrst approach, that is, only the low inﬂation equilibrium is
considered and c becomes
c =
(1− ρ2β)−
√
(1− ρ2β)2 − 4 (1− s)2 ρ2βλ
2 (1− s) ρβ
. (43)
Multiple equilibria would be especially problematic in this essay, since the governments
would then be uncertain about the inﬂation and unemployment processes with a given
set of parameter values and would have to base their ﬂexibility decisions on some expec-
tation about the realized equilibrium. The justiﬁcation for excluding the high inﬂation
equilibrium is novel. By applying the theory of adaptive learning it is shown in Chapter
4 that only the low inﬂation equilibrium is stable under least-squares learning. That is,
if the agents don’t know the parameters of the policy rule, but act as econometricians
and re-estimate them from existing data in each time period using least-squares estima-
tion technique, they can only learn the low inﬂation equilibrium. Evans and Honkapohja
(2001) provide a comprehensive treatment of learning in macroeconomics.
Now, rearranging the ﬁrst Riccati equation (38) gives
γ
1
(1− β ((1− s) c+ ρ)) = 0, (44)
17
“Low inﬂation” equilibrium means that with a given u
t−1
> 0 the lower value of c gives lower
inﬂation than the higher value of c. Obviously, when u
t−1
< 0 the opposite happens.
18
In the “high inﬂation” equilibrium inﬂation increases when the weight given to inﬂation variability
in the central bank’s objective function increases, and decreases when the real persistence increases or
when the central bank cares more about the future.
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which holds in general if γ
1
= 0. The second Riccati equation (39) can be written as
γ
2
=
λρ2 (1− s)2
(1− ρ2β)
+
c2
(1− ρ2β)
. (45)
Substitution of γ
1
= 0 and (45) into (35) gives the optimal policy rule under discretion
π
t
= π∗ + bµ
t
+ cu
t−1
(46)
where
b =
(1− s)2 λ+ (1− s)2 βc2(
1 + (1− s)2 λ− βρ2 + (1− s)2 βc2
) , (47)
and c is given by equation (41). It is easy to see from the optimal policy rule that average
inﬂation bias is absent. Inﬂation ﬂuctuates around the target rate π∗ like in the commit-
ment solution. This is due to the fact that the unemployment target of the central bank is
not over-ambitious, but coincides with the long-run natural rate. Since it is obvious from
(41) that c > 0, it follows that with a given level of s there is a stabilization bias under
discretion, that is, b > b∗. Discretionary monetary policy overreacts to production shocks
causing too much inﬂation variability and too little unemployment variability relative
to the socially optimal stabilization policy. Moreover, c > 0 implies that even though
there is no average inﬂation bias in monetary policy, there is a state-dependent inﬂation
bias, that is, inﬂation responds ineﬃciently to changes in unemployment. The ineﬃ-
cient stabilization is induced by the fact that under discretion the future state-dependent
inﬂation bias depends on the current unemployment rate. It is therefore important to sta-
bilize unemployment in order to reduce the future state-dependent inﬂation bias. Quite
interestingly, the optimal discretionary policy rule (46) indicates that unlike in the com-
mitment solution, real persistence induces inﬂation persistence as well. This can be seen
by noting that u
t−1
follows the process (36).
Noting that lim
ρ→0
(c) = 0 (see the Appendix) it becomes evident that (47) and
(28) are identical when ρ = 0. This is just the well-known fact that in the standard
Barro-Gordon framework stabilization is eﬃcient under discretion (see e.g. Persson and
Tabellini (2000), Ch. 15).
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4 Determination of Labor Market Flexibility
4.1 National Labor Market Policy
When governments choose their preferred labor market ﬂexibility, s
i
, they know the
monetary policy rule derived in the previous section. However, since there is a large
number of countries in the monetary union, each government takes the discretionary
monetary policy reaction as given when setting s
i
. In other words, inﬂation variability is
exogenous in government’s optimization problem. It is easy to show that social welfare is
increasing in ﬂexibility, since both inﬂation and unemployment variability are decreasing
in s (see the Appendix).
Since governments are assumed to be able to commit to a certain level of ﬂexibility
indeﬁnitely, and the optimal behavior of the central bank is correctly anticipated, it is
convenient to express the intertemporal loss function in terms of the endogenous variables
and model parameters
GL
i
=
1
2 (1− β)
((
b2 +
β (1− s)2 (1− b)2
(1− βρ2)
c2
)
σ2
µ
(48)
+λ
(1− s
i
)2
(
(1− b)2 σ2
µ
+ σ2
ν
)
(1− βρ2)
+ 2κs
i
)
,
which is obtained by inserting the inﬂation rule (46) into the government’s loss function
(13) and using the expressions of expected present values of squared future unemploy-
ment deviations derived in the Appendix. Parameters b and c are functions of s (and
not of s
i
), and therefore taken as exogenous. The government faces a tradeoﬀ between
unemployment variability (the second term) and political costs (the third term). A higher
level of ﬂexibility is needed in order to lower unemployment ﬂuctuations, but it can be
attained only through higher political costs.
The ﬁrst-order condition of the government’s problem will be
∂GL
i
∂s
i
=
1
2 (1− β)
(
−
2λ (1− s
i
) (1− b)2
(1− βρ2)
σ2
µ
−
2λ (1− s
i
)
(1− βρ2)
σ2
ν
+ 2κ
)
= 0. (49)
The ﬁrst-order condition determines implicitly the optimal level of labor market ﬂexibility.
Solving s
i
as a function of s from the ﬁrst-order condition yields
s
i
= H (s) = 1−
κ (1− βρ2)
λ
(
(1− b)2 σ2
µ
+ σ2
ν
) , (50)
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where H
s
> 0 implies that the ﬂexibility choices of the governments are strategic comple-
ments.19 It follows that multiple equilibria are possible in this model. Since the economic
environment of the countries is ex ante identical, that is, the variances of the country
speciﬁc shocks and the structural parameters are equal across countries, the equilibrium
is symmetric, s
i
= s. Replacing s
i
by s in the ﬁrst-order condition gives
κ = F (s) =
λ (1− s) (1− b)2
(1− βρ2)
σ2
µ
+
λ (1− s)
(1− βρ2)
σ2
ν
, (51)
where F (s) represents marginal beneﬁts from ﬂexibility at the common level of s. As in
Calmfors (2001), the non-uniqueness of equilibria is ruled out by imposing the following
condition
−
(
(1− b)2 + 2 (1− s) (1− b) b
s
)
σ2
µ
− σ2
ν
< 0, (52)
which implies that F
s
< 0. The optimal level of labor market ﬂexibility, s∗, solves equation
(51) and the equilibrium is illustrated graphically as the intersection of the horizontal line
at κ and function F (s) in Figure 1.20
s
κ
10
F(s)
s*
Figure 1: Determination of labor market ﬂexibility under national decision making
This graphical representation can be applied to analyze the comparative statics prop-
erties of the equilibrium. First, it is easy to establish that increasing the total variance
of production shocks, σ2
µ
+ σ2
ν
, so that neither σ2
µ
nor σ2
ν
is reduced will shift F (s) up-
wards while the horizontal line at κ remains unchanged. Other things equal, stronger
19
H
s
> 0, because b
s
< 0 (see the Appendix).
20
By “optimal ﬂexibility” it is meant that ﬂexibility is optimal from the government’s point of view.
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disturbances thus bring about more ﬂexible economies. Second, the more asymmetric
the shocks, the more ﬂexibility is chosen. This result is also intuitive and follows directly
from (51). Raising σ2
ν
and lowering σ2
µ
by the same amount so that σ2
µ
+σ2
ν
is unchanged
moves F (s) upwards, since (1− b)2 is always smaller than unity. Third, more persistence
tends to increase ﬂexibility, because it leads to prolonged deviations of unemployment
from the target level of zero. Numerical analysis is applied to establish the third point,
because the impact of ρ on the ﬁrst term on the RHS of (51) is ambiguous due to the
fact that b
ρ
> 0 (see the Appendix). Numerical simulations, reported in Table 1, indicate
that optimal ﬂexibility is positively related to unemployment persistence.
ρ 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
κ = 0.08 0.843 0.862 0.893 0.937
κ = 0.16 0.668 0.710 0.778 0.871
κ = 0.24 0.431 0.513 0.638 0.797
κ = 0.32 0 0.079 0.379 0.695
Other parameter values: λ=0.5, β=0.95, σ
2
µ
=0.7 and σ
2
ν
=0.3
Table 1 Optimal ﬂexibility, s∗, as persistence varies
Table 1 also shows that a combination of low persistence and high marginal political
costs can result in total inﬂexibility. Graphically this means that given the marginal
political cost κ, the function F (s) is below κ at s = 0. Another interesting feature of
model becomes apparent from Table 1. It has been assumed that the marginal political
cost of ﬂexibility, κ, is independent of the insider power in the labor markets, ρ. Then it is
fairly obvious that increasing ρ will push optimal ﬂexibility upwards, since the marginal
beneﬁt from ﬂexibility is increasing in ρ, whereas the marginal cost of ﬂexibility, κ, is
ﬁxed. If this assumption is transformed so that insider power also raises political costs
of ﬂexibility, the results can be overturned. The main diagonal of Table 1 from top left
corner to bottom right corner demonstrates this point in a special case where κ = 0.4ρ.
Contrary to the basic model, with low values of ρ more persistence decreases ﬂexibility.
When ρ is high enough, the impact of ρ on s∗ is positive, so that the relation between
optimal ﬂexibility and real persistence can be U-shaped.
4.2 International Labor Market Policy Coordination
In the previous section the ﬂexibility decision was left to the hands of the national gov-
ernments. Since each government is assumed to be small in the sense that it will take
monetary union wide variables as given, the choice of s
i
is made without taking into
account its impact on inﬂation variability. At ﬁrst sight it seems that national decision
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making leads to a suboptimal level of ﬂexibility, because the inﬂation variability eﬀect is
ignored.
In this section the optimal ﬂexibility is derived assuming that national governments
coordinate their policy choices. In this setup where all countries are ex ante symmetrical,
the solution is extremely simple. Under coordination, the policy objective is the sum of
member country governments’ objective functions, that is GL =
∫
1
0
GL
i
di. Symmetry
implies s
i
= s with all i, and the joint objective becomes
GL =
1
2 (1− β)
((
b2 +
(1− s)2 (1− b)2
(1− βρ2)
(
λ+ βc2
))
σ2
µ
(53)
+
λ
(1− βρ2)
(1− s)2 σ2
ν
+ 2κs
)
,
which is otherwise the same as (48), but s
i
is replaced by s and the terms have been
reorganized. The ﬂexibility parameter, s, is chosen so as to minimize (53). The term in
front of σ2
µ
can be further simpliﬁed by noting that
(1−s)
2(λ+βc2)
1−βρ
2
= b
1−b
, which yields
GL =
1
2 (1− β)
(
bσ2
µ
+
λ
(1− βρ2)
(1− s)2 σ2
ν
+ 2κs
)
. (54)
The ﬁrst-order condition under policy coordination will be
∂GL
∂s
=
1
2 (1− β)
(
b
s
σ2
µ
−
2λ (1− s)
(1− βρ2)
σ2
ν
+ 2κ
)
= 0. (55)
From (55) one obtains a similar type of expression as under national decision making
(equation (51))
κ = G (s) = −
1
2
b
s
σ2
µ
+
λ (1− s)
(1− βρ2)
σ2
ν
. (56)
The optimal level of labor market ﬂexibility, s∗∗, solves equation (56) and the equilibrium
can be presented graphically as under national policy making. The second-order condition
of the optimization problem limits the slope of G (s) to be negative, that is, G
s
< 0.
This implies that multiple equilibria are not possible under policy coordination. Table 2
shows that like under national decision making, optimal ﬂexibility is positively related to
persistence.21
21
Also, the main diagonal of the Table from top left corner to bottom right corner reveals that the
relation between persistence and optimal ﬂexibility can be U-shaped, provided that political costs and
insider power (persistence) are positively related.
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ρ 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
κ = 0.08 0.843 0.863 0.894 0.938
κ = 0.16 0.669 0.714 0.785 0.877
κ = 0.24 0.439 0.534 0.668 0.820
κ = 0.32 0 0.276 0.542 0.770
Other parameter values: λ=0.5, β=0.95, σ
2
µ
=0.7 and σ
2
ν
=0.3
Table 2 Optimal ﬂexibility, s∗∗, as persistence varies
Comparing (56) with (51) reveals that the optimal ﬂexibility under policy coordination
is greater than under national decision making if the following strict inequality holds
b
s
+
2λ (1− s) (1− b)2
(1− βρ2)
< 0. (57)
In the Appendix it is shown that (57) indeed holds in the model, provided that unem-
ployment is persistent. The graphical representation of the problem in Figure 2 shows
that when this condition holds, the function G (s) will lie above the function F (s) with
all values of s between zero and unity.
s
κ
10
G(s) F(s)
s* s**
Figure 2: Determination of labor market ﬂexibility under policy coordination
It is noteworthy that in the standard Barro-Gordon framework without unemployment
persistence, that is, ρ = 0, the above condition doesn’t hold, but is equal to zero. The
fact that coordination of ﬂexibility choice matters only in case with unemployment per-
sistence and is thus irrelevant in the standard setup deserves a closer look. At ﬁrst sight,
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it seems surprising that even though coordination internalizes the impact of ﬂexibility
on inﬂation variability, the optimal ﬂexibility remains unchanged when ρ = 0. How-
ever, there is another new eﬀect, which goes to the opposite direction, namely that by
increasing ﬂexibility in the monetary union area the stabilization parameter b goes down
(see equation (47) with ρ = c = 0). This, in turn, reduces optimal ﬂexibility through
increased unemployment variability, since (1− b) goes up (see equation (36)). It turns
out that these two eﬀects cancel out in the discretionary monetary policy equilibrium in
the model without persistence.
The solution to this ”puzzle” is simple. Stabilization of production shocks in the
standard Barro-Gordon model is socially optimal in the discretionary equilibrium. It
means that under both national decision making and policy coordination the governments
know that monetary union wide shocks are stabilized optimally for any level of ﬂexibility.
That is, the common central bank’s optimal policy minimizes the social loss function
(12) with any given s
i
. Therefore, the government just balances the marginal loss arising
from political costs associated with ﬂexibility and marginal beneﬁts deriving from reduced
variability of inﬂation and unemployment. In other words, the government doesn’t have to
worry about whether the relative stabilization of inﬂation with respect to unemployment
is optimal or not, and thus there is no interaction between ﬂexibility and stabilization
properties.
A similar argument can be applied in the case with unemployment persistence when
the central bank has access to a commitment technology. Stabilization is optimal from
the society’s point of view, which brings about the same type of irrelevance result as in
no persistence case.
These observations suggest that the stabilization performance is the key to under-
standing the impact of policy coordination on the chosen labor market ﬂexibility. As
shown in Section 3.3, persistence in the real economy creates a stabilization bias and a
state-dependent inﬂation bias under discretionary monetary policy. Relative to the op-
timal stabilization, which occurs in the commitment equilibrium, inﬂation variability is
too high (b > b∗ and c > 0) and unemployment variability is too low relative to the opti-
mum. The social loss function (12) is thus not minimized with a given s
i
. This fact gives
rise to an incentive to use the choice of ﬂexibility as a tool to improve the stabilization
properties of the economy. This can be seen by constructing a measure for the relative
stabilization bias under discretion, b˜ (s), as
b˜ (s) =
b (s)− b∗ (s)
b∗ (s)
=
(1− b (s)) βc2
λ
. (58)
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It is important to notice that in b˜ (s), the ﬂexibility parameter, s, is the equilibrium
outcome of the discretionary case also in b∗ (s), although in the model the optimally
chosen endogenous s would certainly be diﬀerent in the two monetary policy regimes.22
The correct interpretation of b∗ (s) is that it is the unattainable value of the stabilization
parameter b which would result in optimal stabilization of production shocks with a given
structure of the economy, that is, with a given s. The purpose of (58) is just to show the
size of the stabilization bias under discretion as a function of s.
A suﬃcient condition for the result that by increasing ﬂexibility the stabilization prop-
erties of the economy are improved is two-fold. First, the relative stabilization bias, b˜ (s),
must be decreasing in s. This condition guarantees that b approaches b∗ as ﬂexibility is
increased. Second, the state-dependent inﬂation bias parameter, c, must also be decreas-
ing in s, because c = 0 under optimal stabilization. It is shown in the Appendix that
both conditions, b˜ (s)
s
< 0 and c
s
< 0, indeed hold in the model. These two conditions
together imply that the discretionary inﬂation rule (46) approaches the optimal rule (22)
as s goes up.
Hence, the chosen level of ﬂexibility is higher under policy coordination not because
of internalization of inﬂation variability eﬀect, but because ﬂexibility interacts with stabi-
lization performance so that by choosing more s it is possible to push stabilization closer
to the optimum.
5 Extensions and Variations
5.1 State-Dependent Unemployment Target
This section derives the optimal monetary policy rule with state-dependent unemploy-
ment target. Svensson (1997) claimed that optimal stabilization can be attained by
directing the central bank to target the short-run natural rate of unemployment, that is,
u∗
t
= ρu
t−1
in (14) instead of targeting the long-run natural rate of unemployment, which
is normalized to zero in this model. Røisland (2001) showed, however, that in this case
the solution is not the commitment solution of the model with unemployment persistence,
but the outcome coincides with the solution of the no persistence case. In other words,
the monetary policy rule is not optimal from the society’s point of view. After having
derived the monetary policy rule, the implications of labor market policy coordination in
this monetary policy regime will be studied.
22
As the stabilization parameter b is smaller under commitment, one can conjecture that the optimally
chosen s would be higher under commitment than under discretion.
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As discussed in Introduction, this regime can be seen to result from a misinterpretation
concerning the source of variations of the unemployment rate. From a practical point of
view, this kind of monetary policy regime can be questioned, because in reality it is a
very demanding task to ﬁgure out the short-run natural rate.23
In order to work out the optimal monetary policy rule in this case the central bank’s
problem is restated with the state-dependent unemployment target. Assuming that
V (u
t−1
) exists, the Bellman equation can be written as
V (u
t−1
) = E
t−1
min
π
t
(
1
2
(
(π
t
− π∗)2 + λ (u
t
− ρu
t−1
)2
)
+ βV (u
t
)
)
, (59)
where minimization is carried out subject to (11). The ﬁrst-order condition is also sightly
modiﬁed and is given by
(π
t
− π∗)− λ (1− s) (u
t
− ρu
t−1
)− β (γ′
1
+ γ′
2
u
t
) (1− s) = 0. (60)
Taking expectations of (60) yields
E
t−1
π
t
= π∗ + β (1− s) γ′
1
+ (1− s)βγ′
2
ρu
t−1
. (61)
Combining (60) and (61), using (11) and (16) yields an optimal discretionary decision
rule
π
t
= a′ + b′µ
t
+ c′u
t−1
, (62)
where
a′ = π∗ + β (1− s) γ′
1
, (63)
b′ =
(1− s)2 (λ+ βγ′
2
)(
1 + (1− s)2 (λ+ βγ′
2
)
) ,
c′ = (1− s) βγ′
2
ρ.
Average unemployment in the monetary union will follow the process
u
t
= ρu
t−1
+ (1− s) (1− b′)µ
t
, (64)
23
Milton Friedman, for example, responded when he was asked about the natural rate by saying “I
don’t know what the natural rate is, neither do you, and neither does anyone else” (quoted in King
(1999)).
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and country i unemployment process is given by
u
it
= ρu
it−1
+ (1− s
i
) (1− b′)µ
t
+ (1− s
i
) ν
it
. (65)
As before, γ′
1
and γ′
2
need to be determined. Substituting equations (62)-(64) into the
Bellman equation (59) and identifying the coeﬃcients of u
t−1
and u2
t−1
yields two Riccati
equations
γ′
1
= (1− s)2 βγ′
2
βργ′
1
+ βργ′
1
, (66)
1
2
γ′
2
=
1
2
(1− s)2 (βγ′
2
)
2
ρ2 +
1
2
βγ′
2
ρ2. (67)
Re-organizing the second equation and using c′ from (63) results in
(1− s) βρc′2 −
(
1− ρ2β
)
c′ = 0, (68)
which yields two real solutions
c′ =
(1− ρ2β)±
√
(1− ρ2β)2
2 (1− s) ρβ
. (69)
As in Section 3.3, the larger root is ignored by appealing to the learning argument put
forth in Chapter 4. The smaller root c′ = 0 is the relevant one, and from (63) it follows
that γ′
2
= 0. From (66) and βρ < 1 it is thus evident that γ′
1
= 0. The optimal inﬂation
response to a production shock becomes
b′ =
(1− s)2 (λ+ βγ′
2
)(
1 + (1− s)2 (λ+ βγ′
2
)
) = (1− s)2 λ
1 + (1− s)2 λ
. (70)
When the central bank targets the short-run natural rate, there is neither average
inﬂation bias (γ′
1
= 0) nor state-dependent inﬂation bias (γ′
2
= c′ = 0), but a new sta-
bilization bias problem emerges. As is clear from Section 3.2, the optimal stabilization
of production shocks is characterized by b∗ in equation (28). The optimal stabilization
parameter is increasing in the persistence of the real economy. However, in this case
where the central bank targets the short-run natural rate, b′ coincides with the optimal
stabilization parameter of the economy without any persistence. In other words, the
central bank doesn’t care about the temporal properties of the unemployment rate, and
therefore stabilizes production shocks too little from the society’s point of view. The
direction of the stabilization bias is altered from under-stabilization of inﬂation in the
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basic setup with unemployment persistence to over-stabilization of inﬂation.
What about the implications for labor market ﬂexibility? The government’s problem
is obtained from (48) by setting c′ = 0
GL
i
=
1
2 (1− β)
(
b′2σ2
µ
+ λ
(1− s
i
)2
(
(1− b′)2 σ2
µ
+ σ2
ν
)
(1− βρ2)
+ 2κs
i
)
. (71)
The ﬁrst-order condition under national decision making is given by
∂GL
i
∂s
i
=
1
2 (1− β)
(
−
2λ (1− s
i
) (1− b′)2
(1− βρ2)
σ2
µ
(72)
−
2λ (1− s
i
)
(1− βρ2)
σ2
ν
+ 2κ
)
= 0.
Numerical analysis presented in Table 3 reveals that optimal ﬂexibility, s′, under national
decision making increases with persistence as in earlier cases.
ρ 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
κ = 0.08 0.843 0.863 0.894 0.937
κ = 0.16 0.669 0.713 0.782 0.873
κ = 0.24 0.438 0.531 0.659 0.807
κ = 0.32 0 0.256 0.509 0.737
Other parameter values: λ=0.5, β=0.95, σ
2
µ
=0.7 and σ
2
ν
=0.3
Table 3 Optimal ﬂexibility, s′, as persistence varies
In order to derive the ﬁrst-order condition under policy coordination it is useful to
write the optimization problem as in the previous section in equation (53)
GL
i
=
1
2 (1− β)
((
b′2 +
λ (1− s)2 (1− b′)2
(1− βρ2)
)
σ2
µ
(73)
+λ
(1− s)2
(1− βρ2)
σ2
ν
+ 2κs
)
.
The ﬁrst-order condition under policy coordination becomes
∂GL
∂s
=
1
2 (1− β)
(
2b′
s
(
b′ −
λ (1− b′) (1− s)2
(1− βρ2)
)
σ2
µ
(74)
−
2λ (1− s) (1− b′)2
(1− βρ2)
σ2
µ
−
2λ (1− s)
(1− βρ2)
σ2
ν
+ 2κ
)
= 0,
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with
b′
s
= −
2 (1− s)λ(
1 + (1− s)2 λ
)
2
< 0. (75)
Table 4 indicates that, as expected, persistence increases optimal ﬂexibility, s′′, under
policy coordination.
ρ 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
κ = 0.08 0.843 0.862 0.894 0.937
κ = 0.16 0.668 0.710 0.780 0.872
κ = 0.24 0.433 0.518 0.647 0.804
κ = 0.32 0 0.181 0.468 0.728
Other parameter values: λ=0.5, β=0.95, σ
2
µ
=0.7 and σ
2
ν
=0.3
Table 4 Optimal ﬂexibility, s′′, as persistence varies
Comparing the ﬁrst-order condition (74) with the one obtained under national de-
cision making (equation (72)) reveals that the sign of the ﬁrst term inside the brack-
ets in (74) determines the impact of coordination on optimal ﬂexibility. If the term
2b′
s
(
b′ −
λ(1−b
′
)(1−s)
2
(1−βρ
2
)
)
is positive, then the marginal beneﬁt of choosing more s is smaller
under coordination. Keeping in mind that the marginal cost is the same in both regimes,
it follows that the optimal s will be lower under coordination. Using (70) to rewrite
(1− b′) the ﬁrst term becomes
2b′
s
(
b′ −
λ (1− b′) (1− s)2
(1− βρ2)
)
= −2b′
s
βρ2
(1− βρ2)
b′ > 0, (76)
which veriﬁes that optimal ﬂexibility is indeed lower under policy coordination. The
explanation is again related to the implied stabilization properties of the equilibrium
monetary policy rule. The central bank’s response to production shocks is too small from
the society’s point of view. In the coordinated equilibrium the governments can aﬀect
the stabilization parameter b′, and from equations (47) and (70) it is clear that choosing
lower s will push b′ upwards and stabilization is closer to the optimum. Naturally, when
there is no persistence in the real economy, that is ρ = 0, the unemployment target of
the central bank will be constant at zero, and the model collapses to the standard no
persistence case where policy coordination is irrelevant.
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5.2 Social Welfare and Government Incentives for Coordination
Social losses deﬁned in (12) are decreasing in labor market ﬂexibility.24 In the absence
of any institutional constraints, it would be possible to attain the ﬁrst-best solution
with zero losses by just setting s = 1.25 Fully ﬂexible labor markets would bring about
stable unemployment at zero level, and real wages would be perfectly ﬂexible. Inﬂation
variability would be eliminated as well, since monetary policy is neither needed for nor
capable of stabilizing the economy. However, in this model it is assumed that this ideal
world can’t be reached, because it is not preferred by the labor unions (or their leaders),
who have inﬂuence over the national government. In order to make labor markets better
functioning, the government therefore has to bear increasing political costs.
This section discusses the impact of coordination on social welfare under various
monetary policy regimes and studies government incentives for coordination. When co-
ordination is irrelevant for the equilibrium outcome, it immediately follows that social
welfare is unchanged under coordinated equilibrium. This applies to both no persistence
case and to commitment case treated in earlier sections. Hence, government losses are
unaﬀected as well, and governments have no reason to coordinate their actions.
In the baseline model, that is, when there is persistence in the real economy and the
common central bank acts under discretion, coordination leads to more ﬂexible labor
markets and stabilization properties of the economy are improved. Both of these eﬀects
contribute to reducing the social loss measured by (12). By looking at the government’s
loss function (13) it becomes clear that even though social loss goes down under coordi-
nation, the government may not have incentives to pursue coordination, because political
costs are higher. However, numerical analysis in Table 5 suggests that the increase in
political costs is not strong enough to overshadow the beneﬁts of ﬂexibility on macroeco-
nomic stability, and so both social losses (SL
i
) and government losses (GL
i
) are smaller
under policy coordination (PC) than under national decision making (ND).26
24
See the Appendix for a proof.
25
Obviously, political losses deﬁned in (13) would not equal zero with fully ﬂexible labor markets.
26
Qualitatively similar, but quantitatively weaker, results are obtained with lower political costs
(κ = 0.08, 0.16, 0.24). κ = 0.32 was chosen in order to make the diﬀerence between the two policy
regimes as clear as possible.
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ρ 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
SL
i
ND 3.987 4.000 2.735 1.305
PC 3.987 2.658 1.523 0.700
GL
i
ND 3.987 4.506 5.160 5.753
PC 3.987 4.424 4.992 5.628
Other parameter values: κ=0.32, λ=0.5, β=0.95, σ
2
µ
=0.7 and σ
2
ν
=0.3
Table 5 Social and government losses when persistence varies
When the central bank targets the short-run natural rate, coordination improves
stabilization performance, which lowers the social loss, but at the same time ﬂexibility
decreases, and both inﬂation and unemployment variability are increased. The net eﬀect
on social welfare is then ambiguous. However, political costs attached to ﬂexibility will go
down, which implies that there may be government incentives to coordinate, even though
social welfare may decrease.
ρ 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
SL
i
ND 3.954 2.710 1.652 0.849
PC 3.954 3.181 1.908 0.906
GL
i
ND 3.954 4.348 4.910 5.567
PC 3.954 4.339 4.903 5.565
Other parameter values: κ=0.32, λ=0.5, β=0.95, σ
2
µ
=0.7 and σ
2
ν
=0.3
Table 6 Social and government losses when persistence varies and
the central bank targets the short-run natural rate
Simulation results in Table 6 suggest that in terms of social losses improved stabiliza-
tion properties under policy coordination are overruled by decreasing ﬂexibility, whereby
coordination actually brings about higher social losses. However, as decreased ﬂexibility
lowers political costs, government losses under coordination will go down. Hence, govern-
ments do have an incentive to coordinate their ﬂexibility choices, even though it entails
increased social losses.
The analysis above suggests that if the central bank misinterprets its unemployment
target to coincide with the short-run natural rate instead of the long-run one, governments
may respond by coordinating their actions although it leads to increased social losses.
5.3 Determination of Flexibility in a Country with Independent
Monetary Policy
In Calmfors (2001) it is shown that when the central bank doesn’t have an over-ambitious
unemployment target, which would result in inﬂation bias, the chosen level of ﬂexibility
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in a monetary union is higher than in a country, which has independent monetary policy.
In his study governments don’t coordinate their actions in a monetary union. However,
as shown in this essay in Section 4.2, when there is no persistence in the economy, as is
the case in Calmfors (2001), coordination doesn’t matter and thus could be equally well
assumed without changing the result. This section extends Calmfors’s model to include
real persistence and discusses how the results are aﬀected.
Only minor modiﬁcations to the previous analysis are needed in order to work out
the optimal ﬂexibility level in a country outside a monetary union. The optimization
problem of the national central bank is identical to (29), except that monetary union
wide variables are replaced by country speciﬁc ones. This means that the only change in
the central bank’s reaction function (46) is that now monetary policy is able to respond
to the country speciﬁc shock ν
i
as well. Therefore, the optimal discretionary monetary
policy rule becomes
π
it
= π∗ + b (µ
t
+ ν
it
) + cu
it−1
, (77)
where b and c are deﬁned as before. The government’s problem is very similar to the one
faced inside a monetary union under policy coordination. In both cases the government
knows that the choice of ﬂexibility will aﬀect stabilization performance, since b is a
function of s. The ﬁrst-order condition of the government is obtained from (55) by
dropping the term containing σ2
ν
, since monetary policy reacts also to the asymmetric
shock, and by replacing σ2
µ
with σ2
µ
+σ2
ν
in the ﬁrst term inside the brackets. The optimal
ﬂexibility, s∗∗∗, solves
κ = P (s) = −
1
2
b
s
(
σ2
µ
+ σ2
ν
)
. (78)
Table 7 shows the optimal ﬂexibility with various parameter values. When a compar-
ison is made between these values and the ones presented in Table 1, it becomes apparent
that with low levels of persistence ﬂexibility is higher inside a monetary union, but when
ρ is high enough (ρ ≥ 0.6 in Table 7), ﬂexibility is actually at a lower level in a mon-
etary union than under independent monetary policy. Hence, the result obtained from
a static model in Calmfors (2001) is overturned. The explanation is once again related
to the stabilization properties of the economy. Even though the need for ﬂexibility is
higher in the monetary union due to asymmetric shocks which can’t be stabilized with
common monetary policy, high persistence brings about severe stabilization bias which
can be reduced by choosing more ﬂexibility only under independent monetary policy. In
no persistence case analyzed in Calmfors (2001) the latter eﬀect is absent and therefore
ﬂexibility is always higher inside a monetary union.
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ρ 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
κ = 0.08 0.842 0.862 0.894 0.938
κ = 0.16 0.654 0.705 0.782 0.878
κ = 0.24 0 0.481 0.659 0.823
κ = 0.32 0 0 0.521 0.776
Other parameter values: λ=0.5, β=0.95, σ
2
µ
=0.7 and σ
2
ν
=0.3
Table 7 Optimal ﬂexibility, s∗∗∗, as persistence varies
Another interesting comparison can be drawn between a country with independent
monetary policy and countries inside a monetary union where ﬂexibility is chosen in a
coordinated fashion. When countries consider whether to join or not to join a monetary
union, behavioral eﬀects should be taken into account. Hence, this exercise can be justi-
ﬁed by noting that in a monetary union governments do have an incentive to coordinate
their actions, as was shown in Section 5.2. Numerical examples presented in Table 2 and
Table 7 indicate, that ﬂexibility is likely to be higher inside a monetary union. Intuition
behind this result is clear, since in both regimes the governments internalize the eﬀect
increased ﬂexibility has on stabilization properties, but in a monetary union asymmetric
shocks are not stabilized by common monetary policy and therefore more ﬂexibility is
called for. However, provided that persistence is high enough (e.g. ρ = 0.8), ﬂexibility
can be lower inside a monetary union. By looking at (56) and (78) it is clear that this
extreme case is possible if −1
2
b
s
>
λ(1−s)
(1−βρ
2
)
. It is noteworthy that if this condition holds, it
also follows from (56) that some comparative statics properties of the coordination case
are counter-intuitive. In particular, the more asymmetric the production shocks are, the
less ﬂexibility is chosen in a coordinated equilibrium.
6 Concluding Remarks
This essay studied the determination of labor market ﬂexibility in a large monetary union
when national governments decide on the level of nominal wage ﬂexibility independently
of each other or in a coordinated fashion, and ﬂexibility entails increasing political costs
to the governments. The main result of the essay is that coordination tends to yield more
ﬂexible labor markets because ﬂexibility and stabilization properties of the economy are
interrelated. More precisely, the stabilization bias of discretionary monetary policy can
be alleviated by more ﬂexible labor markets. Each government is too small to be able to
aﬀect the average ﬂexibility in the monetary union area, but by coordinating labor market
policies the governments can have inﬂuence on the common central bank’s stabilization
policy. Coordination internalizes the positive externality that ﬂexibility generates by
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improving the stabilization properties of the economy, and therefore coordination results
in more ﬂexible markets.
The essay also analyzed a special case where the central bank misinterprets changes
in the short-run natural rate as arising solely from structural factors, thereby stabilizing
the production shocks too little. Then coordination is shown to result in less ﬂexible
markets, since lower ﬂexibility calls for stronger reaction to production shocks, thereby
pushing stabilization closer to the optimum. The essay also digressed from the main
subject and brieﬂy looked at the case where a country is outside a monetary union and
has an independent monetary policy. The purpose was to examine whether the results of
Calmfors (2001) are unaltered when real persistence is introduced. It turned out that if
unemployment is persistent enough, ﬂexibility is not necessarily higher inside a monetary
union, which is always the case without persistence. The explanation is once again related
to the interplay between ﬂexibility and stabilization policy identiﬁed in the essay.
Throughout the essay the countries are assumed to be perfectly symmetric in the sense
that all structural parameters and preferences are identical. This modelling choice is obvi-
ously highly restrictive, but chosen because of analytical simplicity. Moreover, assuming
symmetry conforms well with the common practice in the research ﬁeld on international
policy coordination (see e.g. Persson and Tabellini (2000, Ch. 18)). An apparent ex-
tension of the model would be to allow some asymmetries, other than country-speciﬁc
shocks, between countries. It would be interesting to let the persistence parameter, that
is, insider power or political costs very across countries. In that case the precise deﬁnition
of coordination would become important. In the symmetric case there is no diﬀerence
whether coordination means that all countries must set the same level of ﬂexibility, or
that ﬂexibility is allowed the vary across countries. In an asymmetric case this distinction
certainly matters and will probably have implications for chosen levels of ﬂexibility under
coordination relative to national decision making. Also, it is likely that the desirability
of coordination in terms of social welfare and government incentives will be aﬀected as
well. Asymmetries in country size is another related issue, which deserves a closer look.
In the EMU it is certain that some member countries are so large that their actions do
have an eﬀect on the area wide variables. Adding this to the model would be important,
but aggregation would certainly become more problematic.
There is at least one more simplifying assumption, which needs to be discussed. A
starting point of the analysis of ﬂexibility choice is that governments set ﬂexibility only
once and stick to it ever after. In other words, the governments commit to a certain level of
ﬂexibility. As was discussed in Introduction, this is quite a plausible assumption provided
that ﬂexibility choice has irreversibilities in the form of relatively high costs of rewriting
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legislation and reshaping the institutional structure of the economy. It follows from
this assumption that the central bank can’t behave strategically toward the governments
when setting monetary policy, because it takes the ﬂexibility of the economies as given.
However, in practice governments resign and new government are appointed. This fact has
at least two implications. First, the discount factor of the government may be smaller
than that of the society, since the expected life span of the government is only a few
years.27 Second, and probably more important point is that the central bank actually
knows that from time to time the ﬂexibility issue is reconsidered in every country in
connection with general elections and the formation of the new government. This opens
the door for strategic behavior on the common central bank’s side. It may be optimal
for the central bank to conduct monetary policy so that the governments are forced to
choose a relatively high level of ﬂexibility, since inﬂation and unemployment variability
are decreasing in ﬂexibility. So, one is inclined to conjecture that in this case the central
bank could act very conservatively and let unemployment to ﬂuctuate a lot in order to
compel new governments to choose high ﬂexibility. Obviously, a thorough investigation
of this point is outside the scope of this essay and is left for future research.
27
Same argument could be made about central bankers. King (1997) writes “Central bankers, despite
their prudent and austere life-style, do not live for ever. They tend to be judged by the realised value of
the loss function during their term of oﬃce, and rarely on whether the loss subsequent to their retirement
was lower than it would otherwise have been.”
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A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of lim
ρ→0
(c)
It is easy to see from (43) that lim
ρ→0
(c) is of the form
(
0
0
)
. Applying L’Hôpital’s rule
and simplifying yields
lim
ρ→0
(c) = lim
ρ→0
ρ
((
1− βρ2 + 2λ (1− s)2
)
−
√
(1− ρ2β)2 − 4 (1− s)2 ρ2βλ
)
(1− s)
√
(1− ρ2β)2 − 4 (1− s)2 ρ2βλ
= 0.
A.2 Derivation of b
s
and c
s
Taking the derivative from (47) with respect to s gives
b
s
=
(
−2 (1− s) (λ+ βc2) + 2βcc
s
(1− s)2
) (
1− βρ2 + (1− s)2 (λ+ βc2)
)(
1− βρ2 + (1− s)2 (λ+ βc2)
)
2
−
(
−2 (1− s) (λ+ βc2) + 2βcc
s
(1− s)2
)
(1− s)2 (λ+ βc2)(
1− βρ2 + (1− s)2 (λ+ βc2)
)
2
=
−2 (1− s) (λ+ βc2) (1− βρ2) + 2βcc
s
(1− s)2 (1− βρ2)(
1− βρ2 + (1− s)2 (λ+ βc2)
)
2
=
−2 (1− s) (1− βρ2) ((λ+ βc2)− βcc
s
(1− s))(
1− βρ2 + (1− s)2 (λ+ βc2)
)
2
< 0.
Taking the derivative from (43) with respect to s and simplifying gives
c
s
= −
1
2
(
1− βρ2
) (1− βρ2)−√(1− ρ2β)2 − 4 (1− s)2 ρ2βλ√
(1− ρ2β)2 − 4 (1− s)2 ρ2βλ (1− s)2 ρβ
= −
(
1− βρ2
) c√
(1− ρ2β)2 − 4 (1− s)2 ρ2βλ (1− s)
< 0.
A.3 Derivation of
∂(var(u
i
))
∂s
and
∂(var(π))
∂s
From (37) one obtains
var (u
it
) = var (ρu
it−1
+ (1− s
i
) (1− b)µ
t
+ (1− s
i
) ν
it
)
= ρ2var (u
it−1
) + (1− s
i
)2 (1− b)2 σ2
µ
+ (1− s
i
)2 σ2
ν
,
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assuming var (u
it
) = var (u
i
) with all t and s
i
= s gives
var (u
i
) =
(1− s)2 (1− b)2 σ2
µ
+ (1− s)2 σ2
ν
1− ρ2
.
The sign of ∂(var(ui))
∂s
depends on the sign of ∂
∂s
(
(1− s)2 (1− b)2
)
∂
∂s
(
(1− s)2 (1− b)2
)
=
−2 (1− s) (1− b) ((1− b) + b
s
(1− s))(
1− βρ2 + (1− s)2 (λ+ βc2)
)
2
,
which is negative provided that
−b
s
<
1− b
1− s
.
Using the condition −b
s
< 1−b
2(1−s)
from Appendix A.8 it is clear that the condition above
holds and
∂ (var (u
i
))
∂s
< 0.
From (46) one obtains
var (π) = var (bµ
t
+ cu
t−1
) = b2σ2
µ
+ c2var (u)
⇒
∂ (var (π))
∂s
= 2bb
s
σ2
µ
+ 2cc
s
var (u) +
∂ (var (u))
∂s
c2 < 0,
because b
s
< 0, c
s
< 0 (see Appendix A.2) and ∂(var(u))
∂s
< 0, where the last inequality
follows directly from ∂(var(ui))
∂s
< 0.
A.4 Derivation of Expected Present Values of Squared Future
Unemployment Deviations for Equation (48)
The expected present value of squared future monetary union wide unemployment devi-
ations is given by
E
0
(
∞∑
t=1
βt−1u2
t−1
)
= E
0
(
u2
0
+ βu2
1
+ β2u2
2
+ β3u2
3
+ β4u2
4
+ ...
)
,
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where
βE
0
(
u2
1
)
= β
(
ρ2u2
0
+ (1− s)2 (1− b)2 σ2
µ
)
,
β2E
0
(
u2
2
)
= β2E
0
(
ρ2u2
1
+ (1− s)2 (1− b)2 σ2
µ
)
= β2
(
ρ4u2
0
+ ρ2 (1− s)2 (1− b)2 σ2
µ
+ (1− s)2 (1− b)2 σ2
µ
)
= β2ρ4u2
0
+ β2
(
1 + ρ2
)
(1− s)2 (1− b)2 σ2
µ
,
β3E
0
(
u2
i3
)
= β3E
0
(
ρ2u2
2
+ (1− s)2 (1− b)2 σ2
µ
)
= β3
(
ρ6u2
0
+ ρ4 (1− s)2 (1− b)2 σ2
µ
+ ρ2 (1− s)2 (1− b)2 σ2
µ
+(1− s)2 (1− b)2 σ2
µ
)
= β3ρ6u2
0
+
(
1 + ρ2 + ρ4
)
(1− s)2 (1− b)2 σ2
µ
,
β4E
0
(
u2
i4
)
= β4E
0
(
ρ2u2
3
+ (1− s)2 (1− b)2 σ2
µ
)
= β4
(
ρ8u2
0
+ ρ6 (1− s)2 (1− b)2 σ2
µ
+ ρ4 (1− s)2 (1− b)2 σ2
µ
+ρ2 (1− s)2 (1− b)2 σ2
µ
+ (1− s)2 (1− b)2 σ2
µ
)
= β4ρ8u2
0
+ β4
(
1 + ρ2 + ρ4 + ρ6
)
(1− s)2 (1− b)2 σ2
µ
.
.
.
The ﬁrst terms of each time period make up a geometric series of the form
u2
0
+ βρ2u2
0
+ β2ρ4u2
0
+ β3ρ6u2
0
+ β4ρ8u2
0
+ ... =
1
1− βρ2
u2
0
.
The second term of each time period is of the form
βt
(
1 + ρ2 + ρ4 + ... +
(
ρ2
)
t−1
)
(1− s)2 (1− b)2 σ2
µ
.
If ρ2 = 1 (as is the case here, since ρ < 1), the geometric series in the above expression
is given by (
1 + ρ2 + ρ4 + ...+
(
ρ2
)
t−1
)
=
1− (ρ2)
t
1− ρ2
.
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Combining the second terms gives
∞∑
t=1
(
βt
1− (ρ2)
t
1− ρ2
(1− s)2 (1− b)2 σ2
µ
)
=
(1− s)2 (1− b)2 σ2
µ
1− ρ2
∞∑
t=1
(
βt
(
1−
(
ρ2
)
t
))
=
(1− s)2 (1− b)2 σ2
µ
1− ρ2
(
β + β2 + β3 + ...− ρ2β −
(
ρ2β
)
2
−
(
ρ2β
)
3
− ...
)
=
(1− s)2 (1− b)2 σ2
µ
1− ρ2
(
β
1− β
− ρ2β
(
1 + ρ2β +
(
ρ2β
)
2
+ ...
))
=
(1− s)2 (1− b)2 σ2
µ
1− ρ2
(
β
1− β
−
ρ2β
1− ρ2β
)
=
β (1− s)2 (1− b)2 σ2
µ
1− ρ2
(
1− ρ2
(1− β) (1− ρ2β)
)
=
β (1− s)2 (1− b)2 σ2
µ
(1− β) (1− ρ2β)
.
Adding the ﬁrst and the second terms up and setting u
0
= 0, which is only a minor
restriction assuming that the discount rate, β, is close to unity, yields
E
0
(
∞∑
t=1
βt−1u2
t−1
)
=
β (1− s)2 (1− b)2 σ2
µ
(1− β) (1− βρ2)
.
The derivation of E
0
(∑
∞
t=1
βt−1u2
it
)
is almost identical to the one above, but now
(1− s)2 × (1− b)2 σ2
µ
is replaced with (1− s
i
)2
(
(1− b)2 σ2
µ
+ σ2
ν
)
, and u
0
is replaced by
u
i0
, since the variable of interest is the unemployment rate of a country i. The ﬂexibility
parameter is thus the country speciﬁc one s
i
instead of the average s. Another change to
the previous derivation is the relevant time index. Now the inﬁnite sum is over the current
period unemployment rate, not over the previous period one. The expected present value
of squared future country i speciﬁc unemployment deviations is given by
E
0
(
∞∑
t=1
βt−1u2
it
)
= E
0
(
u2
i1
+ βu2
i2
+ β2u2
i3
+ β3u2
i4
+ ...
)
.
Noting that
E
0
(
∞∑
t=1
βt−1u2
i,t−1
)
= u2
i0
+ β
(
E
0
(
∞∑
t=1
βt−1u2
it
))
,
and solving this expression for E
0
(∑
∞
t=1
βt−1u2
it
)
and using the expression for
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E
0
(∑
∞
t=1
βt−1u2
t−1
)
derived above (keeping in mind that (1− s)2 (1− b)2 σ2
µ
is replaced
with (1− s
i
)2
(
(1− b)2 σ2
µ
+ σ2
ν
)
) yields
E
0
(
∞∑
t=1
βt−1u2
i,t
)
= −
u2
i0
β
+
E
0
(∑
∞
t=1
βt−1u2
i,t−1
)
β
= −
u2
i0
β
+
1
β
(
1
1− βρ2
u2
i0
+
β (1− s
i
)2
(
(1− b)2 σ2
µ
+ σ2
ν
)
(1− β) (1− ρ2β)
)
=
(1− β) ρ2u2
i0
+ (1− s
i
)2
(
(1− b)2 σ2
µ
+ σ2
ν
)
(1− β) (1− βρ2)
.
Finally, setting u
i0
= 0 yields
E
0
(
∞∑
t=1
βt−1u2
it
)
=
(1− s
i
)2
(
(1− b)2 σ2
µ
+ σ2
ν
)
(1− β) (1− βρ2)
.
A.5 Derivation of b
ρ
Diﬀerentiating (47) with respect to ρ and simplifying yields
b
ρ
= 2 (1− s)2 β
(1− ρ2β) cc
ρ
+ ρ (λ+ βc2)(
1 + (1− s)2 λ− βρ2 + (1− s)2 βc2
)
2
> 0,
where c
ρ
is given by
c
ρ
=
1
2
(
1 + ρ2β
) (1− ρ2β)−√(1− ρ2β)2 − 4ρ2βλ (1− s)2√
(1− ρ2β)2 − 4ρ2βλ (1− s)2 (1− s) ρ2β
=
(
1 + ρ2β
) c√
(1− ρ2β)2 − 4ρ2βλ (1− s)2ρ
> 0.
A.6 Derivation of Condition (57)
In order to show that the condition (57) does actually hold in this model, the expressions
for b
s
and c
s
are needed (see Appendix A.2). Using (47) to rewrite (1− b)2 the second
term of (57) becomes
2λ (1− s) (1− b)2
(1− βρ2)
=
2λ (1− s) (1− βρ2)(
1 + (1− s)2 λ− βρ2 + (1− s)2 βc2
)
2
.
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Inserting b
s
and the above expression into (57) yields
b
s
+
2λ (1− s) (1− b)2
(1− βρ2)
=
−
2 (1− s)β (1− βρ2) c (c− c
s
(1− s))(
1− βρ2 + (1− s)2 (λ+ βc2)
)
2
< 0,
which holds since c > 0 and c
s
< 0, provided that ρ > 0.
A.7 Derivation of lim
ρ→0
(c
s
)
It is easy to see from Appendix A.2 that lim
ρ→0
(c
s
) is of the form
(
0
0
)
. Applying
L’Hôpital’s rule gives (after tedious manipulation)
lim
ρ→0
(c
s
)
= lim
ρ→0
∂
∂ρ
(
− (1− ρ2β)
(
(1− ρ2β)−
√
(1− ρ2β)2 − 4ρ2βλ (1− s)2
))
∂
∂ρ
(
2 (1− s)2 ρβ
√
(1− ρ2β)2 − 4ρ2βλ (1− s)2
)
= lim
ρ→0
− 2ρ
 − (1− βρ2)
√
(1− ρ2β)2 − 4ρ2βλ (1− s)2
(1− s)2
(
(1− ρ2β)2 − 2ρ2β
(
1− βρ2 + 4λ (1− s)2
))
+
(1− ρ2β)
2
+ λ (1− s)2 (1− 3ρ2β)
(1− s)2
(
(1− ρ2β)2 − 2ρ2β
(
1− βρ2 + 4λ (1− s)2
)))
= 0.
A.8 Derivation of Conditions b˜ (s)
s
< 0 and c
s
< 0
The ﬁrst condition, b˜ (s)
s
< 0, can be established as follows. The uniqueness of equi-
librium condition (52) in the strictest form with σ2
ν
= 0 implies −b
s
<
(1−b)
2(1−s)
, and the
condition b˜ (s)
s
< 0 is given by
b˜ (s)
s
=
βc
λ
(−b
s
c+ 2c
s
(1− b)) < 0.
Now, if the above condition holds when −b
s
<
(1−b)
2(1−s)
is inserted into it, b˜ (s)
s
< 0 is
shown to be valid. In order to proceed, it is useful to note the following relation between
c and c
s
, which can be derived (see equation (43) and c
s
in Appendix A.2
k
c
(1− s)
+ c
s
= 0,
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where
k =
1− βρ2√
(1− βρ2)2 − 4 (1− s)2 ρ2βλ
≥ 1.
Now, the ﬁrst condition, b˜ (s)
s
< 0, becomes
b˜ (s)
s
<
2βc (1− b)
λ
(
1
4
c
(1− s)
+ c
s
)
=
2βc (1− b)
λ
(
1
4
− k
)
c
(1− s)
< 0.
The second part of the suﬃcient condition for improved stabilization as s increases,
that is, c
s
< 0, is always satisﬁed, as is evident from Appendix A.2.
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Chapter 4
Adaptive Learning and Multiple Equilibria
in a Natural Rate Model with
Unemployment Persistence
Abstract
This essay demonstrates that adaptive learning approach of modelling private
sector expectations can be used as an equilibrium selection mechanism in a nat-
ural rate monetary model with unemployment persistence. In particular, it is shown
that only one of the two rational expectations equilibria is stable under least-squares
learning, and that it is always the low inﬂation equilibrium with intuitive compar-
ative statics properties which is learnable. Hence, this essay provides a theoretical
justiﬁcation for focusing on the low inﬂation equilibrium. Earlier contributions, in
which the high inﬂation equilibrium was ignored mainly because of its unpleasant
characteristics, are not theoretically satisfactory.
1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed a surge of interest in the application of adaptive learning
approach on the analysis of monetary policy (see Evans and Honkapohja (2003) for a
recent survey of the literature). The starting point in the analysis of adaptive learning in
macroeconomics is that some or all agents have imperfect knowledge about the structure
of the economy. The agents rely on an econometric learning technology to form expec-
tations and continuously update their estimates on the structure of the economy based
on incoming data (see Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for a comprehensive treatment of
learning in macroeconomics).
In the literature of learning and monetary policy there are, broadly speaking, two
separate classes of papers. The ﬁrst one looks at the case where the central bank has
imperfect knowledge about the functioning of the economy, whereas the private sector
has fully rational expectations (see e.g. Sargent (1999) and Cho, Williams and Sargent
(2002)). Another, more widely used approach models the private sector being boundedly
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rational and the central bank having full information about the structure of the economy
(see e.g. Evans and Honkapohja (2002)). However, these two modelling choices are not
mutually exclusive, as is demonstrated in Honkapohja and Mitra (2002), where both the
central bank and the private sector are learning. Another classiﬁcation can be made in
terms of the macroeconomic framework used in the analysis. Some contributions apply the
natural rate model where the Phillips curve is of the neoclassical type, whereas the bulk
of the latest literature uses a New-Keynesian framework with forward-looking agents.1
The purpose of this essay is to demonstrate that the adaptive learning approach of
modelling private sector expectations can be used as an equilibrium selection mechanism
in a dynamic monetary policy model of Lockwood and Philippopoulos (1994).2 Their
model is an extension to the classic Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gor-
don (1983) natural rate model.3 Lockwood and Philippopoulos (1994) show that when
unemployment rate is persistent, there are two rational expectations equilibria in the
model.4 One is associated with low inﬂation and intuitive comparative statics properties,
and the other with high inﬂation and counter-intuitive comparative statics properties. In
particular, this essay shows that only one of the two rational expectations equilibria is
stable under adaptive learning, and that it is always the low inﬂation equilibrium with
intuitive comparative statics properties which is learnable. Earlier Sargent (1999) has
shown that the unique rational expectations equilibrium of the standard Barro-Gordon
model is stable under least-squares learning.
The learning approach to expectations formation is especially interesting in a situation
where the economy has gone through a regime shift, like the formation of the Economic
and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe. Monetary policies were quite diﬀerent in the
member countries before the EMU, and thus it is quite natural to assume that the agents
don’t exactly know all parameter values, e.g. the preferences of the common central bank,
which aﬀect the economy. After such a dramatic change in the economic environment as
the EMU brought about, rational expectations is a particularly strong assumption and
some sort of bounded rationality may provide a much more realistic starting point in
thinking of the behavior of the agents.
In the earlier contributions which use the natural rate model with real persistence two
1
Most notable examples of the former approach are Sargent (1999), Cho, Williams and Sargent
(2002) and Orphanides and Williams (2003). Evans and Honkapohja (2003) contains a survey of the
New-Keynesian strand of the literature.
2
Rantala (2003) is an almost identical working paper version of this essay.
3
The standard natural rate model is usually called the Barro-Gordon model, a convention which is
somewhat unfair to the original contribution by Kydland and Prescott (1977). For brevity, this usual
practice is also followed in this essay.
4
It is empirically well established that the unemployment rate is highly persistent in most industrial-
ized countries (see e.g. Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991)).
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solutions to the multiple equilibria problem have been adopted. The ﬁrst solution is to
ignore the “bad” high inﬂation equilibrium by appealing to counter-intuitive comparative
statics properties, and to the fact that the high inﬂation equilibrium appears only in
the inﬁnite horizon model. This strategy is followed e.g. by Svensson (1997, 1999),
Beetsma and Jensen (1999), Lockwood, Miller and Zhang (1998), Røisland (2001) and
also in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. The second solution treats the two equilibria more
equally and considers them as being the possible outcomes of the model. This line of
reasoning in followed e.g. by Lockwood and Philippopoulos (1994), Lockwood (1997) and
Jensen (1999). This essay proposes a third solution to this problem, namely the use of
adaptive learning as a selection tool. Hence, this essay provides perhaps a more elegant
justiﬁcation in a theoretical sense for focusing on the low inﬂation equilibrium than the
ﬁrst approach, where the high inﬂation equilibrium was ignored mainly because of its
unpleasant characteristics.
This essay is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model setup. The rational
expectations equilibria are solved in Section 3. Expectational stability of the equilibria
is studied in Section 4, and 5 analyzes the model under least-squares learning. Section 6
concludes.
2 The Model
The model economy evolves over an inﬁnite number of time periods t = 1, 2, .... The
economy consists of a private sector and a central bank. In the private sector there is a
continuum of ﬁrms producing the same product, so that the goods market is perfectly
competitive. In each ﬁrm the labor force is organized in a ﬁrm-speciﬁc labor union, which
sets the nominal wage in each time period before the central bank sets inﬂation.
The assumption of an atomistic labor market is made in order to make inﬂation exoge-
nous to each individual labor union. This assumption rules out any strategic interactions
between the wage setters and the central bank. Assuming that labor union preferences
are identical across ﬁrms and abstracting from ﬁrm-speciﬁc disturbances makes it possible
to write the model in terms of a single ﬁrm-union pair, where the union takes inﬂation as
given. Naturally, one could continue to work with the continuum of ﬁrm-union pairs and
aggregate over ﬁrms later on. The approach adopted here is chosen purely for notational
simplicity.5
Labor demand determines employment in the model. For simplicity, the labor demand
schedule is written directly in terms of unemployment instead of employment and the real
5
In what follows, the notions “private sector” and “labor union” are used interchangeably.
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wage elasticity is set to unity
u
t
= w
t
− p
t
, (1)
where u
t
is the unemployment rate, w
t
is the log of the nominal wage and p
t
is the log of
the price level.
The labor union’s loss function is of the form
U
t
= (u
t
− u
t
)2 , (2)
where u
t
is the time period t unemployment target. The unemployment target of the
labor union is assumed to be time varying and aﬀected by “insider power”. In the
spirit of Lindbeck and Snower (1986), and following the formulation by Blanchard and
Summers (1986) with a minor modiﬁcation (unemployment instead of employment), it is
assumed that the unemployment target of the union is a weighted average of the currently
unemployed workers, u
t−1
, and the long-run unemployment target of the labor union, u0,
which is normalized to zero6
u
t
= ρu
t−1
+ (1− ρ) u0, (3)
where u0 = 0 and 0 < ρ < 1. This formulation captures the insider power in wage setting
in a sense that when unemployment is above the long-run target of zero, the currently
employed insiders want to set the nominal wage at a level which is consistent with the
current unemployment rate u
t−1
. This wage level is higher than the one consistent with
the long-run target of zero unemployment. The parameter ρ is thus a measure of insider
power in the model. If the insiders don’t have more power than others, ρ equals zero and
the unemployment target is constant. In this case the model collapses to the standard
Barro-Gordon model. A high ρ implies that insiders dominate wage setting and the
unemployment target of the union varies a lot with changes in the number of insiders.
The union’s optimization problem is to set w
t
so as to minimize the expected value
of (2). Carrying out minimization yields a simple nominal wage rule of the form (after
inserting (3))
w
t
= pe
t
+ ρu
t−1
. (4)
Combining the wage rule (4) with the labor demand schedule (1) , and using the con-
ventional deﬁnitions π
t
= p
t
− p
t−1
and πe
t
= pe
t
− p
t−1
for inﬂation and inﬂationary
expectations yields the neoclassical (expectations augmented) Phillips curve with unem-
6
u
0
could equally well be non-zero. This normalization is made for analytical simplicity only.
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ployment persistence
u
t
= ρu
t−1
− (π
t
− πe
t
) . (5)
In this simple framework the insider power parameter directly determines the persistence
of the unemployment rate.7 The long-run natural rate of unemployment is zero in the
model, which results directly from the long-run unemployment target of the labor union
being zero.
The intertemporal loss (or value) function of the central bank is of the standard
quadratic type
V =
∞∑
t=1
δt−1
1
2
(
λu2
t
+ (1− λ)π2
t
)
, (6)
where δ (0 < δ < 1) is the discount factor and λ and (1− λ) are the relative weights
of unemployment and inﬂation stabilization, respectively.8 It is noteworthy that the
unemployment target of the central bank is zero, so it coincides with the long-run natural
rate. This implies that the central bank doesn’t have an over-ambitious unemployment
target on average. Hence, there is no average inﬂation bias in the model. Inﬂation
target of the central bank is, without loss of generality, normalized to zero for analytical
convenience. Throughout the essay it is assumed that the central bank doesn’t have access
to a commitment technology and therefore sets inﬂation in a discretionary manner.9
3 Rational Expectations Equilibria
In this section the model is solved assuming that the private sector has rational expec-
tations. The game between the private sector and the central bank is dynamic. This
results from unemployment persistence, because the central bank’s decisions today will
aﬀect the future through unemployment rate. Obviously, another requirement for the
game being dynamic is that the central bank is forward-looking in a sense that it cares
about the future, that is, δ > 0. The unemployment rate of the previous time period,
u
t−1
, is the state variable of the dynamic problem, since it summarizes the impact of the
history of the game on the current state of the economy.
The solution concept used in the essay is the Markov-perfect equilibrium, where the
current actions of the players depend on the history of the game only through the state
variable and trigger strategies are ruled out (see e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)).
7
See Lockwood, Miller and Zhang (1998) for a formulation where both unemployment and real wage
deviations enter the labor union’s loss function.
8
The notation follows that of Lockwood and Philippopoulos (1994) and diﬀers somewhat from the
one used in the second essay (Chapter 3).
9
The commitment solution to the problem is presented e.g. in Svensson (1997).
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Although the labor union is setting the nominal wage, equally well it can be said that it
chooses inﬂation expectations. Thereby, the choice variables of the central bank and the
labor union are inﬂation and inﬂation expectations, respectively.
The linear-quadratic structure of the model implies that the value functions will be
quadratic. The labor union has only one target and one instrument. Hence, in a model
without uncertainty it can choose inﬂation expectations in every period so that it will
achieve its target. From (2)-(5) it is easy to see that by setting πe
t
= π
t
, that is, having
rational expectations, yields zero loss in each time period. The central bank’s value
function from time period t onwards will be of the form
V =
β
2
u2
t−1
, (7)
where β ≥ 0 is the parameter to be solved. Throughout the analysis it is assumed that
β is not time dependent.
The dynamic game can now be written as
β
2
u2
t−1
= min
π
t
(λ+ δβ)
u2
t
2
+ (1− λ)
π2
t
2
given (5) and πe
t
ﬁxed, (8)
πe
t
= π
t
. (9)
The left-hand side of (8) is the present value of losses from t onwards, and the right-hand
side is the value of current period losses, plus the losses from t + 1 onwards evaluated
at the optimally chosen level of inﬂation. Monetary policy is discretionary and thereby
the central bank takes inﬂation expectations as given. Equation (9) is the best response
function of the union, which says that rational expectations are optimal.
The ﬁrst-order condition of the central bank is given by
− (λ+ δβ)u
t
+ (1− λ) π
t
= 0, (10)
which after inserting (5) and solving for π
t
yields
π
t
=
λ+ δβ
1 + δβ
πe
t
+
λ+ δβ
1 + δβ
ρu
t−1
. (11)
This is the best response function of the central bank, which is conditional on ﬁxed β.
The rational expectations equilibrium with ﬁxed β is then obtained by setting πe
t
= π
t
,
which gives
π
t
(β) = πe
t
(β) =
λ+ δβ
1− λ
ρu
t−1
. (12)
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Since the problem is linear-quadratic, the central bank’s and the labor union’s actions
are linear functions of the state variable.
The next step is to solve β. Inserting (12) into (8) and reorganizing the terms results
in the Riccati equation deﬁning β
ρ2δ2β2 +
(
λ− 1 + (1 + λ) δρ2
)
β + λρ2 = 0. (13)
This equation is quadratic in β, which implies that there in general are two equilibrium
values for β. From (12) it is then obvious that there are multiple rational expectations
inﬂation equilibria in the model. The lower equilibrium value of β corresponds to the low
inﬂation equilibrium, and the higher value corresponds to the high inﬂation equilibrium.
Solving (8) for β reveals that β is a non-linear function of the optimally chosen rate
of inﬂation π
t
and the given inﬂation expectations πe
t
β =
λ (ρu
t−1
+ πe
t
− π
t
)2 + (1− λ) π2
t
u2
t−1
− δ (ρu
t−1
+ πe
t
− π
t
)2
, (14)
where π
t
is determined by (11).10 Substitution of (14) into (11) and simplifying yields a
quadratic equation
(1− λ) δ (ρu
t−1
+ πe
t
) π2
t
+
(
u2
t−1
− (1− λ) δ (ρu
t−1
+ πe
t
)2
)
π
t
− λ (ρu
t−1
+ πe
t
) u2
t−1
= 0. (15)
This quadratic function of π
t
has two roots, but one of them is always negative irrespective
of πe
t
and u
t−1
. This is inconsistent with (11) and β ≥ 0, so the unconditional reaction
function of the central bank is the larger root of (15)11
π
t
=
−
(
u2
t−1
− ϕ (πe
t
)
)
+
√(
u2
t−1
− ϕ (πe
t
)
)
2
+ 4λϕ (πe
t
) u2
t−1
2 (1− λ) δ (ρu
t−1
+ πe
t
)
. (16)
where ϕ (πe
t
) = (1− λ) δ (ρu
t−1
+ πe
t
)2. It is evident from (16) that the relationship
between inﬂation and inﬂationary expectations is highly nonlinear.
The two rational expectations equilibria can now be solved by setting πe
t
= π
t
in (16)
10
(14) is derived from (8) assuming that β is not time varying. The min
π
t
operator can be removed,
since π
t
is the optimal inﬂation chosen by the central bank.
11
The present value of losses at time period t is non-negative, that is, β ≥ 0. Giving π
e
t
and u
t−1
arbitrary positive values in (11) yields a positive π
t
. Since the smaller root of (15) yields negative values
for π
t
with all possible combinations of π
e
t
and u
t−1
, it is ignored in the analysis.
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and simplifying, which yields real solutions
π
t
= πe
t
=
1
2δρ
((
1− δρ2
)
±
√
(1− δρ2)2 − 4λ (1− λ)−1 δρ2
)
u
t−1
, (17)
if, and only if, the following existence condition holds
λ
1− λ
≤
(1− δρ2)
2
4δρ2
. (18)
Obviously, this condition is assumed to hold, since complex solutions make no sense for
rates of inﬂation and unemployment.
When the unemployment rate of previous time period is above (below) the long-run
natural rate of zero, there are two equilibrium levels of inﬂation, both of which are positive
(negative). Hence, there is a state-dependent inﬂation bias in the model. Naturally, when
u
t−1
= 0, inﬂation is at the target level of zero, since the is no average inﬂation bias.
It is noteworthy that in addition to the multiple equilibria problem, there is also an
indeterminacy problem in the model. With given parameter values either one of the two
equilibria can emerge as an equilibrium of the dynamic game.
The comparative statics properties for the two equilibria are quite diﬀerent. At the
low inﬂation equilibrium inﬂation increases when the central bank puts more weight on
unemployment stabilization and less weight on inﬂation stabilization, that is, when λ
becomes bigger. This is intuitive, since the central bank then cares more about persis-
tent unemployment ﬂuctuations, and therefore reacts more strongly to unemployment by
creating higher inﬂation. Moreover, inﬂation increases when unemployment persistence
ρ increases, or when the discount factor δ becomes bigger so that the central bank cares
more about the future. An increase in ρ calls for a stronger inﬂation reaction, because the
state-dependent inﬂation bias in the future gets more serious when unemployment ﬂuc-
tuations become bigger, and so the beneﬁts of higher inﬂation this period are increased
while the costs are unaﬀected. When the central bank cares more about the future, it
pays more attention to persistence in unemployment and therefore reacts more strongly to
unemployment deviations. All this is quite intuitive, but it holds only at the low inﬂation
equilibrium. When the economy is at the high inﬂation equilibrium, changes in the values
of these three parameters bring about inﬂation responses, which are exactly of opposite
direction. That is, the comparative statics are counter-intuitive (see the Appendix for
derivations).
There exists a unique rational expectations equilibrium in the model provided that
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the time horizon of the central bank is ﬁnite.12 In addition, it can be shown that the
equilibrium in question approaches the low inﬂation equilibrium of the inﬁnite horizon
model as the terminal period goes further away from the current period (see the Appendix
for an illustration of this point).
The two equilibria in (17) can be illustrated graphically in (π
t
, πe
t
)-space as intersec-
tions of the best response functions of the central bank and the labor union. Before doing
that, it is useful to characterize the behavior of the best response function of the central
bank (16). First, (16) can be shown to be positive at πe
t
= 0 when u
t−1
> 0. Second, the
slope of (16) can, after tedious manipulations, be shown to be positive with all πe
t
(see
the Appendix). These two properties together with the fact that there are exactly two
positive inﬂation equilibria when u
t−1
> 0 guarantee that (16) cuts the 45 degree line
twice, ﬁrst from above and then from below. This is depicted in Figure 1, where the low
and high inﬂation equilibria are denoted by π
−
and π
+
, respectively.
π te
πt
π te= π te(π t)
πt= π t(π te)
π+
π-
Figure 1: Determination of rational expectations equilibria
The multiplicity of equilibria in the model arises from unemployment persistence,
which makes the best response function of the central bank nonlinear in inﬂationary
expectations. In the standard Barro-Gordon model real persistence is absent and the
reaction function of the central bank is linear in inﬂationary expectations with a slope
12
Lockwood and Philippopoulos (1994) point out that a somewhat weaker condition than a ﬁnite
horizon suﬃces to guarantee the uniqueness of equilibrium in the model. Namely, they show that if the
inﬂation variability is eliminated with probability one at some known time period in the future, the high
inﬂation equilibrium disappears.
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smaller than unity (see e.g. Sargent (1999)). Therefore, in that case the equilibrium
is unique. Moreover, both inﬂation equilibria in the presence of real persistence yield a
higher inﬂation than in the standard case.13 This is quite intuitive, since with persistence
the incentive to inﬂate the economy becomes stronger due to the fact that the state-
dependent inﬂation bias in the future can be reduced by choosing a higher inﬂation
today.
4 Expectational Stability of the Equilibria
Rational expectations from the private sector’s point of view mean that the agents are
endowed with perfect knowledge about the structure of the economy including e.g. the
preferences of the central bank and the monetary transmission mechanism. Obviously,
this is a very strict requirement which is relaxed in a speciﬁc manner in what follows. In
particular, the agents are assumed to be boundedly rational in a sense that they don’t
know the inﬂation process exactly, but they try to learn it by estimating the process
with observed macroeconomic data at each time period. The setting is non-standard,
because the system is self-referential in a sense that future data points are aﬀected by the
estimates produced today. Analyzing the dynamics of such a system calls for a special
technique called stochastic approximation, which is discussed in the next section.
The agents apply the standard least-squares estimation procedure, in which the para-
meters to be estimated are assumed to be constants over time. However, since the agents
are updating their estimates, the true coeﬃcient governing the inﬂation process is actu-
ally changing over time. Their model is thereby dynamically misspeciﬁed, but if learning
converges the misspeciﬁcation problem disappears. Throughout the analysis it is assumed
that the estimated model is of the same form as the rational expectations equilibria in
(17), that is, inﬂation is assumed to be a constant times last period’s unemployment rate
(plus some noise in the next section).14
This section uses the methodology of Evans and Honkapohja (2001, Ch. 2) to study
the learnability of the rational expectations equilibria. The criterion used in the analysis
is called expectational stability, or E-stability for short. An equilibrium is said to be stable
under learning if it fulﬁlls the E-stability condition. Next section demonstrates that the
local convergence of real-time recursive least-squares learning in this model is governed
13
See Lockwood and Philippopoulos (1994) for an illustration of this point.
14
In the next section a control error is added for technical reasons to the inﬂation process. Obviously,
the stochastic component could have been introduced into the model already in section 2 without any
changes in the main results.
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by the very same E-stability condition.15 The E-stability approach is very useful, since
the E-stability of an equilibrium is in most cases technically much easier to establish than
least-squares learnability.
The private sector has a perceived law of motion (PLM) of the same form as (17)
π
t
= au
t−1
, (19)
but it doesn’t know the correct value of the coeﬃcient in front of u
t−1
. The parameter
a is the private sector’s perception of the coeﬃcient. The forecast function used to form
expectations is obtained from the PLM
πe
t
= au
t−1
. (20)
Combining (20) with the best response function of the central bank (16) and reorganizing
gives the actual law of motion (ALM) the economy follows when the private sector has
the PLM described above
π
t
=
− (1− ω (a)) +
√
(1− ω (a))2 + 4λω (a)
2 (1− λ) δ (ρ+ a)
u
t−1
, (21)
where ω (a) = (1− λ) δ (ρ + a)2. Now, the mapping from the PLM to the ALM takes the
form
T (a) =
− (1− ω (a)) +
√
(1− ω (a))2 + 4λω (a)
2 (1− λ) δ (ρ + a)
. (22)
Expectational stability is determined by the following diﬀerential equation
da
dτ
= T (a)− a, (23)
where τ denotes virtual time. The ﬁxed points of (23) give the rational expectations
equilibria presented in (17). An equilibrium a is said to be E-stable if the ﬁxed point
of the diﬀerential equation (23) is locally asymptotically stable at that point. Thus the
E-stability condition is
T ′ (a) < 1. (24)
For the E-stability analysis it is possible to utilize previously derived results concerning
the behavior of the best response function of the central bank (16). The expression (22)
15
This is a standard result in the literature.
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is just a special case of (16) , where πe
t
is replaced by a and u
t−1
is set to unity. Hence, it
is immediately clear from Figure 1 that the slope coeﬃcient T ′ (a) is smaller than one at
the low inﬂation equilibrium, a
−
, and greater than one at the high inﬂation equilibrium,
a
+
. The result of the analysis can be summarized as
T ′ (a
−
) < 1⇒ a
−
is E-stable, (25)
T ′ (a
+
) > 1⇒ a
+
is E-unstable. (26)
The low inﬂation equilibrium with intuitive comparative statics properties is always E-
stable, whereas the high inﬂation equilibrium is never E-stable.
5 Real-Time Adaptive Learning
The purpose of this section is to show that under real-time learning, where the private
sector updates the coeﬃcient estimate by running recursive least-squares on actual data,
the local convergence to the rational expectations equilibrium is governed by the very
same E-stability condition derived in the previous section. The mathematical method
which is used in analyzing the convergence of least-squares learning is called the theory
of stochastic recursive algorithms (SRA) or stochastic approximation (see Evans and
Honkapohja (2001, Ch. 6)).
The basic technique of applying the SRA approach in adaptive learning is presented
in Evans and Honkapohja (2001, Ch. 2) and here it is adapted for this particular model.
Following Sargent (1999), a disturbance term representing the central bank’s imperfect
control of inﬂation is added to the bank’s best response function (16). The reason for do-
ing that is mainly technical, since then it is guaranteed that the stochastic approximation
tools can be applied. The bank’s reaction function becomes
π
t
=
−
(
u2
t−1
− ϕ (πe
t
)
)
+
√(
u2
t−1
− ϕ (πe
t
)
)
2
+ 4λϕ (πe
t
) u2
t−1
2 (1− λ) δ (ρu
t−1
+ πe
t
)
+ η
t
, (27)
where ϕ (πe
t
) = (1− λ) δ (ρu
t−1
+ πe
t
)2 and η
t
is an independent and identically distributed
random term with zero mean.
Assuming rational expectations in this stochastic setup would mean that πe
t
= E
t−1
π
t
,
where E
t−1
π
t
is obtained from (27) , keeping in mind that E
t−1
η
t
= 0. Solving πe
t
from
this expression gives exactly the same functional form as in (17). The inﬂation process
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under rational expectations can be written as
π
t
= πe
t
+ η
t
, (28)
and hence the rational expectations equilibria are of the same form as (17), but augmented
with the control error η
t
.
Now, the private sector knows the form of the rational expectations equilibria and
updates the coeﬃcient estimate each period after a new data point is observed. The
PLM is thus time dependent
π
t
= a
t−1
u
t−1
+ η
t
, (29)
where a
t−1
is the coeﬃcient estimate obtained at time period t− 1,which is used to form
inﬂationary expectations for time period t
πe
t
= a
t−1
u
t−1
. (30)
The estimation problem can be written in recursive least-squares (RLS) form
a
t
= a
t−1
+ t−1R−1
t
u
t−1
(π
t
− a
t−1
u
t−1
) , (31)
R
t
= R
t−1
+ t−1
(
u2
t−1
−R
t−1
)
, (32)
where R
t
is the moment matrix for the regressors, which in this simple setup without an
intercept and with only one regressor is actually a scalar R
t
= t−1
∑
t
i=1
u2
i−1
. The reason
for including the stochastic control error η
t
to inﬂation can be seen from (31). Without
η
t
the model would be deterministic, and u
t−1
would then approach the equilibrium level
of zero asymptotically. But then R
t
would be zero at the equilibrium and the estimation
problem wouldn’t be well deﬁned, since R−1
t
enters (31). By introducing a stochastic
element into the model, it is guaranteed that R
t
is non-zero at the equilibrium.
The ALM determining π
t
is now generated by the perceptions prevailing at time
period t− 1
π
t
=
− (1− ω (a
t−1
)) +
√
(1− ω (a
t−1
))2 + 4λω (a
t−1
)
2 (1− λ) δ (ρ + a
t−1
)
+ η
t
= T (a
t−1
) u
t−1
+ η
t
. (33)
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Inserting (33) into (31) yields a stochastic recursive system
a
t
= a
t−1
+ t−1R−1
t
u
t−1
((T (a
t−1
)− a
t−1
)u
t−1
+ η
t
) , (34)
R
t
= R
t−1
+ t−1
(
u2
t−1
−R
t−1
)
. (35)
Before it is possible to study the convergence of this system by applying results from the
stochastic approximation literature, a minor modiﬁcation is needed. On the right-hand
side of (34) there exists R
t
, but the SRA approach allows only lagged values of a
t
and
R
t
to appear. This problem is solved by deﬁning a new variable S
t−1
= R
t
. The system
(34)-(35) becomes
a
t
= a
t−1
+ t−1S−1
t−1
u
t−1
((T (a
t−1
)− a
t−1
)u
t−1
+ η
t
) , (36)
S
t
= S
t−1
+ t−1
(
t
t+ 1
)(
u2
t
− S
t−1
)
, (37)
which is now in the standard SRA form (see Evans and Honkapohja (2001, Ch. 2)
θ
t
= θ
t−1
+ γ
t
Q (t, θ
t−1
, X
t
) , (38)
with
θ
t
=
(
a
t
S
t
)
, X
t
=


u
t
u
t−1
η
t

 , γ
t
= t−1 and (39)
Q (t, θ
t−1
, X
t
) =
(
S−1
t−1
u
t−1
((T (a
t−1
)− a
t−1
)u
t−1
+ η
t
)(
t
t+1
)
(u2
t
− S
t−1
)
)
.
The stochastic approximation approach associates an ordinary diﬀerential equation
(ODE) with the SRA,
dθ
dτ
= h (θ (τ )) , (40)
where h (θ) is obtained as
h (θ) = lim
t→∞
EQ (t, θ,X
t
) . (41)
EQ (t, θ,X
t
) denotes the expectation of Q (·) for ﬁxed θ. The stochastic approximation
results show that the ODE (40) approximates the behavior of the SRA (38) well with
large t. Importantly, the limit points of the SRA correspond to locally stable equilibria
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of the ODE.16
Adapted for the problem at hand, (41) becomes
h
a
(a, S) = lim
t→∞
ES−1u
t−1
((T (a)− a)u
t−1
+ η
t
) , (42)
h
S
(a, S) = lim
t→∞
(
t
t+ 1
)
E
(
u2
t
− S
)
, (43)
where a and S are ﬁxed. Writing lim
t→∞
Eu2
t
≡ M and noting that lim
t→∞
(
t
t+1
)
= 1
the second equation (43) becomes
h
S
(a, S) = M − S. (44)
The ﬁrst equation (42) can be rewritten by noting that E (u
t−1
η
t
) = 0 and
lim
t→∞
Eu2
t−1
= lim
t→∞
Eu2
t
≡M , which gives
h
a
(a, S) = S−1M (T (a)− a) . (45)
Finally, the associated ODE is then
da
dτ
= S−1M (T (a)− a) , (46)
dS
dτ
= M − S. (47)
The second equation of the recursive system is globally stable so that S approaches M
from any starting point. The stability of the system is thereby governed by the ﬁrst
diﬀerential equation, which can be further simpliﬁed by noting that S−1M approaches
unity
da
dτ
= T (a)− a. (48)
But, this is exactly the same stability condition as the E-stability condition derived
in the previous section. Thus E-stability (E-instability) of an equilibrium implies also
(in)stability under least-squares learning.
16
The technical assumptions required for the convergence conditions to hold include regularity assump-
tions on Q, conditions on the rate at which γ
t
→ 0 and assumptions on the properties of the stochastic
process followed by X
t
(see Honkapohja and Evans (2001, Ch. 6) for the precise assumptions).
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6 Concluding Remarks
This essay has demonstrated that it is possible to use adaptive learning approach as an
equilibrium selection device in a dynamic model of monetary policy by Lockwood and
Philippopoulos (1994). When the private sector has imperfect information about the way
economy works and try to learn the rational expectations equilibrium, it turns out that
the economy always arrives at the low inﬂation equilibrium of the model. In the earlier
literature the high inﬂation equilibrium was ignored by referring to counter-intuitive
comparative statics properties or to the fact that it appeared only in an inﬁnite horizon
version of the model. These arguments are obviously quite weak in the theoretical sense.
The contribution of this essay is that it perhaps provides a more elegant way based on
adaptive learning to exclude the high inﬂation equilibrium from the analysis.
Obviously, the analysis could be extended to many diﬀerent directions. It would
be interesting to study learning with misspeciﬁcation in this framework. What would
happen if some or all agents try to learn a wrong model? For example, some agents could
misinterpret the joint existence of inﬂation and unemployment as an (average) inﬂation
bias, which would result from an over-ambitious long-run unemployment target of the
central bank. Would the model still converge to some restricted perceptions equilibrium
(see Evans and Honkapohja (2001, Ch. 3)), which would possibly be diﬀerent from the
rational expectations equilibria? Another extension would be to study the robustness
of the learnability results when there exists a stabilization role for monetary policy. A
potentially challenging extension is related to the solution technique of the dynamic
problem adopted in the essay. The dependence of β on the optimal choice of inﬂation
by the central bank is ignored (see equation (14)). If the central bank would take into
account this interdependence, the dynamic problem would obviously become a lot harder
to solve. The issues raised in this section call for a closer examination, but are left for
future research.
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A Appendix
A.1 Comparative Statics Properties of the Rational Expecta-
tions Equilibria
The rational expectations equilibria are given by (17). Setting u
t−1
= 1 and dropping
time indices yields
π =
1
2δρ
((
1− δρ2
)
±
√
(1− δρ2)2 − 4λ (1− λ)−1 δρ2
)
.
In what follows the low and high inﬂation equilibria are denoted by π
−
and π
+
, respec-
tively.
Now, it is easy to establish the following results concerning the weight of unemploy-
ment stabilization in the central bank loss function
∂π
−
∂λ
= −
1
4δρ
√(
(1− δρ2)2 − 4 λ
1−λ
δρ2
)
(
−
4
1− λ
δρ2 − 4
λ
(1− λ)2
δρ2
)
> 0,
∂π
+
∂λ
=
1
4δρ
√(
(1− δρ2)2 − 4 λ
1−λ
δρ2
)
(
−
4
1− λ
δρ2 − 4
λ
(1− λ)2
δρ2
)
< 0,
where π
−
behaves intuitively and π
+
counter-intuitively with respect to changes in λ.
Next, the comparative statics with respect to ρ are derived
∂π
−
∂ρ
= −
1
2
(
1 + δρ2
) −1 + δρ2 +
√(
λ−1+2λδρ
2
+2δρ
2
+δ
2
ρ
4
λ−δ
2
ρ
4
λ−1
)
√(
λ−1+2λδρ
2
+2δρ
2
+δ
2
ρ
4
λ−δ
2
ρ
4
λ−1
)
δρ2
> 0,
∂π
+
∂ρ
=
1
2
(
1 + δρ2
) −1 + δρ2 −
√(
λ−1+2λδρ
2
+2δρ
2
+δ
2
ρ
4
λ−δ
2
ρ
4
λ−1
)
√(
λ−1+2λδρ
2
+2δρ
2
+δ
2
ρ
4
λ−δ
2
ρ
4
λ−1
)
δρ2
< 0.
It is clear that ∂π+
∂ρ
is negative, since −1 + δρ2 < 0. In order to establish that ∂π−
∂ρ
> 0
one needs to investigate the sign of the numerator of that expression
−1 + δρ2 +
√(
λ− 1 + 2λδρ2 + 2δρ2 + δ2ρ4λ− δ2ρ4
λ− 1
)
,
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where the ﬁrst part −1+δρ2 negative. Now, if the ﬁrst term squared, that is, (−1 + δρ2)
2
is bigger than the expression inside the square root, it follows that the numerator is
negative and ∂π−
∂ρ
> 0
(
−1 + δρ2
)
2
−
(
λ− 1 + 2λδρ2 + 2δρ2 + δ2ρ4λ− δ2ρ4
λ− 1
)
= 4
λ
1− λ
δρ2 > 0,
which veriﬁes that the numerator is negative and ∂π−
∂ρ
> 0. π
−
behaves intuitively and
π
+
counter-intuitively with respect to changes in ρ.
The comparative statics with respect to δ are as follows
∂π
−
∂δ
=
1
2
(λδρ2 + λ− 1 + δρ2) + (1− λ)
√(
λ−1+2λδρ
2
+2δρ
2
+δ
2
ρ
4
λ−δ
2
ρ
4
λ−1
)
δ2ρ
√(
λ−1+2λδρ
2
+2δρ
2
+δ
2
ρ
4
λ−δ
2
ρ
4
λ−1
)
(λ− 1)
> 0,
∂π
+
∂δ
= −
1
2
(λδρ2 + λ− 1 + δρ2)− (1− λ)
√(
λ−1+2λδρ
2
+2δρ
2
+δ
2
ρ
4
λ−δ
2
ρ
4
λ−1
)
δ2ρ
√(
λ−1+2λδρ
2
+2δρ
2
+δ
2
ρ
4
λ−δ
2
ρ
4
λ−1
)
(λ− 1)
< 0.
First, it is useful to examine the expression inside the square root. For real solu-
tions to exist, it must be non-negative. Thus the following inequality need to hold
(note that the denominator λ− 1 < 0)
λ− 1 + 2λδρ2 + 2δρ2 + δ2ρ4λ− δ2ρ4 < 0.
This restriction limits the term λδρ2+λ−1+δρ2 in the numerators of the both derivatives(
∂π
−
∂δ
and ∂π+
∂δ
)
to negative values. This can be seen by subtracting the term λδρ2 + λ−
1 + δρ2 from the restriction above, that is λ − 1 + 2λδρ2 + 2δρ2 + δ2ρ4λ − δ2ρ4, which
yields
λ− 1 + 2λδρ2 + 2δρ2 + δ2ρ4λ− δ2ρ4 −
(
λδρ2 + λ− 1 + δρ2
)
= δρ2
(
λ− ρ2δ + ρ2λδ + 1
)
> 0.
Subtracting a positive term from a negative term equals always something negative, but
here the outcome is positive, which implies that the term λδρ2 + λ− 1 + δρ2 is negative
provided that the restriction derived above holds. Now, it is clear that ∂π+
∂δ
< 0, since
the numerator is negative. To prove that ∂π−
∂δ
> 0 one must study the numerator of that
expression more closely. The ﬁrst term squared is bigger than the term inside the square
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root (with 1− λ moved inside)
(
λδρ2 + λ− 1 + δρ2
)
2
− (λ− 1)2
(
λ− 1 + 2λδρ2 + 2δρ2 + δ2ρ4λ− δ2ρ4
λ− 1
)
= 4δ2λρ4 > 0,
which directly implicates that the numerator is negative, and hence ∂π−
∂δ
> 0. Again, π
−
behaves intuitively and π
+
counter-intuitively.
A.2 Finite Horizon Case
Assuming that there exists a terminal time period T , the central bank’s optimizing prob-
lem needs to be modiﬁed so that future losses equal zero at T . This implies a terminal
condition β
T
= 0. The Riccati equation with time subscripts can be derived from (8)-
(12) by letting β be time dependent. Then on the left-hand side of (8) β is replaced by
β
t−1
, whereas on the right-hand side β is replaced by β
t
. This means that in (10)-(12) β
becomes β
t
. Now, inserting (12) with β
t
into (8) yields a dynamic Riccati equation
β
t−1
= (λ+ δβ
t
) ρ2 + (λ+ δβ
t
)2 ρ2 (1− λ)−1 = f (β
t
) .
The function f (β
t
) is an increasing and convex function in the relevant range, that is
β
t
∈ [0,∞)
f ′ (β
t
) = δρ2 + 2 (λ+ δβ
t
)
ρ2
1− λ
δ > 0, when β
t
∈ [0,∞) ,
f ′′ (β
t
) = 2δ2
ρ2
1− λ
> 0.
By drawing a phase diagram (Figure 2) it is possible to investigate the backward iterations
from the terminal condition β
T
= 0.
The phase diagram makes evident that assuming a ﬁnite horizon guarantees a unique
equilibrium, as iterating backwards from T makes β
t
asymptotically converge to the lower
equilibrium value of β
−
, which is associated with the low inﬂation equilibrium. However,
it is noteworthy, that the equilibrium is not exactly the low inﬂation equilibrium of the
inﬁnite horizon model, since β
t
< β
−
with all T < ∞. The two equilibria coincide only
when T → ∞, but then also the high inﬂation equilibrium emerges. The more further
away in the future T is, the closer the two equilibria are. In other words, since inﬂation
is positively related to β, inﬂation approaches gradually zero as t approaches T .
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βt
βt-1
f(βt)
β-
Figure 2: Determination of equilibrium in a ﬁnite horizon case
A.3 Behavior of equation (16)
Setting πe
t
= 0 in (16) yields
π
t
(0) =
−
(
u2
t−1
− ϕ (0)
)
+
√(
u2
t−1
− ϕ (0)
)
2
+ 4λϕ (0) u2
t−1
2 (1− λ) δρu
t−1
=
− (1− (1− λ) δρ2) +
√
(1− (1− λ) δρ2)2 + 4 (1− λ)λδρ2
2 (1− λ) δρ
u
t−1
> 0.
Taking the derivative of (16) with respect to πe
t
and collecting terms gives
π′
t
(πe
t
) =
1
2
(
u2
t−1
+ ϕ (πe
t
)
) (u
t−1
2 − ϕ (πe
t
)) +
√(
u2
t−1
− ϕ (πe
t
)
)
2
+ 4λϕ (πe
t
)
ϕ (πe
t
)
√(
u2
t−1
− ϕ (πe
t
)
)
2
+ 4λϕ (πe
t
)
> 0.
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